B737-300 crew had an altitude overshoot when flying the kepec 1 RNAV arrival into las.

Attributes
ACN	632133
Time
Date	200409
Day	Tue
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	intersection : kepec
State Reference	NV
Altitude	msl bound lower : 11500 msl bound upper : 12000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Weather Elements	other
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : l30.tracon
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B737-300
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Route In Use	arrival star : kepec
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Controlling Facilities	tracon : l30.tracon
Make Model Name	Pilatus Undifferentiated
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 248 flight time total : 9000 flight time type : 4700
ASRS Report	632133
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 23677 flight time type : 17639
ASRS Report	632067
Events
Anomaly	altitude deviation : excursion from assigned altitude altitude deviation : overshoot altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met conflict : airborne critical inflight encounter : weather inflight encounter other non adherence : company policies non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure non adherence : required legal separation non adherence : clearance
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment : tcas other controllera other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	controller : issued advisory flight crew : took evasive action flight crew : became reoriented flight crew : returned to assigned altitude other
Consequence	other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance Company Weather
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative:

We were on the 5TH leg of 5 for the day on flight to las. We were on the kepec 1 arrival into las when we were cleared to descend via the kepec arrival. We made the altitude and speed restr at clarr (13000 ft and 250 KTS) and started the next segment. The captain (PF) said the next restr is kepec at 10000 ft and set 10000 ft in the window. I (pilot monitoring) took a quick look at my arrival plate at kepec and thought I saw 10000 ft and confirmed 10000 ft. My plate is in good shape so there is no reason I shouldn't have seen the 12000 ft restr. I should add at this point that we were flying in virga with light chop. We had discussed the virga and the possibility of a bumpy ride through it. The concern about the ride had us a bit distraction as this event occurred. While we were still at 13000 ft, we received a traffic callout for traffic at 1-2 O'clock position. We began the descent and got another callout for traffic at 2 O'clock position (still several mi). I began looking for the traffic. About the same time I found the traffic (a couple of mi away and below us), we got an RA saying climb. The captain initiated an immediate climb and approach said we were only cleared to 12000 ft on the arrival. I told approach we had the traffic in sight and we were in a climb. The captain leveled at 12000 ft, we both checked our plates again, realizing we had made a mistake. The rest of the arrival and landing was uneventful. The bottom line is we both looked at the ar plate, checking the restrs in the FMC. The captain set 10000 ft in the window and I looked at my arrival plate (albeit quickly) and saw what I thought was 10000 ft. Clearly, as pilot monitoring, I should have looked more carefully. This seems to be a case of seeing what we expected to see, not what was really there. My only recommendation is: no matter what else is going on outside of the cockpit, it is important to take an extra couple of seconds to doublechk restrs and numbers set in the window. My quick glance at the chart was inadequate. As pilot monitoring or PF in the future, I will absolutely take the extra time as I should. Supplemental information from acn 632067: causes: I misread the arrival plate. I had previously reviewed the arrival and compared it to the altitude restrs in the FMC and was thus aware of the restrs on the arrival. We were in virga with its accompanying turbulence and were looking for lower to escape it. When I looked at the arrival plate for the next restr, I saw 10000 ft instead of 12000 ft! Recommendations: when operating in a demanding environment such as las with its myriad arrs and departures, extra vigilance is required. We have a history there of problems with correct course and altitude compliance. Everyone knows this. Due to the high traffic volume, the complexity of the stars, and unceasing communication chatter, our cognitive antennae needs to go on high alert. Check and doublechk waypoints, courses, and altitudes. Do not be complacent!

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW HAD AN ALT OVERSHOOT WHEN FLYING THE KEPEC 1 RNAV ARR INTO LAS.

Narrative: WE WERE ON THE 5TH LEG OF 5 FOR THE DAY ON FLT TO LAS. WE WERE ON THE KEPEC 1 ARR INTO LAS WHEN WE WERE CLRED TO DSND VIA THE KEPEC ARR. WE MADE THE ALT AND SPD RESTR AT CLARR (13000 FT AND 250 KTS) AND STARTED THE NEXT SEGMENT. THE CAPT (PF) SAID THE NEXT RESTR IS KEPEC AT 10000 FT AND SET 10000 FT IN THE WINDOW. I (PLT MONITORING) TOOK A QUICK LOOK AT MY ARR PLATE AT KEPEC AND THOUGHT I SAW 10000 FT AND CONFIRMED 10000 FT. MY PLATE IS IN GOOD SHAPE SO THERE IS NO REASON I SHOULDN'T HAVE SEEN THE 12000 FT RESTR. I SHOULD ADD AT THIS POINT THAT WE WERE FLYING IN VIRGA WITH LIGHT CHOP. WE HAD DISCUSSED THE VIRGA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A BUMPY RIDE THROUGH IT. THE CONCERN ABOUT THE RIDE HAD US A BIT DISTR AS THIS EVENT OCCURRED. WHILE WE WERE STILL AT 13000 FT, WE RECEIVED A TFC CALLOUT FOR TFC AT 1-2 O'CLOCK POS. WE BEGAN THE DSCNT AND GOT ANOTHER CALLOUT FOR TFC AT 2 O'CLOCK POS (STILL SEVERAL MI). I BEGAN LOOKING FOR THE TFC. ABOUT THE SAME TIME I FOUND THE TFC (A COUPLE OF MI AWAY AND BELOW US), WE GOT AN RA SAYING CLB. THE CAPT INITIATED AN IMMEDIATE CLB AND APCH SAID WE WERE ONLY CLRED TO 12000 FT ON THE ARR. I TOLD APCH WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT AND WE WERE IN A CLB. THE CAPT LEVELED AT 12000 FT, WE BOTH CHKED OUR PLATES AGAIN, REALIZING WE HAD MADE A MISTAKE. THE REST OF THE ARR AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE BOTTOM LINE IS WE BOTH LOOKED AT THE AR PLATE, CHKING THE RESTRS IN THE FMC. THE CAPT SET 10000 FT IN THE WINDOW AND I LOOKED AT MY ARR PLATE (ALBEIT QUICKLY) AND SAW WHAT I THOUGHT WAS 10000 FT. CLRLY, AS PLT MONITORING, I SHOULD HAVE LOOKED MORE CAREFULLY. THIS SEEMS TO BE A CASE OF SEEING WHAT WE EXPECTED TO SEE, NOT WHAT WAS REALLY THERE. MY ONLY RECOMMENDATION IS: NO MATTER WHAT ELSE IS GOING ON OUTSIDE OF THE COCKPIT, IT IS IMPORTANT TO TAKE AN EXTRA COUPLE OF SECONDS TO DOUBLECHK RESTRS AND NUMBERS SET IN THE WINDOW. MY QUICK GLANCE AT THE CHART WAS INADEQUATE. AS PLT MONITORING OR PF IN THE FUTURE, I WILL ABSOLUTELY TAKE THE EXTRA TIME AS I SHOULD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 632067: CAUSES: I MISREAD THE ARR PLATE. I HAD PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED THE ARR AND COMPARED IT TO THE ALT RESTRS IN THE FMC AND WAS THUS AWARE OF THE RESTRS ON THE ARR. WE WERE IN VIRGA WITH ITS ACCOMPANYING TURB AND WERE LOOKING FOR LOWER TO ESCAPE IT. WHEN I LOOKED AT THE ARR PLATE FOR THE NEXT RESTR, I SAW 10000 FT INSTEAD OF 12000 FT! RECOMMENDATIONS: WHEN OPERATING IN A DEMANDING ENVIRONMENT SUCH AS LAS WITH ITS MYRIAD ARRS AND DEPS, EXTRA VIGILANCE IS REQUIRED. WE HAVE A HISTORY THERE OF PROBS WITH CORRECT COURSE AND ALT COMPLIANCE. EVERYONE KNOWS THIS. DUE TO THE HIGH TFC VOLUME, THE COMPLEXITY OF THE STARS, AND UNCEASING COM CHATTER, OUR COGNITIVE ANTENNAE NEEDS TO GO ON HIGH ALERT. CHK AND DOUBLECHK WAYPOINTS, COURSES, AND ALTS. DO NOT BE COMPLACENT!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.