37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 632788 |
Time | |
Date | 200409 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lga.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 13000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : n90.tracon tower : lga.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach descent : intermediate altitude ground : parked ground : taxi landing : roll |
Route In Use | arrival star : korry |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 632788 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : overrode automation other |
Consequence | other Other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
After departure and upon bleed xfer, we received fumes in the cockpit. This would be that odor that you frequently refer to as oil fumes but I have always said smells chemical. The first officer was the PF. I called the flight attendant and she said that she did not detect any odors in the cabin. After much troubleshooting, I determined that the fumes were coming from the right pack. The decision was made to continue to lga single pack as we believed the problem to be isolated. I advised the flight attendant of our intention and requested that she let us know right away if anything changed in the cabin. Approximately 1/2 hour before landing, I walked through the cabin and did not detect any odor. At some point below FL180 but above 13000 ft and cleared for the korry 3 arrival into lga, we began to get the odor in the cockpit again. It was strong this time. I consulted with the flight attendant who reported that she still did not notice any odor in the cabin. My efforts to isolate the problem continued until we were inside the FAF for ILS 4, at which point I closed both bleeds. The odor appeared to dissipate and we landed safely. My first officer and I estimate that the entire event lasted 10 mins or less. Inasmuch as the flight attendant continued to report that she did not notice any odor in the cabin, and we did not feel that we had been affected by the fumes, I elected not to have the paramedics meet the plane as I believed that this event, like so many mechanical issues in the past, was non threatening. Shortly after landing, and after our 8 passenger had deplaned, my first officer and I did experience side effects from the fumes, at which time the paramedics were called and oxygen was administered. The paramedics expressed concern over our hypoxia symptoms: blue fingers, difficulty breathing, high blood pressure, nausea, and dizziness. They insisted that we be taken to the hospital and examined by the doctors who would also do the necessary blood tests. Our paramedics believed that we would have 'blood gases' test done at the hospital, however, to my knowledge, this specific test was not done in lga. All the medical professionals have been told that this was an exposure to fumes from oil for about 10 mins. In truth, I have no idea what fumes we were exposed to, nor do I know for sure that the single pack operation truly isolated the source and that the exposure was only for the last 10 mins. For this reason I am not sure if the first officer was suffering from exposure received during the flight or if her exposure came later when she went to retrieve our bags from the plane before we went to the hospital. As a crew, I do not see what we could have done to prevent this event from occurring. I do know that simple carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide detectors in the cockpit would go a long way to helping crews detect any odorless fumes long before the exposure was overwhelming. If the sulfur dioxide in oil is the only reason that we could ever detect the fumes at all and they only become known in strong or heavy volume, then we need a way to determine if we are operating our aircraft safely.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CARJ FLT CREW EXPERIENCES POSTFLT SYMPTOMS OF HYPOXIA AFTER EXPOSURE TO FUMES POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE AIR CONDITIONING AND PRESSURIZATION SYS.
Narrative: AFTER DEP AND UPON BLEED XFER, WE RECEIVED FUMES IN THE COCKPIT. THIS WOULD BE THAT ODOR THAT YOU FREQUENTLY REFER TO AS OIL FUMES BUT I HAVE ALWAYS SAID SMELLS CHEMICAL. THE FO WAS THE PF. I CALLED THE FLT ATTENDANT AND SHE SAID THAT SHE DID NOT DETECT ANY ODORS IN THE CABIN. AFTER MUCH TROUBLESHOOTING, I DETERMINED THAT THE FUMES WERE COMING FROM THE R PACK. THE DECISION WAS MADE TO CONTINUE TO LGA SINGLE PACK AS WE BELIEVED THE PROB TO BE ISOLATED. I ADVISED THE FLT ATTENDANT OF OUR INTENTION AND REQUESTED THAT SHE LET US KNOW RIGHT AWAY IF ANYTHING CHANGED IN THE CABIN. APPROX 1/2 HR BEFORE LNDG, I WALKED THROUGH THE CABIN AND DID NOT DETECT ANY ODOR. AT SOME POINT BELOW FL180 BUT ABOVE 13000 FT AND CLRED FOR THE KORRY 3 ARR INTO LGA, WE BEGAN TO GET THE ODOR IN THE COCKPIT AGAIN. IT WAS STRONG THIS TIME. I CONSULTED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANT WHO RPTED THAT SHE STILL DID NOT NOTICE ANY ODOR IN THE CABIN. MY EFFORTS TO ISOLATE THE PROB CONTINUED UNTIL WE WERE INSIDE THE FAF FOR ILS 4, AT WHICH POINT I CLOSED BOTH BLEEDS. THE ODOR APPEARED TO DISSIPATE AND WE LANDED SAFELY. MY FO AND I ESTIMATE THAT THE ENTIRE EVENT LASTED 10 MINS OR LESS. INASMUCH AS THE FLT ATTENDANT CONTINUED TO RPT THAT SHE DID NOT NOTICE ANY ODOR IN THE CABIN, AND WE DID NOT FEEL THAT WE HAD BEEN AFFECTED BY THE FUMES, I ELECTED NOT TO HAVE THE PARAMEDICS MEET THE PLANE AS I BELIEVED THAT THIS EVENT, LIKE SO MANY MECHANICAL ISSUES IN THE PAST, WAS NON THREATENING. SHORTLY AFTER LNDG, AND AFTER OUR 8 PAX HAD DEPLANED, MY FO AND I DID EXPERIENCE SIDE EFFECTS FROM THE FUMES, AT WHICH TIME THE PARAMEDICS WERE CALLED AND OXYGEN WAS ADMINISTERED. THE PARAMEDICS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER OUR HYPOXIA SYMPTOMS: BLUE FINGERS, DIFFICULTY BREATHING, HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE, NAUSEA, AND DIZZINESS. THEY INSISTED THAT WE BE TAKEN TO THE HOSPITAL AND EXAMINED BY THE DOCTORS WHO WOULD ALSO DO THE NECESSARY BLOOD TESTS. OUR PARAMEDICS BELIEVED THAT WE WOULD HAVE 'BLOOD GASES' TEST DONE AT THE HOSPITAL, HOWEVER, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, THIS SPECIFIC TEST WAS NOT DONE IN LGA. ALL THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THIS WAS AN EXPOSURE TO FUMES FROM OIL FOR ABOUT 10 MINS. IN TRUTH, I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT FUMES WE WERE EXPOSED TO, NOR DO I KNOW FOR SURE THAT THE SINGLE PACK OP TRULY ISOLATED THE SOURCE AND THAT THE EXPOSURE WAS ONLY FOR THE LAST 10 MINS. FOR THIS REASON I AM NOT SURE IF THE FO WAS SUFFERING FROM EXPOSURE RECEIVED DURING THE FLT OR IF HER EXPOSURE CAME LATER WHEN SHE WENT TO RETRIEVE OUR BAGS FROM THE PLANE BEFORE WE WENT TO THE HOSPITAL. AS A CREW, I DO NOT SEE WHAT WE COULD HAVE DONE TO PREVENT THIS EVENT FROM OCCURRING. I DO KNOW THAT SIMPLE CARBON MONOXIDE AND CARBON DIOXIDE DETECTORS IN THE COCKPIT WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO HELPING CREWS DETECT ANY ODORLESS FUMES LONG BEFORE THE EXPOSURE WAS OVERWHELMING. IF THE SULFUR DIOXIDE IN OIL IS THE ONLY REASON THAT WE COULD EVER DETECT THE FUMES AT ALL AND THEY ONLY BECOME KNOWN IN STRONG OR HVY VOLUME, THEN WE NEED A WAY TO DETERMINE IF WE ARE OPERATING OUR ACFT SAFELY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.