Narrative:

This was a long night including 3 missed approachs to destination airport before proceeding to the alternate. The time of day was early am. After refueling at the alternate, flight was continued to destination #2. On takeoff roll as we approached V1 speed my scan momentarily was on the center instrument gauges checking for stable readings. I was surprised at that time to hear the pilot monitoring call V1 and then rotate. I believe that because of the long night I did not immediately scan back to my own airspeed, but as a conditioned response I began my rotation. I then checked my airspeed and noticed that we had not achieved V2 (takeoff speed) and were in fact 10 KTS from that speed. The pilot monitoring had inadvertently set his airspeed bugs to the wrong speeds. In the debrief he stated that he felt a little rushed on this leg as it was the final leg of a long day. Upon arrival at destination airport it was observed on the postflt that the tailskid had contacted the runway due to the early rotation. Once I realized that I had started the rotation too early I simply lowered the nose which had not exceeded 10 degrees of pitch and accelerated to V2. The airspeed was recovered quickly and a normal takeoff was achieved with no further abnormalities. No one on the crew heard or felt anything that would have been indicative of a tailskid strike. The damage to the skid was minimal and the core was not crushed indicating that the skid was not impacted as much as it was dragged. The fix was quick and the aircraft was returned to service. I believe the factors contributing to this incident were: fatigue, sense of urgency as the flight had become time critical, and my failure to recognize my own airspeed indicator and not respond to the conditional words of 'V1 rotate.' I have adapted a new habit of checking both airspeed indicators just after the speeds are called aloud. Being tired is a human factor that we all must deal with. When things are beginning to pile up on you and are happening fast you must interject and slow down the pace. This is a hard, fast rule in aviation that most pilots know, but sometimes don't apply. That is until they receive their wakeup call.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727 STRUCK THE TAILSKID ON TKOF BECAUSE THE FO INCORRECTLY SET HIS AIRSPD BUGS THAT RESULTED IN A LOW SPD ROTATION.

Narrative: THIS WAS A LONG NIGHT INCLUDING 3 MISSED APCHS TO DEST ARPT BEFORE PROCEEDING TO THE ALTERNATE. THE TIME OF DAY WAS EARLY AM. AFTER REFUELING AT THE ALTERNATE, FLT WAS CONTINUED TO DEST #2. ON TKOF ROLL AS WE APCHED V1 SPD MY SCAN MOMENTARILY WAS ON THE CTR INST GAUGES CHKING FOR STABLE READINGS. I WAS SURPRISED AT THAT TIME TO HEAR THE PLT MONITORING CALL V1 AND THEN ROTATE. I BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE OF THE LONG NIGHT I DID NOT IMMEDIATELY SCAN BACK TO MY OWN AIRSPD, BUT AS A CONDITIONED RESPONSE I BEGAN MY ROTATION. I THEN CHKED MY AIRSPD AND NOTICED THAT WE HAD NOT ACHIEVED V2 (TKOF SPD) AND WERE IN FACT 10 KTS FROM THAT SPD. THE PLT MONITORING HAD INADVERTENTLY SET HIS AIRSPD BUGS TO THE WRONG SPDS. IN THE DEBRIEF HE STATED THAT HE FELT A LITTLE RUSHED ON THIS LEG AS IT WAS THE FINAL LEG OF A LONG DAY. UPON ARR AT DEST ARPT IT WAS OBSERVED ON THE POSTFLT THAT THE TAILSKID HAD CONTACTED THE RWY DUE TO THE EARLY ROTATION. ONCE I REALIZED THAT I HAD STARTED THE ROTATION TOO EARLY I SIMPLY LOWERED THE NOSE WHICH HAD NOT EXCEEDED 10 DEGS OF PITCH AND ACCELERATED TO V2. THE AIRSPD WAS RECOVERED QUICKLY AND A NORMAL TKOF WAS ACHIEVED WITH NO FURTHER ABNORMALITIES. NO ONE ON THE CREW HEARD OR FELT ANYTHING THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN INDICATIVE OF A TAILSKID STRIKE. THE DAMAGE TO THE SKID WAS MINIMAL AND THE CORE WAS NOT CRUSHED INDICATING THAT THE SKID WAS NOT IMPACTED AS MUCH AS IT WAS DRAGGED. THE FIX WAS QUICK AND THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC. I BELIEVE THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WERE: FATIGUE, SENSE OF URGENCY AS THE FLT HAD BECOME TIME CRITICAL, AND MY FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE MY OWN AIRSPD INDICATOR AND NOT RESPOND TO THE CONDITIONAL WORDS OF 'V1 ROTATE.' I HAVE ADAPTED A NEW HABIT OF CHKING BOTH AIRSPD INDICATORS JUST AFTER THE SPDS ARE CALLED ALOUD. BEING TIRED IS A HUMAN FACTOR THAT WE ALL MUST DEAL WITH. WHEN THINGS ARE BEGINNING TO PILE UP ON YOU AND ARE HAPPENING FAST YOU MUST INTERJECT AND SLOW DOWN THE PACE. THIS IS A HARD, FAST RULE IN AVIATION THAT MOST PLTS KNOW, BUT SOMETIMES DON'T APPLY. THAT IS UNTIL THEY RECEIVE THEIR WAKEUP CALL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.