Narrative:

While sitting at the gate in ZZZ, the first officer informed me that the aircraft refueler had asked one of the ground personnel to inform us that fuel was leaking out of the refueling manifold while she was refueling. We entered this problem into the maintenance log and contacted maintenance. A mechanic came out to inspect the problem and informed the first officer and me that he did, in fact, see an area where fuel had leaked during the refueling process. He stated that the amount of fuel that had leaked was not large and it was coming out very slowly. I asked what the allowable leakage was, if any. He did not know and went to research the situation. While we were waiting for the mechanic to return, I contacted maintenance center to see if I could get any information directly from them. Maintenance center informed me that there was absolutely no allowable fuel leakage. The mechanic came back with another mechanic who was senior to him. The second mechanic inspected the area, said there was no leak and signed off the maintenance log. With two mechanics giving me conflicting information, I decided the most prudent course of action was for the first officer, the two mechanics and I to inspect the area together, which we did. We noted an area around a fitting on the neck of the refueling manifold that showed evidence of a leak, which was confirmed by an area of the ramp directly below the fitting that was wet from the fuel leak. At this point, there was no longer any additional fuel leaking out of the fitting. The senior mechanic insisted there was never a fuel leak, while the first officer and I clearly saw evidence of a leak. The senior mechanic signed off the maintenance log, without having taken any corrective action, and departed, stating this type of thing was common on MD80's. I asked the other mechanic to call his supervisor and ask him to come to the aircraft. While waiting for the maintenance supervisor, I called maintenance center back. I relayed what had just transpired to them and asked for an opinion. The representative I spoke with stated, unequivocally, that the area we were discussing was not permitted any leakage. He stated, 'there is no leakage allowed at all, the area must be completely dry.' the maintenance supervisor arrived with the refueling supervisor. They told me that the refueler had only been on the job for a week and that this type of leak was common on MD80's. They further stated that if maintenance action were taken each time this type of leak was discovered, the MD80 fleet would never fly. Their implication was that if the individual who refueled the airplane was more experienced, she would have never reported the leak. I was still on the phone with maintenance center at this point and discussed this with the rep. The rep said something to the effect of, I don't know what to tell you captain, the maintenance manual says the area has to be dry. Clearly the area was not dry. I discussed the reps comment with the supervisor and what followed really shocked me. The supervisor said that he didn't care what the rep from maintenance center said. He stated that his senior technician, the man who signed off the maintenance log, had been doing this since 1964 and that if he didn't think it was safe, he wouldn't sign off the maintenance log. I reminded him about what the maintenance manual stated. He said that did not matter and if his technician signed it off it was okay to go. He reiterated that the MD80 fleet would never fly if this type of discrepancy was corrected every time it occurred. I informed the supervisor that based on the information I had, corrective action would have to be taken before we could depart with the aircraft. The supervisor said something to the effect of, I know how this works, you pilots carry things all the time if there is a problem and you want to get somewhere. Well if you are not going to take the aircraft, enter a write-up into the maintenance log saying that you are refusing the aircraft. I re-entered a discrepancy into the maintenance log noting the discovery of the leak and the information I received from maintenance center. At that point, the aircraft was taken out of service and we switched equipment. This entire situation shocked me. There were at least nine people who were aware of what transpired, the fueler, the fueler's supv, the ground person the fueler spoke with, the first officer, the three mechanics, the technician at maintenance center, and me. Regardless, the maintenance supervisor and his senior mechanic were blatantly ignoring the maintenance manual, taking it upon themselves to determine what was/is acceptable, in spite of what the book says. Further, the supervisor was attempting to persuade us to take an aircraft that we knew had a discrepancy, which required corrective action, without any corrective action taken. Considering the situation, I believe it to be extremely likely that this is not an isolated incident. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the display of aggression in this station by management and one technician was shocking in the way the fuel leak was handled. The reporter said trust was lost with this station and everything must be visibly checked. The reporter stated the reply from the as soon as possible report was an 'O' ring seal was replaced in the fueling manifold adjacent to the pressure fueling fitting. The reporter said the support of the maintenance controller was lacking to convince the maintenance supervisor to fix the leak.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FUEL LEAK WAS DISCOVERED ON AN MD80 THAT WAS PARKED AT THE GATE DURING REFUELING. FLT CREW REFUSED ACFT AND IT WAS TAKEN OUT OF SVC.

Narrative: WHILE SITTING AT THE GATE IN ZZZ, THE FO INFORMED ME THAT THE ACFT REFUELER HAD ASKED ONE OF THE GND PERSONNEL TO INFORM US THAT FUEL WAS LEAKING OUT OF THE REFUELING MANIFOLD WHILE SHE WAS REFUELING. WE ENTERED THIS PROB INTO THE MAINT LOG AND CONTACTED MAINT. A MECHANIC CAME OUT TO INSPECT THE PROB AND INFORMED THE FO AND ME THAT HE DID, IN FACT, SEE AN AREA WHERE FUEL HAD LEAKED DURING THE REFUELING PROCESS. HE STATED THAT THE AMOUNT OF FUEL THAT HAD LEAKED WAS NOT LARGE AND IT WAS COMING OUT VERY SLOWLY. I ASKED WHAT THE ALLOWABLE LEAKAGE WAS, IF ANY. HE DID NOT KNOW AND WENT TO RESEARCH THE SIT. WHILE WE WERE WAITING FOR THE MECHANIC TO RETURN, I CONTACTED MAINT CTR TO SEE IF I COULD GET ANY INFO DIRECTLY FROM THEM. MAINT CTR INFORMED ME THAT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO ALLOWABLE FUEL LEAKAGE. THE MECHANIC CAME BACK WITH ANOTHER MECHANIC WHO WAS SENIOR TO HIM. THE SECOND MECHANIC INSPECTED THE AREA, SAID THERE WAS NO LEAK AND SIGNED OFF THE MAINT LOG. WITH TWO MECHANICS GIVING ME CONFLICTING INFO, I DECIDED THE MOST PRUDENT COURSE OF ACTION WAS FOR THE FO, THE TWO MECHANICS AND I TO INSPECT THE AREA TOGETHER, WHICH WE DID. WE NOTED AN AREA AROUND A FITTING ON THE NECK OF THE REFUELING MANIFOLD THAT SHOWED EVIDENCE OF A LEAK, WHICH WAS CONFIRMED BY AN AREA OF THE RAMP DIRECTLY BELOW THE FITTING THAT WAS WET FROM THE FUEL LEAK. AT THIS POINT, THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY ADDITIONAL FUEL LEAKING OUT OF THE FITTING. THE SENIOR MECHANIC INSISTED THERE WAS NEVER A FUEL LEAK, WHILE THE FO AND I CLEARLY SAW EVIDENCE OF A LEAK. THE SENIOR MECHANIC SIGNED OFF THE MAINT LOG, WITHOUT HAVING TAKEN ANY CORRECTIVE ACTION, AND DEPARTED, STATING THIS TYPE OF THING WAS COMMON ON MD80'S. I ASKED THE OTHER MECHANIC TO CALL HIS SUPVR AND ASK HIM TO COME TO THE ACFT. WHILE WAITING FOR THE MAINT SUPVR, I CALLED MAINT CTR BACK. I RELAYED WHAT HAD JUST TRANSPIRED TO THEM AND ASKED FOR AN OPINION. THE REPRESENTATIVE I SPOKE WITH STATED, UNEQUIVOCALLY, THAT THE AREA WE WERE DISCUSSING WAS NOT PERMITTED ANY LEAKAGE. HE STATED, 'THERE IS NO LEAKAGE ALLOWED AT ALL, THE AREA MUST BE COMPLETELY DRY.' THE MAINT SUPVR ARRIVED WITH THE REFUELING SUPVR. THEY TOLD ME THAT THE REFUELER HAD ONLY BEEN ON THE JOB FOR A WEEK AND THAT THIS TYPE OF LEAK WAS COMMON ON MD80'S. THEY FURTHER STATED THAT IF MAINT ACTION WERE TAKEN EACH TIME THIS TYPE OF LEAK WAS DISCOVERED, THE MD80 FLEET WOULD NEVER FLY. THEIR IMPLICATION WAS THAT IF THE INDIVIDUAL WHO REFUELED THE AIRPLANE WAS MORE EXPERIENCED, SHE WOULD HAVE NEVER RPTED THE LEAK. I WAS STILL ON THE PHONE WITH MAINT CTR AT THIS POINT AND DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE REP. THE REP SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF, I DON'T KNOW WHAT TO TELL YOU CAPT, THE MAINT MANUAL SAYS THE AREA HAS TO BE DRY. CLEARLY THE AREA WAS NOT DRY. I DISCUSSED THE REPS COMMENT WITH THE SUPVR AND WHAT FOLLOWED REALLY SHOCKED ME. THE SUPVR SAID THAT HE DIDN'T CARE WHAT THE REP FROM MAINT CTR SAID. HE STATED THAT HIS SENIOR TECHNICIAN, THE MAN WHO SIGNED OFF THE MAINT LOG, HAD BEEN DOING THIS SINCE 1964 AND THAT IF HE DIDN'T THINK IT WAS SAFE, HE WOULDN'T SIGN OFF THE MAINT LOG. I REMINDED HIM ABOUT WHAT THE MAINT MANUAL STATED. HE SAID THAT DID NOT MATTER AND IF HIS TECHNICIAN SIGNED IT OFF IT WAS OKAY TO GO. HE REITERATED THAT THE MD80 FLEET WOULD NEVER FLY IF THIS TYPE OF DISCREPANCY WAS CORRECTED EVERY TIME IT OCCURRED. I INFORMED THE SUPVR THAT BASED ON THE INFO I HAD, CORRECTIVE ACTION WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN BEFORE WE COULD DEPART WITH THE ACFT. THE SUPVR SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF, I KNOW HOW THIS WORKS, YOU PLTS CARRY THINGS ALL THE TIME IF THERE IS A PROB AND YOU WANT TO GET SOMEWHERE. WELL IF YOU ARE NOT GOING TO TAKE THE ACFT, ENTER A WRITE-UP INTO THE MAINT LOG SAYING THAT YOU ARE REFUSING THE ACFT. I RE-ENTERED A DISCREPANCY INTO THE MAINT LOG NOTING THE DISCOVERY OF THE LEAK AND THE INFO I RECEIVED FROM MAINT CTR. AT THAT POINT, THE ACFT WAS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE AND WE SWITCHED EQUIPMENT. THIS ENTIRE SIT SHOCKED ME. THERE WERE AT LEAST NINE PEOPLE WHO WERE AWARE OF WHAT TRANSPIRED, THE FUELER, THE FUELER'S SUPV, THE GND PERSON THE FUELER SPOKE WITH, THE FO, THE THREE MECHANICS, THE TECHNICIAN AT MAINT CTR, AND ME. REGARDLESS, THE MAINT SUPVR AND HIS SENIOR MECHANIC WERE BLATANTLY IGNORING THE MAINT MANUAL, TAKING IT UPON THEMSELVES TO DETERMINE WHAT WAS/IS ACCEPTABLE, IN SPITE OF WHAT THE BOOK SAYS. FURTHER, THE SUPVR WAS ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE US TO TAKE AN ACFT THAT WE KNEW HAD A DISCREPANCY, WHICH REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION, WITHOUT ANY CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. CONSIDERING THE SIT, I BELIEVE IT TO BE EXTREMELY LIKELY THAT THIS IS NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE DISPLAY OF AGGRESSION IN THIS STATION BY MANAGEMENT AND ONE TECHNICIAN WAS SHOCKING IN THE WAY THE FUEL LEAK WAS HANDLED. THE RPTR SAID TRUST WAS LOST WITH THIS STATION AND EVERYTHING MUST BE VISIBLY CHECKED. THE RPTR STATED THE REPLY FROM THE ASAP RPT WAS AN 'O' RING SEAL WAS REPLACED IN THE FUELING MANIFOLD ADJACENT TO THE PRESSURE FUELING FITTING. THE RPTR SAID THE SUPPORT OF THE MAINT CTLR WAS LACKING TO CONVINCE THE MAINT SUPVR TO FIX THE LEAK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.