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Attributes | |
ACN | 633554 |
Time | |
Date | 200410 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sea.airport |
State Reference | WA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 5000 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B767-300 and 300 ER |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine pilot : private pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 14000 flight time type : 2454 |
ASRS Report | 633554 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : non compliance with mel maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : company policies non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : overcame equipment problem none taken : detected after the fact other |
Consequence | other other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : inspection performance deficiency : fault isolation performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : testing |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Environmental Factor Flight Crew Human Performance Company Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
After pushback and engine start at sea, the right pack indicated 'inoperative' with 'right pack temperature' on the EICAS. Reset attempts were unsuccessful. Due to ramp congestion, I elected to exit the ramp and taxi out to the runway. We advised maintenance and our dispatcher, via ACARS, of the problem, expecting to dispatch with 1 pack inoperative according to MEL 21-51-01A and a maximum altitude of FL350. I requested fuel burn at FL330 versus filed FL370. At the end of the runway, with the right pack shut down and while awaiting the required dispatch authority/authorized, we received, via ACARS, fuel burn information from dispatch. To my later chagrin, we realized, after takeoff, that this was not dispatch approval, but an answer to my original request for fuel burn in advance of approval. As these linking events usually go, we received a left engine bleed valve light during the latter stage of the takeoff roll. The takeoff was continued. We were then in position of having no pressure sources. I asked for and received a low altitude hold down and excellent assistance from ATC while we troubleshot the situation. After consulting with maintenance control, it was recommended that we turn the right pack back on. It, of course, worked perfectly. The left bleed was a repeat gripe that had been supposedly cleared by maintenance in sea. All parties agreed that it was safe to proceed to our destination. Although the flight crew placarding with dispatch approval of the original problem would have been appropriate, my expectation of that approval was not. Although coordination had been initiated and would have been received, it was not complete.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B767-300 PIC DEPARTS SEA WITHOUT RECEIVING MEL DISPATCH AUTH FOR A R PACK MALFUNCTION.
Narrative: AFTER PUSHBACK AND ENG START AT SEA, THE R PACK INDICATED 'INOP' WITH 'R PACK TEMP' ON THE EICAS. RESET ATTEMPTS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. DUE TO RAMP CONGESTION, I ELECTED TO EXIT THE RAMP AND TAXI OUT TO THE RWY. WE ADVISED MAINT AND OUR DISPATCHER, VIA ACARS, OF THE PROB, EXPECTING TO DISPATCH WITH 1 PACK INOP ACCORDING TO MEL 21-51-01A AND A MAX ALT OF FL350. I REQUESTED FUEL BURN AT FL330 VERSUS FILED FL370. AT THE END OF THE RWY, WITH THE R PACK SHUT DOWN AND WHILE AWAITING THE REQUIRED DISPATCH AUTH, WE RECEIVED, VIA ACARS, FUEL BURN INFO FROM DISPATCH. TO MY LATER CHAGRIN, WE REALIZED, AFTER TKOF, THAT THIS WAS NOT DISPATCH APPROVAL, BUT AN ANSWER TO MY ORIGINAL REQUEST FOR FUEL BURN IN ADVANCE OF APPROVAL. AS THESE LINKING EVENTS USUALLY GO, WE RECEIVED A L ENG BLEED VALVE LIGHT DURING THE LATTER STAGE OF THE TKOF ROLL. THE TKOF WAS CONTINUED. WE WERE THEN IN POS OF HAVING NO PRESSURE SOURCES. I ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED A LOW ALT HOLD DOWN AND EXCELLENT ASSISTANCE FROM ATC WHILE WE TROUBLESHOT THE SIT. AFTER CONSULTING WITH MAINT CTL, IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT WE TURN THE R PACK BACK ON. IT, OF COURSE, WORKED PERFECTLY. THE L BLEED WAS A REPEAT GRIPE THAT HAD BEEN SUPPOSEDLY CLRED BY MAINT IN SEA. ALL PARTIES AGREED THAT IT WAS SAFE TO PROCEED TO OUR DEST. ALTHOUGH THE FLT CREW PLACARDING WITH DISPATCH APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINAL PROB WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE, MY EXPECTATION OF THAT APPROVAL WAS NOT. ALTHOUGH COORD HAD BEEN INITIATED AND WOULD HAVE BEEN RECEIVED, IT WAS NOT COMPLETE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.