Narrative:

It's what you know that isn't so that leads to error. Descending to FL190 the first officer was acquiring ATIS and I, the PF, received clearance to cross jordan at 11000 ft. We had already been cleared direct to jordan. I set the altitude in the MCP and advised the first officer of the restr when he returned to ATC frequency. The first failure was not programming the fdc yet believing it was properly programmed to compute the descent profile from FL190. I looked at the deviation below the actual computed path (about 6100 ft low) and erroneously reasoned this was about right for our position. Two asides: with the adoption of the full up LNAV system I have not been manually computing descent points as strenuously as I used to and since I failed to program the crossing restr there was no trigger to have the pm check the accuracy. Also, from experience, I expected jordan at 11000 ft, it is almost a constant yet it is not noted in commercial charts, it is on the moose sheets I believe. This ambiguity kept me from programming the fdc earlier in cruise. Leaving FL190 ZBW asks if we are going to make jordan at 11000 ft. Believing I was on the correct profile to accomplish this at 280 KIAS I thought 'what a nanny state, I'm right where I'm supposed to be' and had the first officer answer in the affirmative. Shortly thereafter the first officer realizes we are high and says something like 'you only have 8 mi.' he is somewhat soft spoken at times and I did not hear him clearly. In my mindset I interpreted this as a comedic remark lampooning center's oversight of our 'on profile' descent. With some more communication I finally realize we won't make the restr. Closing on jordan, center asks about our altitude combined with a frequency change to approach. My first officer doesn't respond to center, switches to approach, but doesn't call them, waiting for our leveloff (this is my post event understanding). I call on approach (thinking we're on center) because the first officer is not responding that we're leaving 13000 ft to 11000 ft believing honesty is the best policy in this situation. We're over jordan at this point. We continue to pvd and make a normal approach and landing. So first there was a breakdown in crew coordination followed by ineffective communication. The first officer had tried earlier in cruise to get ATIS at pvd. I believe he was getting it at the first opportunity. Descending into mco on the bitho in a B-700 on the next leg and seeing the touchdown and omn restr clearly depicted brought home the less than optimum crew interface using LNAV with our round dial 3/500's. The duty period section doesn't accurately reflect the lack of sleep I had recently experienced. Nominally I've gotten 6 hours of sleep per day, too much homework, not enough hours per day. Since midnight EDT the prior sunday, I had 2 days of 4 hours of sleep. One on a lax pm and the other at home, circadian disruption I suppose. So the root cause, the reason the descent became a bad plan poorly executed is most likely fatigue. I've gotten 'are you going to make the restr' call before. I'd reckon they were evenly split between having actually been distraction and passing the proper descent point and being a few mi prior to the point. Thus my initial reaction as we were in the descent. I suppose I'll be spring loaded to boards and 320 KIAS if I hear another. Prevention: diligently check all fdc programming and solutions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 CREW WITH AN FMC, BUT NO GLASS NAV DISPLAYS, MISSED A DSCNT XING ALT ASSIGNMENT.

Narrative: IT'S WHAT YOU KNOW THAT ISN'T SO THAT LEADS TO ERROR. DSNDING TO FL190 THE FO WAS ACQUIRING ATIS AND I, THE PF, RECEIVED CLRNC TO CROSS JORDAN AT 11000 FT. WE HAD ALREADY BEEN CLRED DIRECT TO JORDAN. I SET THE ALT IN THE MCP AND ADVISED THE FO OF THE RESTR WHEN HE RETURNED TO ATC FREQ. THE FIRST FAILURE WAS NOT PROGRAMMING THE FDC YET BELIEVING IT WAS PROPERLY PROGRAMMED TO COMPUTE THE DSCNT PROFILE FROM FL190. I LOOKED AT THE DEV BELOW THE ACTUAL COMPUTED PATH (ABOUT 6100 FT LOW) AND ERRONEOUSLY REASONED THIS WAS ABOUT RIGHT FOR OUR POS. TWO ASIDES: WITH THE ADOPTION OF THE FULL UP LNAV SYS I HAVE NOT BEEN MANUALLY COMPUTING DSCNT POINTS AS STRENUOUSLY AS I USED TO AND SINCE I FAILED TO PROGRAM THE XING RESTR THERE WAS NO TRIGGER TO HAVE THE PM CHK THE ACCURACY. ALSO, FROM EXPERIENCE, I EXPECTED JORDAN AT 11000 FT, IT IS ALMOST A CONSTANT YET IT IS NOT NOTED IN COMMERCIAL CHARTS, IT IS ON THE MOOSE SHEETS I BELIEVE. THIS AMBIGUITY KEPT ME FROM PROGRAMMING THE FDC EARLIER IN CRUISE. LEAVING FL190 ZBW ASKS IF WE ARE GOING TO MAKE JORDAN AT 11000 FT. BELIEVING I WAS ON THE CORRECT PROFILE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS AT 280 KIAS I THOUGHT 'WHAT A NANNY STATE, I'M RIGHT WHERE I'M SUPPOSED TO BE' AND HAD THE FO ANSWER IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE FO REALIZES WE ARE HIGH AND SAYS SOMETHING LIKE 'YOU ONLY HAVE 8 MI.' HE IS SOMEWHAT SOFT SPOKEN AT TIMES AND I DID NOT HEAR HIM CLRLY. IN MY MINDSET I INTERPED THIS AS A COMEDIC REMARK LAMPOONING CTR'S OVERSIGHT OF OUR 'ON PROFILE' DSCNT. WITH SOME MORE COM I FINALLY REALIZE WE WON'T MAKE THE RESTR. CLOSING ON JORDAN, CTR ASKS ABOUT OUR ALT COMBINED WITH A FREQ CHANGE TO APCH. MY FO DOESN'T RESPOND TO CTR, SWITCHES TO APCH, BUT DOESN'T CALL THEM, WAITING FOR OUR LEVELOFF (THIS IS MY POST EVENT UNDERSTANDING). I CALL ON APCH (THINKING WE'RE ON CTR) BECAUSE THE FO IS NOT RESPONDING THAT WE'RE LEAVING 13000 FT TO 11000 FT BELIEVING HONESTY IS THE BEST POLICY IN THIS SIT. WE'RE OVER JORDAN AT THIS POINT. WE CONTINUE TO PVD AND MAKE A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG. SO FIRST THERE WAS A BREAKDOWN IN CREW COORD FOLLOWED BY INEFFECTIVE COM. THE FO HAD TRIED EARLIER IN CRUISE TO GET ATIS AT PVD. I BELIEVE HE WAS GETTING IT AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY. DSNDING INTO MCO ON THE BITHO IN A B-700 ON THE NEXT LEG AND SEEING THE TOUCHDOWN AND OMN RESTR CLRLY DEPICTED BROUGHT HOME THE LESS THAN OPTIMUM CREW INTERFACE USING LNAV WITH OUR ROUND DIAL 3/500'S. THE DUTY PERIOD SECTION DOESN'T ACCURATELY REFLECT THE LACK OF SLEEP I HAD RECENTLY EXPERIENCED. NOMINALLY I'VE GOTTEN 6 HRS OF SLEEP PER DAY, TOO MUCH HOMEWORK, NOT ENOUGH HRS PER DAY. SINCE MIDNIGHT EDT THE PRIOR SUNDAY, I HAD 2 DAYS OF 4 HRS OF SLEEP. ONE ON A LAX PM AND THE OTHER AT HOME, CIRCADIAN DISRUPTION I SUPPOSE. SO THE ROOT CAUSE, THE REASON THE DSCNT BECAME A BAD PLAN POORLY EXECUTED IS MOST LIKELY FATIGUE. I'VE GOTTEN 'ARE YOU GOING TO MAKE THE RESTR' CALL BEFORE. I'D RECKON THEY WERE EVENLY SPLIT BTWN HAVING ACTUALLY BEEN DISTR AND PASSING THE PROPER DSCNT POINT AND BEING A FEW MI PRIOR TO THE POINT. THUS MY INITIAL REACTION AS WE WERE IN THE DSCNT. I SUPPOSE I'LL BE SPRING LOADED TO BOARDS AND 320 KIAS IF I HEAR ANOTHER. PREVENTION: DILIGENTLY CHK ALL FDC PROGRAMMING AND SOLUTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.