Narrative:

I fly a piper aerostar 600 twin-engine airplane primarily on passenger carrying on-demand operations. One of my best charter clients was calling and requested a flight as soon as possible to rostraver, PA, to pick up a doctor and bring him back to my home-base airport. After quickly reviewing the WX information and determining that the flight was 'doable' I quickly filed an IFR flight plan from my base to rostraver, PA, and then another from rostraver to pikeville, ky, by way of my home base airport. The logan airport (our destination) does not have a WX reporting system and part 135 regulations do not allow it as an IFR destination. The plan was to fly from rostraver to the logan area and see if conditions were VFR at our arrival there. If so, I would simply cancel IFR and conduct a VFR approach and landing in logan. If not, I would continue IFR to our filed destination, pikeville, which is served with an ILS approach and WX reporting. On departure from the logan airport I noted that the bases of the clouds were 4800 ft MSL (3000 ft AGL) and visibility was good, more than 10 mi, and I filed a PIREP with ATC to that affect. Since I would be returning there in less than 2 hours, I felt it likely that we would be able to do our approach and landing in VMC when I returned with the passenger. He is one of few passenger who likes to wear headphones and talk as we fly. We departed rostraver and were issued an IFR clearance to pikeville via logan. The passenger began talking and continued to do so throughout the flight. I did not do anything to dissuade him from talking. We were eventually put in contact with charleston approach control. I explained to the controller that I wanted to fly over the logan area and determine if visual conditions were present. About 30 mi northeast of logan the controller issued us a descent and I broke out of the overcast clouds at about 4800 ft MSL (approximately 3000 ft AGL). I noted that the visibility was still good with scattered valley fog in the vicinity. I told the controller that the WX was VMC and I cancelled IFR. About 15 mi northeast of the logan airport I could see the airport buildings on the field. However, the valley fog appeared to be rising rapidly (as is common at dusk) and I could not see the runway itself. A fog bank appeared to be located approximately 1/2 mi from the threshold and obstructed my view of the single runway 24. Inadvertently entered a fog bank. I momentarily lost sight of the airport environment, but immediately saw it again when we cleared the fog area. I still could not see the runway due to the fast approaching fog bank that remained about 1/2 mi from the threshold, but could clearly see the airport environment. During this time my passenger continued to talk on the intercom and asked a number of questions. I was struggling to remain 'polite' and concentrate on the landing segment of the flight. About 1 mi from the airport, I determined that I could maintain clearance from the fog if I remained level until flying over the obstructing fog bank. I began thinking of my flight plan that did not include an alternate and thought it probable that one would have been required. The thought of a possible far violation immediately raised the anxiety level in my mind. All the while, I allowed the passenger to continue talking and to become even more of a distraction. I flew the plane over the fog bank configured for landing. However, after passing the fog and gaining sight of the runway threshold, the flight path was higher than normal. Rather than execute a rapid descent to the runway, I performed a go around checklist more from habit than conscious thought. The go around included retracting the landing gear. The airport is svced with runway lighting and PAPI glide path lights. But, they are on a 'dusk-to-dawn' switch that does not allow their activation until it's quite dark. At the time, it was getting dark, but the runway lights would not come on. In order to maintain clearance from the fog I elected to do a tight pattern with the base leg between the fog and the runway. I fixated on not losing sight of the runway and maintaining proper airspeed and glide path control. It did not consciously occur to me that I had retracted the landing gear on the go around and the 'G' (gear down) in the 'gumps' check was notverified. I kept the airspeed a bit lower than normal, close to touchdown speed, and about 10 mph above stall for the close pattern. When I reduced power for the descent a warning horn activated and it registered in my mind that it was the stall warning. (The stall warning is very similar in tone to the gear warning.) I increased power to aid in arresting the pending stall and the warning horn silenced. My thoughts were still labored by the possible alternate airport violation, being polite to my passenger, and being upset that the runway lights would not activate as I continued to click the microphone for the pilot-controled lighting system. I approached the runway with power and performed a text-book final approach to the runway. However, as I reduced power for the final touchdown, the horn activated, I knew I was not stalled and that the gear was not extended. However, it was too late and the airplane touched down on its belly and slid to a stop on the centerline. There were no injuries and only minor damage to the airplane, albeit expensive and time-consuming repairs. Although I still believe myself to be a very qualified pilot, I recognize that I am a human who will make mistakes. In the rush to prepare for the flight I did not adequately evaluate the WX and flight planning requirements of the regulations for the alternate airport requirements. This mistake held mental consequences that I could not have foreseen at the time of flight planning. I allowed the passenger to talk and distract me during critical phases of the flight. Not only is this against part 135 regulations, but it can lead to dire consequences. In the normal conduct of flight, I have not heard the stall warning and gear warning indications enough to differentiate between them. The checklists must be verified all the time regardless of what your subconscious may believe. I had developed habits that allowed my mind to be convinced that I hadn't retracted the gear when, in fact, I had. The runway lights at rural airports really should not be on a dusk-to-dawn sensor. The gear warning and stall warning indicators need to be totally different sounds. Above all else, we have to think and evaluate our vulnerabilities during phases of flight. The regulations and system available provide ample opportunity to conduct flight within tolerable risk levels, if we only have the wisdom to utilize them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA60 AEROSTAR CFII ON A PAX FLT MAKES A VISUAL APCH IN MARGINAL WX CONDITIONS AND LANDS GEAR UP AT 6L4.

Narrative: I FLY A PIPER AEROSTAR 600 TWIN-ENG AIRPLANE PRIMARILY ON PAX CARRYING ON-DEMAND OPS. ONE OF MY BEST CHARTER CLIENTS WAS CALLING AND REQUESTED A FLT ASAP TO ROSTRAVER, PA, TO PICK UP A DOCTOR AND BRING HIM BACK TO MY HOME-BASE ARPT. AFTER QUICKLY REVIEWING THE WX INFO AND DETERMINING THAT THE FLT WAS 'DOABLE' I QUICKLY FILED AN IFR FLT PLAN FROM MY BASE TO ROSTRAVER, PA, AND THEN ANOTHER FROM ROSTRAVER TO PIKEVILLE, KY, BY WAY OF MY HOME BASE ARPT. THE LOGAN ARPT (OUR DEST) DOES NOT HAVE A WX RPTING SYS AND PART 135 REGS DO NOT ALLOW IT AS AN IFR DEST. THE PLAN WAS TO FLY FROM ROSTRAVER TO THE LOGAN AREA AND SEE IF CONDITIONS WERE VFR AT OUR ARR THERE. IF SO, I WOULD SIMPLY CANCEL IFR AND CONDUCT A VFR APCH AND LNDG IN LOGAN. IF NOT, I WOULD CONTINUE IFR TO OUR FILED DEST, PIKEVILLE, WHICH IS SERVED WITH AN ILS APCH AND WX RPTING. ON DEP FROM THE LOGAN ARPT I NOTED THAT THE BASES OF THE CLOUDS WERE 4800 FT MSL (3000 FT AGL) AND VISIBILITY WAS GOOD, MORE THAN 10 MI, AND I FILED A PIREP WITH ATC TO THAT AFFECT. SINCE I WOULD BE RETURNING THERE IN LESS THAN 2 HRS, I FELT IT LIKELY THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO OUR APCH AND LNDG IN VMC WHEN I RETURNED WITH THE PAX. HE IS ONE OF FEW PAX WHO LIKES TO WEAR HEADPHONES AND TALK AS WE FLY. WE DEPARTED ROSTRAVER AND WERE ISSUED AN IFR CLRNC TO PIKEVILLE VIA LOGAN. THE PAX BEGAN TALKING AND CONTINUED TO DO SO THROUGHOUT THE FLT. I DID NOT DO ANYTHING TO DISSUADE HIM FROM TALKING. WE WERE EVENTUALLY PUT IN CONTACT WITH CHARLESTON APCH CTL. I EXPLAINED TO THE CTLR THAT I WANTED TO FLY OVER THE LOGAN AREA AND DETERMINE IF VISUAL CONDITIONS WERE PRESENT. ABOUT 30 MI NE OF LOGAN THE CTLR ISSUED US A DSCNT AND I BROKE OUT OF THE OVCST CLOUDS AT ABOUT 4800 FT MSL (APPROX 3000 FT AGL). I NOTED THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS STILL GOOD WITH SCATTERED VALLEY FOG IN THE VICINITY. I TOLD THE CTLR THAT THE WX WAS VMC AND I CANCELLED IFR. ABOUT 15 MI NE OF THE LOGAN ARPT I COULD SEE THE ARPT BUILDINGS ON THE FIELD. HOWEVER, THE VALLEY FOG APPEARED TO BE RISING RAPIDLY (AS IS COMMON AT DUSK) AND I COULD NOT SEE THE RWY ITSELF. A FOG BANK APPEARED TO BE LOCATED APPROX 1/2 MI FROM THE THRESHOLD AND OBSTRUCTED MY VIEW OF THE SINGLE RWY 24. INADVERTENTLY ENTERED A FOG BANK. I MOMENTARILY LOST SIGHT OF THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT, BUT IMMEDIATELY SAW IT AGAIN WHEN WE CLRED THE FOG AREA. I STILL COULD NOT SEE THE RWY DUE TO THE FAST APCHING FOG BANK THAT REMAINED ABOUT 1/2 MI FROM THE THRESHOLD, BUT COULD CLRLY SEE THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT. DURING THIS TIME MY PAX CONTINUED TO TALK ON THE INTERCOM AND ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS. I WAS STRUGGLING TO REMAIN 'POLITE' AND CONCENTRATE ON THE LNDG SEGMENT OF THE FLT. ABOUT 1 MI FROM THE ARPT, I DETERMINED THAT I COULD MAINTAIN CLRNC FROM THE FOG IF I REMAINED LEVEL UNTIL FLYING OVER THE OBSTRUCTING FOG BANK. I BEGAN THINKING OF MY FLT PLAN THAT DID NOT INCLUDE AN ALTERNATE AND THOUGHT IT PROBABLE THAT ONE WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED. THE THOUGHT OF A POSSIBLE FAR VIOLATION IMMEDIATELY RAISED THE ANXIETY LEVEL IN MY MIND. ALL THE WHILE, I ALLOWED THE PAX TO CONTINUE TALKING AND TO BECOME EVEN MORE OF A DISTR. I FLEW THE PLANE OVER THE FOG BANK CONFIGURED FOR LNDG. HOWEVER, AFTER PASSING THE FOG AND GAINING SIGHT OF THE RWY THRESHOLD, THE FLT PATH WAS HIGHER THAN NORMAL. RATHER THAN EXECUTE A RAPID DSCNT TO THE RWY, I PERFORMED A GAR CHKLIST MORE FROM HABIT THAN CONSCIOUS THOUGHT. THE GAR INCLUDED RETRACTING THE LNDG GEAR. THE ARPT IS SVCED WITH RWY LIGHTING AND PAPI GLIDE PATH LIGHTS. BUT, THEY ARE ON A 'DUSK-TO-DAWN' SWITCH THAT DOES NOT ALLOW THEIR ACTIVATION UNTIL IT'S QUITE DARK. AT THE TIME, IT WAS GETTING DARK, BUT THE RWY LIGHTS WOULD NOT COME ON. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CLRNC FROM THE FOG I ELECTED TO DO A TIGHT PATTERN WITH THE BASE LEG BTWN THE FOG AND THE RWY. I FIXATED ON NOT LOSING SIGHT OF THE RWY AND MAINTAINING PROPER AIRSPD AND GLIDE PATH CTL. IT DID NOT CONSCIOUSLY OCCUR TO ME THAT I HAD RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR ON THE GAR AND THE 'G' (GEAR DOWN) IN THE 'GUMPS' CHK WAS NOTVERIFIED. I KEPT THE AIRSPD A BIT LOWER THAN NORMAL, CLOSE TO TOUCHDOWN SPD, AND ABOUT 10 MPH ABOVE STALL FOR THE CLOSE PATTERN. WHEN I REDUCED PWR FOR THE DSCNT A WARNING HORN ACTIVATED AND IT REGISTERED IN MY MIND THAT IT WAS THE STALL WARNING. (THE STALL WARNING IS VERY SIMILAR IN TONE TO THE GEAR WARNING.) I INCREASED PWR TO AID IN ARRESTING THE PENDING STALL AND THE WARNING HORN SILENCED. MY THOUGHTS WERE STILL LABORED BY THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATE ARPT VIOLATION, BEING POLITE TO MY PAX, AND BEING UPSET THAT THE RWY LIGHTS WOULD NOT ACTIVATE AS I CONTINUED TO CLICK THE MIKE FOR THE PLT-CTLED LIGHTING SYS. I APCHED THE RWY WITH PWR AND PERFORMED A TEXT-BOOK FINAL APCH TO THE RWY. HOWEVER, AS I REDUCED PWR FOR THE FINAL TOUCHDOWN, THE HORN ACTIVATED, I KNEW I WAS NOT STALLED AND THAT THE GEAR WAS NOT EXTENDED. HOWEVER, IT WAS TOO LATE AND THE AIRPLANE TOUCHED DOWN ON ITS BELLY AND SLID TO A STOP ON THE CTRLINE. THERE WERE NO INJURIES AND ONLY MINOR DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE, ALBEIT EXPENSIVE AND TIME-CONSUMING REPAIRS. ALTHOUGH I STILL BELIEVE MYSELF TO BE A VERY QUALIFIED PLT, I RECOGNIZE THAT I AM A HUMAN WHO WILL MAKE MISTAKES. IN THE RUSH TO PREPARE FOR THE FLT I DID NOT ADEQUATELY EVALUATE THE WX AND FLT PLANNING REQUIREMENTS OF THE REGS FOR THE ALTERNATE ARPT REQUIREMENTS. THIS MISTAKE HELD MENTAL CONSEQUENCES THAT I COULD NOT HAVE FORESEEN AT THE TIME OF FLT PLANNING. I ALLOWED THE PAX TO TALK AND DISTRACT ME DURING CRITICAL PHASES OF THE FLT. NOT ONLY IS THIS AGAINST PART 135 REGS, BUT IT CAN LEAD TO DIRE CONSEQUENCES. IN THE NORMAL CONDUCT OF FLT, I HAVE NOT HEARD THE STALL WARNING AND GEAR WARNING INDICATIONS ENOUGH TO DIFFERENTIATE BTWN THEM. THE CHKLISTS MUST BE VERIFIED ALL THE TIME REGARDLESS OF WHAT YOUR SUBCONSCIOUS MAY BELIEVE. I HAD DEVELOPED HABITS THAT ALLOWED MY MIND TO BE CONVINCED THAT I HADN'T RETRACTED THE GEAR WHEN, IN FACT, I HAD. THE RWY LIGHTS AT RURAL ARPTS REALLY SHOULD NOT BE ON A DUSK-TO-DAWN SENSOR. THE GEAR WARNING AND STALL WARNING INDICATORS NEED TO BE TOTALLY DIFFERENT SOUNDS. ABOVE ALL ELSE, WE HAVE TO THINK AND EVALUATE OUR VULNERABILITIES DURING PHASES OF FLT. THE REGS AND SYS AVAILABLE PROVIDE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT FLT WITHIN TOLERABLE RISK LEVELS, IF WE ONLY HAVE THE WISDOM TO UTILIZE THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.