Narrative:

While taxiing out to depart on runway 25 at phf, which was uncontrolled at the time, we obtained our clearance and release to depart from norfolk approach control. After making all of the required self-announcements as to aircraft movement on an uncontrolled airport and after completing the necessary checklists, I instructed the first officer to announce our intended takeoff from runway 25. Upon taxiing onto the runway, someone in newport tower as well as another aircraft alerted us to the fact that an air carrier Y aircraft was in position on runway 7. We acknowledged this transmission but at this point were unable to immediately exit the runway. We made it clear that we had a clearance and release to depart phf obtained from norfolk approach control. Air carrier Y at this time apparently did not have clearance nor release to depart the airport. Why they were on the runway without clearance or release is not clear. Once the air carrier Y crew realized they could not depart, they exited the runway to permit our takeoff. At no time did we attempt a takeoff roll prior to air carrier Y exiting the runway. After air carrier Y aircraft had made the announcement of being clear of the runway and we visually acquired his position, we then proceeded to depart uneventfully. Comment: there are 3 air carrier departures from this airport early morning within 15 mins of each other. This to me is unacceptable. If the FAA wants to talk about safety and runway incursions, then they need to look at their own culpability in preventing these types of incidents when it is totally within their control to enhance safety. One would certainly believe that 3 air carrier departures within 15 mins of each other at an airport would prompt an entity charged with the safety of the public (the FAA) to adjust the tower's operation (whose primary role is to insure safe movement of aircraft under its jurisdiction) so that the movement of these aircraft are under positive control to prevent these types of incidents. Supplemental information from acn 634905: during departure and taxi out at phf, a potentially dangerous situation occurred. We pushed back for departure as did another aircraft. We taxied to runway 25 and other aircraft taxied to runway 7. We were given a clearance and release time for norfolk 124.9. As we self-announced intentions on CTAF to depart runway 25, the other aircraft announced, 'in position and holding runway 7.' the other aircraft was in position and holding without a clearance or release time. Please note both aircraft are part 121 operators. Even though communication between our aircraft and the other aircraft at runway 7 occurred, we were both on the runway simultaneously. After advising other aircraft we had our clearance and release, the other aircraft left runway 7 and positioned itself on taxiway. After visually confirming other aircraft was clear of runway 7, we departed from runway 25 without incident. Some contributing factors to this potentially dangerous situation include: the other aircraft occupying runway without clearance or release in an uncontrolled environment. Phf is uncontrolled during a time of multiple part 121 carrier departures. This is an unacceptable practice. A corrective action would have been to fully sort out why other aircraft was on runway without release prior to going onto runway. Despite the potential for an accident, I believe both aircraft utilized the CTAF to ascertain the intentions of each other. A major safety improvement would be to have the tower adjust its hours of operation to accommodate the part 121 departures. Callback conversation with reporter acn 634905 revealed the following information: reporter stated phf WX was IFR and that 15 mins earlier they had received an IFR clearance and a release from norfolk departure control to depart. He said as they approached the runway for takeoff, they noticed a dash 7 aircraft in position on the other end. The dash 7 crew said they were waiting for their clearance and advised they would move off the runway. According to the reporter, an ATC controller in the tower observed the dash 7 in position on runway 7 and the crj crew taking position on runway 25. The reporter believes the controller did not hear the dialog between the 2 crews and filed a violation because the crj took position on runway 25 before the dash 7 taxied off runway 7.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SHORTLY BEFORE THE PHF TWR OPENED, A CRJ200 CREW WITH IFR RELEASE, FIND THEMSELVES TAKING POS ON THE RWY FOR TKOF BEFORE ANOTHER ACR IN POS ON THE OTHER END OF THE RWY TAXIES OFF TO WAIT FOR CLRNC.

Narrative: WHILE TAXIING OUT TO DEPART ON RWY 25 AT PHF, WHICH WAS UNCTLED AT THE TIME, WE OBTAINED OUR CLRNC AND RELEASE TO DEPART FROM NORFOLK APCH CTL. AFTER MAKING ALL OF THE REQUIRED SELF-ANNOUNCEMENTS AS TO ACFT MOVEMENT ON AN UNCTLED ARPT AND AFTER COMPLETING THE NECESSARY CHKLISTS, I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO ANNOUNCE OUR INTENDED TKOF FROM RWY 25. UPON TAXIING ONTO THE RWY, SOMEONE IN NEWPORT TWR AS WELL AS ANOTHER ACFT ALERTED US TO THE FACT THAT AN ACR Y ACFT WAS IN POS ON RWY 7. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS XMISSION BUT AT THIS POINT WERE UNABLE TO IMMEDIATELY EXIT THE RWY. WE MADE IT CLR THAT WE HAD A CLRNC AND RELEASE TO DEPART PHF OBTAINED FROM NORFOLK APCH CTL. ACR Y AT THIS TIME APPARENTLY DID NOT HAVE CLRNC NOR RELEASE TO DEPART THE ARPT. WHY THEY WERE ON THE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC OR RELEASE IS NOT CLR. ONCE THE ACR Y CREW REALIZED THEY COULD NOT DEPART, THEY EXITED THE RWY TO PERMIT OUR TKOF. AT NO TIME DID WE ATTEMPT A TKOF ROLL PRIOR TO ACR Y EXITING THE RWY. AFTER ACR Y ACFT HAD MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF BEING CLR OF THE RWY AND WE VISUALLY ACQUIRED HIS POS, WE THEN PROCEEDED TO DEPART UNEVENTFULLY. COMMENT: THERE ARE 3 ACR DEPS FROM THIS ARPT EARLY MORNING WITHIN 15 MINS OF EACH OTHER. THIS TO ME IS UNACCEPTABLE. IF THE FAA WANTS TO TALK ABOUT SAFETY AND RWY INCURSIONS, THEN THEY NEED TO LOOK AT THEIR OWN CULPABILITY IN PREVENTING THESE TYPES OF INCIDENTS WHEN IT IS TOTALLY WITHIN THEIR CTL TO ENHANCE SAFETY. ONE WOULD CERTAINLY BELIEVE THAT 3 ACR DEPS WITHIN 15 MINS OF EACH OTHER AT AN ARPT WOULD PROMPT AN ENTITY CHARGED WITH THE SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC (THE FAA) TO ADJUST THE TWR'S OP (WHOSE PRIMARY ROLE IS TO INSURE SAFE MOVEMENT OF ACFT UNDER ITS JURISDICTION) SO THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THESE ACFT ARE UNDER POSITIVE CTL TO PREVENT THESE TYPES OF INCIDENTS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 634905: DURING DEP AND TAXI OUT AT PHF, A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SIT OCCURRED. WE PUSHED BACK FOR DEP AS DID ANOTHER ACFT. WE TAXIED TO RWY 25 AND OTHER ACFT TAXIED TO RWY 7. WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC AND RELEASE TIME FOR NORFOLK 124.9. AS WE SELF-ANNOUNCED INTENTIONS ON CTAF TO DEPART RWY 25, THE OTHER ACFT ANNOUNCED, 'IN POS AND HOLDING RWY 7.' THE OTHER ACFT WAS IN POS AND HOLDING WITHOUT A CLRNC OR RELEASE TIME. PLEASE NOTE BOTH ACFT ARE PART 121 OPERATORS. EVEN THOUGH COM BTWN OUR ACFT AND THE OTHER ACFT AT RWY 7 OCCURRED, WE WERE BOTH ON THE RWY SIMULTANEOUSLY. AFTER ADVISING OTHER ACFT WE HAD OUR CLRNC AND RELEASE, THE OTHER ACFT LEFT RWY 7 AND POSITIONED ITSELF ON TXWY. AFTER VISUALLY CONFIRMING OTHER ACFT WAS CLR OF RWY 7, WE DEPARTED FROM RWY 25 WITHOUT INCIDENT. SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SIT INCLUDE: THE OTHER ACFT OCCUPYING RWY WITHOUT CLRNC OR RELEASE IN AN UNCTLED ENVIRONMENT. PHF IS UNCTLED DURING A TIME OF MULTIPLE PART 121 CARRIER DEPS. THIS IS AN UNACCEPTABLE PRACTICE. A CORRECTIVE ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO FULLY SORT OUT WHY OTHER ACFT WAS ON RWY WITHOUT RELEASE PRIOR TO GOING ONTO RWY. DESPITE THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ACCIDENT, I BELIEVE BOTH ACFT UTILIZED THE CTAF TO ASCERTAIN THE INTENTIONS OF EACH OTHER. A MAJOR SAFETY IMPROVEMENT WOULD BE TO HAVE THE TWR ADJUST ITS HRS OF OP TO ACCOMMODATE THE PART 121 DEPS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 634905 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED PHF WX WAS IFR AND THAT 15 MINS EARLIER THEY HAD RECEIVED AN IFR CLRNC AND A RELEASE FROM NORFOLK DEP CTL TO DEPART. HE SAID AS THEY APCHED THE RWY FOR TKOF, THEY NOTICED A DASH 7 ACFT IN POS ON THE OTHER END. THE DASH 7 CREW SAID THEY WERE WAITING FOR THEIR CLRNC AND ADVISED THEY WOULD MOVE OFF THE RWY. ACCORDING TO THE RPTR, AN ATC CTLR IN THE TWR OBSERVED THE DASH 7 IN POS ON RWY 7 AND THE CRJ CREW TAKING POS ON RWY 25. THE RPTR BELIEVES THE CTLR DID NOT HEAR THE DIALOG BTWN THE 2 CREWS AND FILED A VIOLATION BECAUSE THE CRJ TOOK POS ON RWY 25 BEFORE THE DASH 7 TAXIED OFF RWY 7.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.