Narrative:

The purpose of this form is to document operational shortcomings idented by crew members. Air carrier has initiated an internal evaluation process which encourages employees to inform management of operational problems or concerns. The crew was informed by the handling agent that brought the weight and balance to the aircraft that we had 2 tires on board in the flyaway kit. This was reflected in the ballast (other) block on our weight and balance as 280 KG's. We applied the rest of the information and departed on the way to ZZZ. Once airborne we reviewed the weight and balance books an at the time we realized that the agent had the wrong weight for the two tires. Aircraft table reflects the weight for two tires is 420 KG's for this aircraft, not 280 KT's. It is not very clear if by the statement the additional weight gets applied in the load planner or on the final crew form. We had flown the 2 previous legs without being informed that the tires were on board. We reviewed the other flight envelopes on the aircraft and realized that out of 16 other flts, only 1 was correct. We arrived in ZZZ and had the station superintendent meet the flight. He was not informed of the tires in the flyaway kit, and explained that air carrier 1 does it different. He indicated that air carrier 1 applies the information to the weight and balance advisory on the flight release. All the air carrier 2 releases show are the basic operating weight, including basic crew and not anything else. I asked that he make the changes. Air carrier 2 crew should be better informed as to what is on board the maintenance support items weight. The information should be on the flight release, or by the information posted on the aircraft logbook. My concern is how many other air carrier 2 flts have not had the correct information since the implementation of the new weight and balance procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-300 FREIGHTER WAS REPEATEDLY DISPATCHED WITH AN INCORRECT WT FOR AN ONBOARD MAINT FLY AWAY TIRE KIT.

Narrative: THE PURPOSE OF THIS FORM IS TO DOCUMENT OPERATIONAL SHORTCOMINGS IDENTED BY CREW MEMBERS. ACR HAS INITIATED AN INTERNAL EVALUATION PROCESS WHICH ENCOURAGES EMPLOYEES TO INFORM MGMNT OF OPERATIONAL PROBS OR CONCERNS. THE CREW WAS INFORMED BY THE HANDLING AGENT THAT BROUGHT THE WT AND BAL TO THE ACFT THAT WE HAD 2 TIRES ON BOARD IN THE FLYAWAY KIT. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE BALLAST (OTHER) BLOCK ON OUR WT AND BAL AS 280 KG'S. WE APPLIED THE REST OF THE INFO AND DEPARTED ON THE WAY TO ZZZ. ONCE AIRBORNE WE REVIEWED THE WT AND BAL BOOKS AN AT THE TIME WE REALIZED THAT THE AGENT HAD THE WRONG WT FOR THE TWO TIRES. ACFT TABLE REFLECTS THE WT FOR TWO TIRES IS 420 KG'S FOR THIS ACFT, NOT 280 KT'S. IT IS NOT VERY CLR IF BY THE STATEMENT THE ADDITIONAL WT GETS APPLIED IN THE LOAD PLANNER OR ON THE FINAL CREW FORM. WE HAD FLOWN THE 2 PREVIOUS LEGS WITHOUT BEING INFORMED THAT THE TIRES WERE ON BOARD. WE REVIEWED THE OTHER FLT ENVELOPES ON THE ACFT AND REALIZED THAT OUT OF 16 OTHER FLTS, ONLY 1 WAS CORRECT. WE ARRIVED IN ZZZ AND HAD THE STATION SUPERINTENDENT MEET THE FLT. HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE TIRES IN THE FLYAWAY KIT, AND EXPLAINED THAT ACR 1 DOES IT DIFFERENT. HE INDICATED THAT ACR 1 APPLIES THE INFO TO THE WT AND BAL ADVISORY ON THE FLT RELEASE. ALL THE ACR 2 RELEASES SHOW ARE THE BASIC OPERATING WT, INCLUDING BASIC CREW AND NOT ANYTHING ELSE. I ASKED THAT HE MAKE THE CHANGES. ACR 2 CREW SHOULD BE BETTER INFORMED AS TO WHAT IS ON BOARD THE MAINT SUPPORT ITEMS WT. THE INFO SHOULD BE ON THE FLT RELEASE, OR BY THE INFO POSTED ON THE ACFT LOGBOOK. MY CONCERN IS HOW MANY OTHER ACR 2 FLTS HAVE NOT HAD THE CORRECT INFO SINCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW WT AND BAL PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.