Narrative:

I was the PF. We departed runway 9L out of ZZZ1 without incident. After reaching a clean confign and calling for 'climb thrust,' we were passing 3000 ft. It was at this time we received the initial master warning, triple chime, aural 'bleed air duct,' and the EICAS warning message 'left 14TH duct.' the captain xferred the radios to me and proceeded with the 'left or right 14TH duct' checklist in the cfm. We let ATC know we were having problems and we would keep them updated. During the climb, the captain was going through the checklist. The checklist stated if the warning persists for 40 seconds (it did) to close the 14TH stage 'sov' and open the 14TH stage 'isol' valve. After doing both items, the warning went away. The checklist then states to leave the affected thrust lever at idle and land at the nearest suitable airport. The captain let departure know of our emergency (left engine at idle) and our intent to return to the airport. The captain then went off communication #1 to advise operations of our return to the airport. I was accepting radar vectors and altitude changes from departure and then approach, once being handed off to them. I had at some point asked for flaps 8 degrees and 20 degrees. I was given a vector to intercept and join the localizer. Only after quickly getting the frequency and setting the runway 9R approach into the FMS did I realize how close to the airport we were. I accepted an approach clearance the same time the captain was coming back to communication #1. I saw the GS move below us and I asked for gear down. I put the autoplt in vertical speed mode at 1.0 to 1.3 in an attempt to catch the GS. I had pulled the right (operating) engine to idle in an attempt to control the airspeed. Even with both thrust levers at idle, however, the speed continued to increase. We got the overspd clacker at 230 KTS. A few moments later we got the GPWS aural warning 'terrain, terrain' and 'GS.' upon hearing all the warnings, I turned the autoplt off and started pulling up. We xferred the controls and at that time the runway came into sight. We were already in a position where a safe approach could not be made and we started a go around. The captain and I both agreed we needed more time for another approach. I told tower we would like to do another approach, but we needed delay vectors to complete checklists. After the 'missed approach/go around' checklist was completed, I stated to approach that we were ready for the approach. The captain flew the radar vectors and we intercepted the localizer and GS with flaps 20 degrees and gear down. We were cleared for the approach and then handed off to tower. Tower cleared us to land, we were also notified that the 2 aircraft before us had gone around for windshear with gain/losses of 20 KTS. Soon after we received the windshear warning, aural 'windshear, windshear' and alpha margin on the pfd's, a go around was initiated. The captain used both thrust levers on the go around. When I called positive rate, we once again got the windshear warning. The aural 'bleed air duct' was also going off because the original 'duct' warning message returned. After clearing the second windshear, the captain reduced the left thrust lever to idle and the warning went out. We then proceeded to clean up the aircraft. I called tower and let them know of our go around due to windshear with final gains and losses of 30 KTS. We both agreed that going to ZZZ2 would be a better choice. We were given a clearance to ZZZ2. Approach gave us radar vectors to runway 1R and a successful landing was made. Supplemental information from acn 634421: I then noticed that my first officer was having some problems with speed control. The thrust levers were at idle and the airspeed was still increasing. Unable to slow the aircraft, we received the overspd clacker (230 KTS). My first officer seemed a little nervous so I asked if she wanted me to take the controls. She said yes and we established a smooth xfer of controls using standard phraseology. As I look at the events of that flight, it becomes very obvious that lack of crew communication and planning played a huge part in the problems that arose. I did not properly convey to my first officer when I went off of radio #1 that we were not to accept an approach until we had completed all pertinent checklists (including a thorough approach brief) and we both were completely ready to start an approach. I then tried to catch up with my first officer rather than asking for a vector off the localizer to have more time. I also believe that a strong urge to 'get the plane on the ground' caused a poor decision in commencing what was essentially a single engine approach at a time that possible windshear was present on the approach. I believe that if we, as a crew, communicated our intentions to each other better and slowed down substantially (not let nerves or ATC decide when we would get the plane on the ground), we could have made much better choices and avoided putting the aircraft into sits where the margin for error was greatly reduced.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF CARJ RECEIVE PNEUMATIC DUCT WARNING ON TKOF. PROC REQUIRES A LNDG AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. 2 UNSTABLE APCHS IN WINDSHEAR CONDITIONS CONVINCE THE CREW THAT ZZZ1 IS UNSUITABLE AND THEY PROCEED SAFELY TO ZZZ2.

Narrative: I WAS THE PF. WE DEPARTED RWY 9L OUT OF ZZZ1 WITHOUT INCIDENT. AFTER REACHING A CLEAN CONFIGN AND CALLING FOR 'CLB THRUST,' WE WERE PASSING 3000 FT. IT WAS AT THIS TIME WE RECEIVED THE INITIAL MASTER WARNING, TRIPLE CHIME, AURAL 'BLEED AIR DUCT,' AND THE EICAS WARNING MESSAGE 'L 14TH DUCT.' THE CAPT XFERRED THE RADIOS TO ME AND PROCEEDED WITH THE 'L OR R 14TH DUCT' CHKLIST IN THE CFM. WE LET ATC KNOW WE WERE HAVING PROBS AND WE WOULD KEEP THEM UPDATED. DURING THE CLB, THE CAPT WAS GOING THROUGH THE CHKLIST. THE CHKLIST STATED IF THE WARNING PERSISTS FOR 40 SECONDS (IT DID) TO CLOSE THE 14TH STAGE 'SOV' AND OPEN THE 14TH STAGE 'ISOL' VALVE. AFTER DOING BOTH ITEMS, THE WARNING WENT AWAY. THE CHKLIST THEN STATES TO LEAVE THE AFFECTED THRUST LEVER AT IDLE AND LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. THE CAPT LET DEP KNOW OF OUR EMER (L ENG AT IDLE) AND OUR INTENT TO RETURN TO THE ARPT. THE CAPT THEN WENT OFF COM #1 TO ADVISE OPS OF OUR RETURN TO THE ARPT. I WAS ACCEPTING RADAR VECTORS AND ALT CHANGES FROM DEP AND THEN APCH, ONCE BEING HANDED OFF TO THEM. I HAD AT SOME POINT ASKED FOR FLAPS 8 DEGS AND 20 DEGS. I WAS GIVEN A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT AND JOIN THE LOC. ONLY AFTER QUICKLY GETTING THE FREQ AND SETTING THE RWY 9R APCH INTO THE FMS DID I REALIZE HOW CLOSE TO THE ARPT WE WERE. I ACCEPTED AN APCH CLRNC THE SAME TIME THE CAPT WAS COMING BACK TO COM #1. I SAW THE GS MOVE BELOW US AND I ASKED FOR GEAR DOWN. I PUT THE AUTOPLT IN VERT SPD MODE AT 1.0 TO 1.3 IN AN ATTEMPT TO CATCH THE GS. I HAD PULLED THE R (OPERATING) ENG TO IDLE IN AN ATTEMPT TO CTL THE AIRSPD. EVEN WITH BOTH THRUST LEVERS AT IDLE, HOWEVER, THE SPD CONTINUED TO INCREASE. WE GOT THE OVERSPD CLACKER AT 230 KTS. A FEW MOMENTS LATER WE GOT THE GPWS AURAL WARNING 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN' AND 'GS.' UPON HEARING ALL THE WARNINGS, I TURNED THE AUTOPLT OFF AND STARTED PULLING UP. WE XFERRED THE CTLS AND AT THAT TIME THE RWY CAME INTO SIGHT. WE WERE ALREADY IN A POS WHERE A SAFE APCH COULD NOT BE MADE AND WE STARTED A GAR. THE CAPT AND I BOTH AGREED WE NEEDED MORE TIME FOR ANOTHER APCH. I TOLD TWR WE WOULD LIKE TO DO ANOTHER APCH, BUT WE NEEDED DELAY VECTORS TO COMPLETE CHKLISTS. AFTER THE 'MISSED APCH/GAR' CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED, I STATED TO APCH THAT WE WERE READY FOR THE APCH. THE CAPT FLEW THE RADAR VECTORS AND WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND GS WITH FLAPS 20 DEGS AND GEAR DOWN. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH AND THEN HANDED OFF TO TWR. TWR CLRED US TO LAND, WE WERE ALSO NOTIFIED THAT THE 2 ACFT BEFORE US HAD GONE AROUND FOR WINDSHEAR WITH GAIN/LOSSES OF 20 KTS. SOON AFTER WE RECEIVED THE WINDSHEAR WARNING, AURAL 'WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR' AND ALPHA MARGIN ON THE PFD'S, A GAR WAS INITIATED. THE CAPT USED BOTH THRUST LEVERS ON THE GAR. WHEN I CALLED POSITIVE RATE, WE ONCE AGAIN GOT THE WINDSHEAR WARNING. THE AURAL 'BLEED AIR DUCT' WAS ALSO GOING OFF BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL 'DUCT' WARNING MESSAGE RETURNED. AFTER CLRING THE SECOND WINDSHEAR, THE CAPT REDUCED THE L THRUST LEVER TO IDLE AND THE WARNING WENT OUT. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO CLEAN UP THE ACFT. I CALLED TWR AND LET THEM KNOW OF OUR GAR DUE TO WINDSHEAR WITH FINAL GAINS AND LOSSES OF 30 KTS. WE BOTH AGREED THAT GOING TO ZZZ2 WOULD BE A BETTER CHOICE. WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO ZZZ2. APCH GAVE US RADAR VECTORS TO RWY 1R AND A SUCCESSFUL LNDG WAS MADE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 634421: I THEN NOTICED THAT MY FO WAS HAVING SOME PROBS WITH SPD CTL. THE THRUST LEVERS WERE AT IDLE AND THE AIRSPD WAS STILL INCREASING. UNABLE TO SLOW THE ACFT, WE RECEIVED THE OVERSPD CLACKER (230 KTS). MY FO SEEMED A LITTLE NERVOUS SO I ASKED IF SHE WANTED ME TO TAKE THE CTLS. SHE SAID YES AND WE ESTABLISHED A SMOOTH XFER OF CTLS USING STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY. AS I LOOK AT THE EVENTS OF THAT FLT, IT BECOMES VERY OBVIOUS THAT LACK OF CREW COM AND PLANNING PLAYED A HUGE PART IN THE PROBS THAT AROSE. I DID NOT PROPERLY CONVEY TO MY FO WHEN I WENT OFF OF RADIO #1 THAT WE WERE NOT TO ACCEPT AN APCH UNTIL WE HAD COMPLETED ALL PERTINENT CHKLISTS (INCLUDING A THOROUGH APCH BRIEF) AND WE BOTH WERE COMPLETELY READY TO START AN APCH. I THEN TRIED TO CATCH UP WITH MY FO RATHER THAN ASKING FOR A VECTOR OFF THE LOC TO HAVE MORE TIME. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT A STRONG URGE TO 'GET THE PLANE ON THE GND' CAUSED A POOR DECISION IN COMMENCING WHAT WAS ESSENTIALLY A SINGLE ENG APCH AT A TIME THAT POSSIBLE WINDSHEAR WAS PRESENT ON THE APCH. I BELIEVE THAT IF WE, AS A CREW, COMMUNICATED OUR INTENTIONS TO EACH OTHER BETTER AND SLOWED DOWN SUBSTANTIALLY (NOT LET NERVES OR ATC DECIDE WHEN WE WOULD GET THE PLANE ON THE GND), WE COULD HAVE MADE MUCH BETTER CHOICES AND AVOIDED PUTTING THE ACFT INTO SITS WHERE THE MARGIN FOR ERROR WAS GREATLY REDUCED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.