Narrative:

I was being vectored for the visual approach runway 14 by approach control. I had received clearance to descend from 3000-2000 ft and to contact tower. At that point I selected the gear down and set approach flaps to 15 degrees approach setting to lose the altitude and set up for the visual approach. On contacting the tower I was advised that I could have runway 23 if desired. I accepted the clearance for the visual to runway 23. This presented a straight in approach from the ene. Everything was normal until I flared for the landing, at which point I felt the nose pitch over, the propellers start striking the runway. I immediately pulled the mixture levers to cut-off. I then felt the aft end of the plane settling to the runway and noted smoke in the cockpit. I immediately switched the master switch off and exited the airplane. The plane came to rest in a distance of about 1500-2000 ft. I rapidly exited the aircraft, and shortly the fire rescue people arrived. At the time of flaring, there was no indication of a gear retracted, no audible warning, and the gear selector was in the down position. During the recovery of the aircraft I was advised to contact the tower, at which time the tower advised me that he attempted to call in the blind, even though he knew it was too late, that the gear was up. I was already settling on the runway. Tower stated that he had observed the approach of the aircraft and everything looked normal with the gear down, but after checking for a conflict with aircraft taxiing on the ground he looked again and noted that the gear was not down and knowing that it was too late, made the call that the gear was not down. I never heard the call due to the tremendous noise of the propellers striking the ground and the plane sliding on the runway. All indications were that the gear was down both mechanically and by the feel of the aircraft. I had no indication that the gear had partially retracted or retracted, and there was no warning when throttling back that the gear was not down and locked. Lesson learned from this incident are to ensure that the landing gear system work properly to include any audible warning and visual indicators, to check the indicators for a down and locked a minimum of 3 times, first on the initial lowering of the gear, 500 ft of touchdown ht, and finally again before short final. I would also stress the use of mirrors to verify that at least the nose gear is down and appears locked. I cannot remember if I looked out the window and verified that I saw the nose gear down.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE58 PLT LANDS GEAR UP AFTER RPTEDLY PUTTING THE GEAR HANDLE DOWN, NOTING FLT CHARACTERISTICS CONSISTENT WITH GEAR IN THE DOWN POS, AND HEARING NO AUDIBLE WARNINGS.

Narrative: I WAS BEING VECTORED FOR THE VISUAL APCH RWY 14 BY APCH CTL. I HAD RECEIVED CLRNC TO DSND FROM 3000-2000 FT AND TO CONTACT TWR. AT THAT POINT I SELECTED THE GEAR DOWN AND SET APCH FLAPS TO 15 DEGS APCH SETTING TO LOSE THE ALT AND SET UP FOR THE VISUAL APCH. ON CONTACTING THE TWR I WAS ADVISED THAT I COULD HAVE RWY 23 IF DESIRED. I ACCEPTED THE CLRNC FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 23. THIS PRESENTED A STRAIGHT IN APCH FROM THE ENE. EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL UNTIL I FLARED FOR THE LNDG, AT WHICH POINT I FELT THE NOSE PITCH OVER, THE PROPS START STRIKING THE RWY. I IMMEDIATELY PULLED THE MIXTURE LEVERS TO CUT-OFF. I THEN FELT THE AFT END OF THE PLANE SETTLING TO THE RWY AND NOTED SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. I IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED THE MASTER SWITCH OFF AND EXITED THE AIRPLANE. THE PLANE CAME TO REST IN A DISTANCE OF ABOUT 1500-2000 FT. I RAPIDLY EXITED THE ACFT, AND SHORTLY THE FIRE RESCUE PEOPLE ARRIVED. AT THE TIME OF FLARING, THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF A GEAR RETRACTED, NO AUDIBLE WARNING, AND THE GEAR SELECTOR WAS IN THE DOWN POS. DURING THE RECOVERY OF THE ACFT I WAS ADVISED TO CONTACT THE TWR, AT WHICH TIME THE TWR ADVISED ME THAT HE ATTEMPTED TO CALL IN THE BLIND, EVEN THOUGH HE KNEW IT WAS TOO LATE, THAT THE GEAR WAS UP. I WAS ALREADY SETTLING ON THE RWY. TWR STATED THAT HE HAD OBSERVED THE APCH OF THE ACFT AND EVERYTHING LOOKED NORMAL WITH THE GEAR DOWN, BUT AFTER CHKING FOR A CONFLICT WITH ACFT TAXIING ON THE GND HE LOOKED AGAIN AND NOTED THAT THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN AND KNOWING THAT IT WAS TOO LATE, MADE THE CALL THAT THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN. I NEVER HEARD THE CALL DUE TO THE TREMENDOUS NOISE OF THE PROPS STRIKING THE GND AND THE PLANE SLIDING ON THE RWY. ALL INDICATIONS WERE THAT THE GEAR WAS DOWN BOTH MECHANICALLY AND BY THE FEEL OF THE ACFT. I HAD NO INDICATION THAT THE GEAR HAD PARTIALLY RETRACTED OR RETRACTED, AND THERE WAS NO WARNING WHEN THROTTLING BACK THAT THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN AND LOCKED. LESSON LEARNED FROM THIS INCIDENT ARE TO ENSURE THAT THE LNDG GEAR SYS WORK PROPERLY TO INCLUDE ANY AUDIBLE WARNING AND VISUAL INDICATORS, TO CHK THE INDICATORS FOR A DOWN AND LOCKED A MINIMUM OF 3 TIMES, FIRST ON THE INITIAL LOWERING OF THE GEAR, 500 FT OF TOUCHDOWN HT, AND FINALLY AGAIN BEFORE SHORT FINAL. I WOULD ALSO STRESS THE USE OF MIRRORS TO VERIFY THAT AT LEAST THE NOSE GEAR IS DOWN AND APPEARS LOCKED. I CANNOT REMEMBER IF I LOOKED OUT THE WINDOW AND VERIFIED THAT I SAW THE NOSE GEAR DOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.