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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 636093 |
Time | |
Date | 200411 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : rno.airport |
State Reference | NV |
Altitude | msl single value : 7500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Weather Elements | Snow |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : rno.tracon tower : lgb.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | ils localizer only : 16r |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : missed approach |
Route In Use | approach : instrument non precision |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Experience | flight time total : 8000 flight time type : 4200 |
ASRS Report | 636093 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | inflight encounter : weather non adherence : far non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment : gpws other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : executed missed approach flight crew : took evasive action flight crew : diverted to alternate |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Weather Navigational Facility Flight Crew Human Performance Airspace Structure Airport ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
We had set up and briefed for runway 34L localizer back course into rno. Captain was the PF. WX getting worse, so controllers tell us to expect for silver ILS runway 16R. We set-up and briefed the ILS including all special procedures, special to reno. While being vectored for the approach, we were advised the RVR was down to 4000 ft. We were on the ILS runway 16R approach, when shortly after intercepting the GS, we lost our GS indication. Tower instructed us to follow the published missed. Tower told us to expect localizer 2, runway 16R approach. Captain told me the 'dda' would be 5750 ft and the approach would be basically the same, but without the GS. He told me this while I was still searching for my approach plate, so I neither agreed or disagreed with what he said. There was not much traffic in the area, so we were quickly vectored onto our downwind leg. Since the captain said no more, I figured he was all ready, somehow, for the approach. Starting to feel just a little rushed, I start to review the approach and box set-up. While checking the approach page in the box, I found the ILS runway 16R was still selected. I changed to localizer runway 16R with acknowledgement from the captain and continued my review. I also brought to his attention that the missed approach procedure was different, along with the engine failure missed approach procedure. Both much less complicated than the previous procedures we briefed for the previously attempted ILS approach. We were on the base leg by now. A few quick comments to the captain about my callout altitudes, and I felt I was pretty much caught up. At this point, we were cleared for the approach. We joined the approach outside takle at 8200 ft. We crossed takle and started down to cross dicey at 6700 ft. Shortly after we nosed over on the descent, at around 7500 ft, we got a GPWS 'terrain, terrain' warning. We were about 3.5 mi from dicey, and exactly on localizer course. We were IMC, so we pulled up and declared to the tower we had GPWS warning and were going around. We didn't feel we were in any danger of hitting terrain. The captain told me to request a clearance back to las, which was our alternate. It wasn't long after we got the plane cleaned up that we realized we didn't have the visibility to do the localizer approach. We needed 2 1/2 mi visibility. The last report we got, the visibility was 4000 ft RVR. I am not exactly sure, but I think we received that report before we attempted the previous ILS approach. On the way back to las, we were never queried by any of the controllers about our GPWS warning, or about the visibility requirement associated with the localizer approach into rno. We abandoned the approach before the FAF, so we should have escaped breaking a far. Why were we so stupid? I think fatigue played a big factor in our actions (I should say, lack of actions). We started early on the east coast, so it already had been a long day. I had flown 6 out of the previous 8 days. We had food for the leg, but didn't find time to eat it. These above reasons I'm sure should be considered when trying to figure out why the captain basically only gave 10% of his normal approach brief when briefing the localizer approach. When we briefed our first expected approach, the localizer back course runway 34L, we reviewed the QRH, and was given a very complete brief. Same goes for the ILS runway 16R approach brief. Both very complete. Talked about visibility requirements on both of those briefs. On the setup for the localizer approach, I should have told the captain I needed more time to review the approach. (Then I would have not neglected to review 'visibility' box.) I should have told the captain he was rushing the approach. If the captain would have given a normal complete brief, which was appropriate for this situation, we would have gotten everything right. I still wonder why the controllers suggested an approach that would guarantee a missed approach with the current WX. I have no recollection of them ever reminding us of the WX during any part of the localizer approach.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AFTER BRIEFING ONE APCH THEN BEING SWITCHED TO ANOTHER FOLLOWED BY A MISSED APCH ON THAT ONE FOR GS LOSS, AN A320 FLT CREW FLIES THE LOC 2 RWY 16R APCH, UNTIL A TERRAIN WARNING IS ISSUED BY THE GPWS SYS 3 PT 5 MI FROM DICEY. DIVERTED TO ALTERNATE.
Narrative: WE HAD SET UP AND BRIEFED FOR RWY 34L LOC BACK COURSE INTO RNO. CAPT WAS THE PF. WX GETTING WORSE, SO CTLRS TELL US TO EXPECT FOR SILVER ILS RWY 16R. WE SET-UP AND BRIEFED THE ILS INCLUDING ALL SPECIAL PROCS, SPECIAL TO RENO. WHILE BEING VECTORED FOR THE APCH, WE WERE ADVISED THE RVR WAS DOWN TO 4000 FT. WE WERE ON THE ILS RWY 16R APCH, WHEN SHORTLY AFTER INTERCEPTING THE GS, WE LOST OUR GS INDICATION. TWR INSTRUCTED US TO FOLLOW THE PUBLISHED MISSED. TWR TOLD US TO EXPECT LOC 2, RWY 16R APCH. CAPT TOLD ME THE 'DDA' WOULD BE 5750 FT AND THE APCH WOULD BE BASICALLY THE SAME, BUT WITHOUT THE GS. HE TOLD ME THIS WHILE I WAS STILL SEARCHING FOR MY APCH PLATE, SO I NEITHER AGREED OR DISAGREED WITH WHAT HE SAID. THERE WAS NOT MUCH TFC IN THE AREA, SO WE WERE QUICKLY VECTORED ONTO OUR DOWNWIND LEG. SINCE THE CAPT SAID NO MORE, I FIGURED HE WAS ALL READY, SOMEHOW, FOR THE APCH. STARTING TO FEEL JUST A LITTLE RUSHED, I START TO REVIEW THE APCH AND BOX SET-UP. WHILE CHKING THE APCH PAGE IN THE BOX, I FOUND THE ILS RWY 16R WAS STILL SELECTED. I CHANGED TO LOC RWY 16R WITH ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM THE CAPT AND CONTINUED MY REVIEW. I ALSO BROUGHT TO HIS ATTN THAT THE MISSED APCH PROC WAS DIFFERENT, ALONG WITH THE ENG FAILURE MISSED APCH PROC. BOTH MUCH LESS COMPLICATED THAN THE PREVIOUS PROCS WE BRIEFED FOR THE PREVIOUSLY ATTEMPTED ILS APCH. WE WERE ON THE BASE LEG BY NOW. A FEW QUICK COMMENTS TO THE CAPT ABOUT MY CALLOUT ALTS, AND I FELT I WAS PRETTY MUCH CAUGHT UP. AT THIS POINT, WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. WE JOINED THE APCH OUTSIDE TAKLE AT 8200 FT. WE CROSSED TAKLE AND STARTED DOWN TO CROSS DICEY AT 6700 FT. SHORTLY AFTER WE NOSED OVER ON THE DSCNT, AT AROUND 7500 FT, WE GOT A GPWS 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN' WARNING. WE WERE ABOUT 3.5 MI FROM DICEY, AND EXACTLY ON LOC COURSE. WE WERE IMC, SO WE PULLED UP AND DECLARED TO THE TWR WE HAD GPWS WARNING AND WERE GOING AROUND. WE DIDN'T FEEL WE WERE IN ANY DANGER OF HITTING TERRAIN. THE CAPT TOLD ME TO REQUEST A CLRNC BACK TO LAS, WHICH WAS OUR ALTERNATE. IT WASN'T LONG AFTER WE GOT THE PLANE CLEANED UP THAT WE REALIZED WE DIDN'T HAVE THE VISIBILITY TO DO THE LOC APCH. WE NEEDED 2 1/2 MI VISIBILITY. THE LAST RPT WE GOT, THE VISIBILITY WAS 4000 FT RVR. I AM NOT EXACTLY SURE, BUT I THINK WE RECEIVED THAT RPT BEFORE WE ATTEMPTED THE PREVIOUS ILS APCH. ON THE WAY BACK TO LAS, WE WERE NEVER QUERIED BY ANY OF THE CTLRS ABOUT OUR GPWS WARNING, OR ABOUT THE VISIBILITY REQUIREMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE LOC APCH INTO RNO. WE ABANDONED THE APCH BEFORE THE FAF, SO WE SHOULD HAVE ESCAPED BREAKING A FAR. WHY WERE WE SO STUPID? I THINK FATIGUE PLAYED A BIG FACTOR IN OUR ACTIONS (I SHOULD SAY, LACK OF ACTIONS). WE STARTED EARLY ON THE EAST COAST, SO IT ALREADY HAD BEEN A LONG DAY. I HAD FLOWN 6 OUT OF THE PREVIOUS 8 DAYS. WE HAD FOOD FOR THE LEG, BUT DIDN'T FIND TIME TO EAT IT. THESE ABOVE REASONS I'M SURE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHEN TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHY THE CAPT BASICALLY ONLY GAVE 10% OF HIS NORMAL APCH BRIEF WHEN BRIEFING THE LOC APCH. WHEN WE BRIEFED OUR FIRST EXPECTED APCH, THE LOC BACK COURSE RWY 34L, WE REVIEWED THE QRH, AND WAS GIVEN A VERY COMPLETE BRIEF. SAME GOES FOR THE ILS RWY 16R APCH BRIEF. BOTH VERY COMPLETE. TALKED ABOUT VISIBILITY REQUIREMENTS ON BOTH OF THOSE BRIEFS. ON THE SETUP FOR THE LOC APCH, I SHOULD HAVE TOLD THE CAPT I NEEDED MORE TIME TO REVIEW THE APCH. (THEN I WOULD HAVE NOT NEGLECTED TO REVIEW 'VISIBILITY' BOX.) I SHOULD HAVE TOLD THE CAPT HE WAS RUSHING THE APCH. IF THE CAPT WOULD HAVE GIVEN A NORMAL COMPLETE BRIEF, WHICH WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THIS SIT, WE WOULD HAVE GOTTEN EVERYTHING RIGHT. I STILL WONDER WHY THE CTLRS SUGGESTED AN APCH THAT WOULD GUARANTEE A MISSED APCH WITH THE CURRENT WX. I HAVE NO RECOLLECTION OF THEM EVER REMINDING US OF THE WX DURING ANY PART OF THE LOC APCH.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.