Narrative:

Starting out our day 2 of a 2-DAY sequence, we met the off-going pilots in the jetway when they arrived. I was briefed that the FMC fuel quality totalizer was giving them erroneous readings by several thousand pounds. I called maintenance control to discuss the matter with them, and it was agreed that a logbook entry should be made using an MEL 34-36 relief. The off-going captain wrote up the discrepancy in the logbook. It said something like MEL 34-36 FMC fuel quantity totalizer inoperative, and he filled out the yellow MEL crew deferral stickers and I put the large one in the inside cover, and the smaller one on the FMC itself in the cockpit. He handed me the book and left the scene for his overnight. I read what he had written in the log and noted that the words 'SP1 complied with' wasn't entered nor was the tracking number which we had gotten from maintenance control. So using my blue pen, I added that information to the logbook page. I also corrected the 'no items' on flight release to reflect our newly added MEL, along with the zulu time and initials our dispatcher. With that, the first officer and I did our preflight items and we pushed for ZZZ on time, and arrived uneventfully at gate in ZZZ a few mins early. We were scheduled to give up the aircraft after this first leg, so we met the new oncoming crew in the jetway. (Name) was the captain and he expressed issue with why we used that MEL to cover the fuel totalizer as being inoperative, and I explained that we could have used the fuel summation relief, but that unit had just been right&right'ed on the previous day, and so maintenance control felt confident that it was more than likely in the FMC software versus the sending unit. Therefore, we MEL'ed the FMC for erroneous indications, but that all the other functions of navigation, etc, were operable. I told him that we had dripped the fuel tanks in ZZZ1 just to verify that we indeed had the same amount of fuel which was indicated both on the wing gauges and those individual ones on the forward instrument panel in the cockpit. I suggested that he might want to do the same just to set hs mind at ease since he still seemed agitated with the whole MEL scenario. I also told him that with the FMC fuel quantity being bad, we had used the individual gauges to figure out our true landing weight by using their totals, and adding the zero fuel weight, and figuring the speeds using the opc numbers. I backed up our numbers with the forecasted landing weight and everything checked out within a couple hundred pounds of the dispatch release forecast. I departed for my deadheading flight at an adjacent gate, and when I departed the plane, the operations agent said there was a phone call for me. It was the captain on the phone and he informed me that he had to make a pen and ink change to the original logbook entry because the original captain (name) had also failed to write the MEL up per the fom's suggested wording. He said that he added the words 'ok to continue per' MEL 34-36 and he had initiated and time stamped his correction to the page, thus indicating that I had flown the aircraft on my leg without the proper wording regarding this discrepancy. He was concerned that me and my first officer might be violated, so he suggested that we submit this report. I spoke to maintenance control again regarding this issue and they said that they weren't 100% sure that those words were required exactly as written on a 'crew deferral,' but for maintenance entries, one must allude to the fact that the MEL was complied with and that you are intending to further operate using that 'relief' as addressed in the MEL.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 WAS DISPATCHED WITH A FAILED FMC FUEL TOTALIZER DEFERRED PER THE MEL, BUT LOGBOOK ENTRY WAS INCORRECT.

Narrative: STARTING OUT OUR DAY 2 OF A 2-DAY SEQUENCE, WE MET THE OFF-GOING PLTS IN THE JETWAY WHEN THEY ARRIVED. I WAS BRIEFED THAT THE FMC FUEL QUALITY TOTALIZER WAS GIVING THEM ERRONEOUS READINGS BY SEVERAL THOUSAND LBS. I CALLED MAINT CTL TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THEM, AND IT WAS AGREED THAT A LOGBOOK ENTRY SHOULD BE MADE USING AN MEL 34-36 RELIEF. THE OFF-GOING CAPT WROTE UP THE DISCREPANCY IN THE LOGBOOK. IT SAID SOMETHING LIKE MEL 34-36 FMC FUEL QUANTITY TOTALIZER INOP, AND HE FILLED OUT THE YELLOW MEL CREW DEFERRAL STICKERS AND I PUT THE LARGE ONE IN THE INSIDE COVER, AND THE SMALLER ONE ON THE FMC ITSELF IN THE COCKPIT. HE HANDED ME THE BOOK AND LEFT THE SCENE FOR HIS OVERNIGHT. I READ WHAT HE HAD WRITTEN IN THE LOG AND NOTED THAT THE WORDS 'SP1 COMPLIED WITH' WASN'T ENTERED NOR WAS THE TRACKING NUMBER WHICH WE HAD GOTTEN FROM MAINT CTL. SO USING MY BLUE PEN, I ADDED THAT INFO TO THE LOGBOOK PAGE. I ALSO CORRECTED THE 'NO ITEMS' ON FLT RELEASE TO REFLECT OUR NEWLY ADDED MEL, ALONG WITH THE ZULU TIME AND INITIALS OUR DISPATCHER. WITH THAT, THE FO AND I DID OUR PREFLT ITEMS AND WE PUSHED FOR ZZZ ON TIME, AND ARRIVED UNEVENTFULLY AT GATE IN ZZZ A FEW MINS EARLY. WE WERE SCHEDULED TO GIVE UP THE ACFT AFTER THIS FIRST LEG, SO WE MET THE NEW ONCOMING CREW IN THE JETWAY. (NAME) WAS THE CAPT AND HE EXPRESSED ISSUE WITH WHY WE USED THAT MEL TO COVER THE FUEL TOTALIZER AS BEING INOP, AND I EXPLAINED THAT WE COULD HAVE USED THE FUEL SUMMATION RELIEF, BUT THAT UNIT HAD JUST BEEN R&R'ED ON THE PREVIOUS DAY, AND SO MAINT CTL FELT CONFIDENT THAT IT WAS MORE THAN LIKELY IN THE FMC SOFTWARE VERSUS THE SENDING UNIT. THEREFORE, WE MEL'ED THE FMC FOR ERRONEOUS INDICATIONS, BUT THAT ALL THE OTHER FUNCTIONS OF NAV, ETC, WERE OPERABLE. I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD DRIPPED THE FUEL TANKS IN ZZZ1 JUST TO VERIFY THAT WE INDEED HAD THE SAME AMOUNT OF FUEL WHICH WAS INDICATED BOTH ON THE WING GAUGES AND THOSE INDIVIDUAL ONES ON THE FORWARD INST PANEL IN THE COCKPIT. I SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WANT TO DO THE SAME JUST TO SET HS MIND AT EASE SINCE HE STILL SEEMED AGITATED WITH THE WHOLE MEL SCENARIO. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT WITH THE FMC FUEL QUANTITY BEING BAD, WE HAD USED THE INDIVIDUAL GAUGES TO FIGURE OUT OUR TRUE LNDG WT BY USING THEIR TOTALS, AND ADDING THE ZERO FUEL WT, AND FIGURING THE SPDS USING THE OPC NUMBERS. I BACKED UP OUR NUMBERS WITH THE FORECASTED LNDG WT AND EVERYTHING CHKED OUT WITHIN A COUPLE HUNDRED LBS OF THE DISPATCH RELEASE FORECAST. I DEPARTED FOR MY DEADHEADING FLT AT AN ADJACENT GATE, AND WHEN I DEPARTED THE PLANE, THE OPS AGENT SAID THERE WAS A PHONE CALL FOR ME. IT WAS THE CAPT ON THE PHONE AND HE INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD TO MAKE A PEN AND INK CHANGE TO THE ORIGINAL LOGBOOK ENTRY BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL CAPT (NAME) HAD ALSO FAILED TO WRITE THE MEL UP PER THE FOM'S SUGGESTED WORDING. HE SAID THAT HE ADDED THE WORDS 'OK TO CONTINUE PER' MEL 34-36 AND HE HAD INITIATED AND TIME STAMPED HIS CORRECTION TO THE PAGE, THUS INDICATING THAT I HAD FLOWN THE ACFT ON MY LEG WITHOUT THE PROPER WORDING REGARDING THIS DISCREPANCY. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT ME AND MY FO MIGHT BE VIOLATED, SO HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SUBMIT THIS RPT. I SPOKE TO MAINT CTL AGAIN REGARDING THIS ISSUE AND THEY SAID THAT THEY WEREN'T 100% SURE THAT THOSE WORDS WERE REQUIRED EXACTLY AS WRITTEN ON A 'CREW DEFERRAL,' BUT FOR MAINT ENTRIES, ONE MUST ALLUDE TO THE FACT THAT THE MEL WAS COMPLIED WITH AND THAT YOU ARE INTENDING TO FURTHER OPERATE USING THAT 'RELIEF' AS ADDRESSED IN THE MEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.