Narrative:

Military areas a, B, and C were hot as well as a military operation area. There were military operation packages distributed to each area and applicable sectors. There were several prescribed rtes south, but essentially no traffic could be east of J79. This closed the oceanic rtes and pushed traffic inland. 20 mins prior to the incident, I was assigned to the controller in charge position of the south area at ZJX. R76 keystone sector was very busy. They were effectively blending 4 streams of traffic sbound over omn. I (as the controller in charge) called tmu and the north area and asked that no more traffic from the ocean be delivered at FL350. The sector (R76) also informed me that most of the rerted aircraft were not receiving the correct routings. In reality, it was probably 1 in 3 aircraft with a bad route. I called the area manager in charge and told him these rtes needed to be issued before coming into the keystone sector (R76). He said he'd get on it. But it appeared to make no difference as aircraft continued to enter the sector on bad rtes. Shortly after this, I was relieved and reassigned as the tracker at the keystone sector (T76). 16 mins after assuming the position, air carrier X entered ZMA ARTCC's airspace on a bad route taking him toward the military operation area. The ZMA controller turned the aircraft drastically right and would had an operational error with a northbound aircraft climbing through FL350 near orlando. The 3 of us at keystone were charged with an operational deviation for missing this aircraft's route and allowing him to enter ZMA headed into the military area. Contributing factors: 1) we were extremely busy. 2) ZMA ARTCC (R02) was not taking handoffs in a timely manner. We had to make landline calls on numerous handoffs. They were busy too. But delaying taking the handoffs meant not talking to the aircraft in a timely manner. Thus, late recognition of bad route, excessive turn, etc. 3) not only were we trying to blend the 4 streams and keep them separated, but on top of that having to issue so many rtes kept us 'behind the power curve' the whole time. 4) the d-side D76 used the 'acid' sort method on the vref. This lists the aircraft in alphabetical order. Thus, aircraft lower in the alphabet are lower on the screen. In this instance, we had so many aircraft on the list that aircraft with call signs like X and Y were scrolled off the bottom of the screen and not visible to the rest of the team. This meant that host embedded route text and ATC preferential route codings (the blue alert box) could not be seen, thereby removing a helpful tool from use. The 'blue box' alerts us to a route that needs to be issued. Air carrier X would have been scrolled off the bottom. 5) many of the rtes listed in the military package did not actually tie into an aircraft's route. These rtes were issued by ZMA tmu and should have been correct. We lost plenty of valuable time trying to get these rtes right. As an afterthought, perhaps we should have stopped taking some handoffs as an effort to slow the sector down. Of course, the impact on surrounding sectors would have been significant.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZJX CTLR INVOLVED IN OPDEV AS NUMEROUS ACFT WERE RERTED BECAUSE OF A MIL OP, OVERLOADED SECTOR, AND ENTERED ZMA'S AIRSPACE ON WRONG ROUTING.

Narrative: MIL AREAS A, B, AND C WERE HOT AS WELL AS A MIL OP AREA. THERE WERE MIL OP PACKAGES DISTRIBUTED TO EACH AREA AND APPLICABLE SECTORS. THERE WERE SEVERAL PRESCRIBED RTES S, BUT ESSENTIALLY NO TFC COULD BE E OF J79. THIS CLOSED THE OCEANIC RTES AND PUSHED TFC INLAND. 20 MINS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT, I WAS ASSIGNED TO THE CIC POS OF THE S AREA AT ZJX. R76 KEYSTONE SECTOR WAS VERY BUSY. THEY WERE EFFECTIVELY BLENDING 4 STREAMS OF TFC SBOUND OVER OMN. I (AS THE CIC) CALLED TMU AND THE N AREA AND ASKED THAT NO MORE TFC FROM THE OCEAN BE DELIVERED AT FL350. THE SECTOR (R76) ALSO INFORMED ME THAT MOST OF THE RERTED ACFT WERE NOT RECEIVING THE CORRECT ROUTINGS. IN REALITY, IT WAS PROBABLY 1 IN 3 ACFT WITH A BAD RTE. I CALLED THE AREA MGR IN CHARGE AND TOLD HIM THESE RTES NEEDED TO BE ISSUED BEFORE COMING INTO THE KEYSTONE SECTOR (R76). HE SAID HE'D GET ON IT. BUT IT APPEARED TO MAKE NO DIFFERENCE AS ACFT CONTINUED TO ENTER THE SECTOR ON BAD RTES. SHORTLY AFTER THIS, I WAS RELIEVED AND REASSIGNED AS THE TRACKER AT THE KEYSTONE SECTOR (T76). 16 MINS AFTER ASSUMING THE POS, ACR X ENTERED ZMA ARTCC'S AIRSPACE ON A BAD RTE TAKING HIM TOWARD THE MIL OP AREA. THE ZMA CTLR TURNED THE ACFT DRASTICALLY R AND WOULD HAD AN OPERROR WITH A NBOUND ACFT CLBING THROUGH FL350 NEAR ORLANDO. THE 3 OF US AT KEYSTONE WERE CHARGED WITH AN OPDEV FOR MISSING THIS ACFT'S RTE AND ALLOWING HIM TO ENTER ZMA HEADED INTO THE MIL AREA. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) WE WERE EXTREMELY BUSY. 2) ZMA ARTCC (R02) WAS NOT TAKING HDOFS IN A TIMELY MANNER. WE HAD TO MAKE LANDLINE CALLS ON NUMEROUS HDOFS. THEY WERE BUSY TOO. BUT DELAYING TAKING THE HDOFS MEANT NOT TALKING TO THE ACFT IN A TIMELY MANNER. THUS, LATE RECOGNITION OF BAD RTE, EXCESSIVE TURN, ETC. 3) NOT ONLY WERE WE TRYING TO BLEND THE 4 STREAMS AND KEEP THEM SEPARATED, BUT ON TOP OF THAT HAVING TO ISSUE SO MANY RTES KEPT US 'BEHIND THE PWR CURVE' THE WHOLE TIME. 4) THE D-SIDE D76 USED THE 'ACID' SORT METHOD ON THE VREF. THIS LISTS THE ACFT IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER. THUS, ACFT LOWER IN THE ALPHABET ARE LOWER ON THE SCREEN. IN THIS INSTANCE, WE HAD SO MANY ACFT ON THE LIST THAT ACFT WITH CALL SIGNS LIKE X AND Y WERE SCROLLED OFF THE BOTTOM OF THE SCREEN AND NOT VISIBLE TO THE REST OF THE TEAM. THIS MEANT THAT HOST EMBEDDED RTE TEXT AND ATC PREFERENTIAL RTE CODINGS (THE BLUE ALERT BOX) COULD NOT BE SEEN, THEREBY REMOVING A HELPFUL TOOL FROM USE. THE 'BLUE BOX' ALERTS US TO A RTE THAT NEEDS TO BE ISSUED. ACR X WOULD HAVE BEEN SCROLLED OFF THE BOTTOM. 5) MANY OF THE RTES LISTED IN THE MIL PACKAGE DID NOT ACTUALLY TIE INTO AN ACFT'S RTE. THESE RTES WERE ISSUED BY ZMA TMU AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN CORRECT. WE LOST PLENTY OF VALUABLE TIME TRYING TO GET THESE RTES RIGHT. AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT, PERHAPS WE SHOULD HAVE STOPPED TAKING SOME HDOFS AS AN EFFORT TO SLOW THE SECTOR DOWN. OF COURSE, THE IMPACT ON SURROUNDING SECTORS WOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.