Narrative:

The purpose of this report is to identify a problem that is affecting safety at anchorage TRACON and possibly at other facilities throughout the nation. The anchorage TRACON today began attempting to revive a heretofore non-existent or non-operational etg (electronic target generator) training program, whereby controllers can be given training, recurrent or initial, on non live traffic sits. While a commendable endeavor, the FAA must accept the responsibility for the distraction this causes and the possible civil liability that could result from conducting this training along side of controllers who are working live traffic in a typically busy environment. The problem is that A11 does not have an etg training lab, and the training of not only instructors but also those who will act as ghost pilots and the actual trainees is being conducted in the 'operational' area where live busy traffic is being controled. This necessitates a minimum of an extra five to seven persons in the room at any given time. At one point today we had 17 persons in the control room. The room became stifling and the extra noise level dramatically contributed to the distraction of the controllers who were working live traffic. At one point an entry made for etg purposes caused the live traffic displays to freeze and controllers could not update their data tags. This occurred during a very busy session. One of the questions asked in any operational error/deviation investigation is always 'were there any distractions that contributed to the event.' the purpose of this report is to identify the fact that as long as the etg problems need to be conducted in the operational quarters the answer to this question will unequivocally be yes, there were unnecessary distractions. Controllers need to listen to what is going on in the room to be as much aware of the traffic sits as possible. The presence of non live traffic related training is not something we are tuned to listen to and distracts from vital air traffic awareness. The recommendation I would make would be to move the etg training to an etg lab, use other scopes available, some re-design of the room and scope allocation etc, and conduct the training at very low level traffic times of the day, not during our busiest sessions. Even though this may require staff to adjust their hours or possibly move the training to another location, it would enhance safety. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter confirmed that etg's had not been used for training at A11 in about nine years. He indicated that etg's may have been used to practice ASR approachs but was not certain. The controller indicated that the data block freeze problem occurred when the training staff tried to shut down the etg problem and was unsure if capacity was an issue. The reporter also confirmed that the facility has no separate room available to conduct etg training, leaving only the control room as the training platform, emphasizing the distraction(south) noted in the report. The reporter stated that he believes the etg problems were started as a reaction to a number of errors and deviations recently experienced by the facility. The controller also indicated that the etg equipment may not be certified to use, as was done on the subject occasion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A11 CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING ETG TRAINING ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN AN OPERATIONAL CTL ROOM, CAUSING DISTRACTIONS AND LOSS OF AUTOMATED RADAR DATA.

Narrative: THE PURPOSE OF THIS RPT IS TO IDENTIFY A PROB THAT IS AFFECTING SAFETY AT ANCHORAGE TRACON AND POSSIBLY AT OTHER FACILITIES THROUGHOUT THE NATION. THE ANCHORAGE TRACON TODAY BEGAN ATTEMPTING TO REVIVE A HERETOFORE NON-EXISTENT OR NON-OPERATIONAL ETG (ELECTRONIC TARGET GENERATOR) TRAINING PROGRAM, WHEREBY CTLRS CAN BE GIVEN TRAINING, RECURRENT OR INITIAL, ON NON LIVE TFC SITS. WHILE A COMMENDABLE ENDEAVOR, THE FAA MUST ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISTRACTION THIS CAUSES AND THE POSSIBLE CIVIL LIABILITY THAT COULD RESULT FROM CONDUCTING THIS TRAINING ALONG SIDE OF CTLRS WHO ARE WORKING LIVE TFC IN A TYPICALLY BUSY ENVIRONMENT. THE PROB IS THAT A11 DOES NOT HAVE AN ETG TRAINING LAB, AND THE TRAINING OF NOT ONLY INSTRUCTORS BUT ALSO THOSE WHO WILL ACT AS GHOST PLTS AND THE ACTUAL TRAINEES IS BEING CONDUCTED IN THE 'OPERATIONAL' AREA WHERE LIVE BUSY TFC IS BEING CTLED. THIS NECESSITATES A MINIMUM OF AN EXTRA FIVE TO SEVEN PERSONS IN THE ROOM AT ANY GIVEN TIME. AT ONE POINT TODAY WE HAD 17 PERSONS IN THE CTL ROOM. THE ROOM BECAME STIFLING AND THE EXTRA NOISE LEVEL DRAMATICALLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE DISTRACTION OF THE CTLRS WHO WERE WORKING LIVE TFC. AT ONE POINT AN ENTRY MADE FOR ETG PURPOSES CAUSED THE LIVE TFC DISPLAYS TO FREEZE AND CTLRS COULD NOT UPDATE THEIR DATA TAGS. THIS OCCURRED DURING A VERY BUSY SESSION. ONE OF THE QUESTIONS ASKED IN ANY OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEV INVESTIGATION IS ALWAYS 'WERE THERE ANY DISTRACTIONS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT.' THE PURPOSE OF THIS RPT IS TO IDENTIFY THE FACT THAT AS LONG AS THE ETG PROBLEMS NEED TO BE CONDUCTED IN THE OPERATIONAL QUARTERS THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WILL UNEQUIVOCALLY BE YES, THERE WERE UNNECESSARY DISTRACTIONS. CTLRS NEED TO LISTEN TO WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE ROOM TO BE AS MUCH AWARE OF THE TFC SITS AS POSSIBLE. THE PRESENCE OF NON LIVE TFC RELATED TRAINING IS NOT SOMETHING WE ARE TUNED TO LISTEN TO AND DISTRACTS FROM VITAL AIR TFC AWARENESS. THE RECOMMENDATION I WOULD MAKE WOULD BE TO MOVE THE ETG TRAINING TO AN ETG LAB, USE OTHER SCOPES AVAILABLE, SOME RE-DESIGN OF THE ROOM AND SCOPE ALLOCATION ETC, AND CONDUCT THE TRAINING AT VERY LOW LEVEL TFC TIMES OF THE DAY, NOT DURING OUR BUSIEST SESSIONS. EVEN THOUGH THIS MAY REQUIRE STAFF TO ADJUST THEIR HOURS OR POSSIBLY MOVE THE TRAINING TO ANOTHER LOCATION, IT WOULD ENHANCE SAFETY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR CONFIRMED THAT ETG'S HAD NOT BEEN USED FOR TRAINING AT A11 IN ABOUT NINE YEARS. HE INDICATED THAT ETG'S MAY HAVE BEEN USED TO PRACTICE ASR APCHS BUT WAS NOT CERTAIN. THE CTLR INDICATED THAT THE DATA BLOCK FREEZE PROB OCCURRED WHEN THE TRAINING STAFF TRIED TO SHUT DOWN THE ETG PROB AND WAS UNSURE IF CAPACITY WAS AN ISSUE. THE RPTR ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE FAC HAS NO SEPARATE ROOM AVAILABLE TO CONDUCT ETG TRAINING, LEAVING ONLY THE CTL ROOM AS THE TRAINING PLATFORM, EMPHASIZING THE DISTR(S) NOTED IN THE RPT. THE RPTR STATED THAT HE BELIEVES THE ETG PROBS WERE STARTED AS A REACTION TO A NUMBER OF ERRORS AND DEVS RECENTLY EXPERIENCED BY THE FAC. THE CTLR ALSO INDICATED THAT THE ETG EQUIP MAY NOT BE CERTIFIED TO USE, AS WAS DONE ON THE SUBJECT OCCASION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.