Narrative:

From ZZZZ to dfw, my flight crew elected to declare an emergency due to low fuel. We had a re-release flight plan with a re-release point at bdf. Our planned fuel at bdf was 22.3 thousand pounds and dispatch had re-released us about 1 hour prior to bdf with 19.7 thousand. Actual fuel on board at bdf was 21.0 thousand pounds. This 1300 pound high/low spread was holding steady as we passed over rzc, approximately 40 mins prior to planned touchdown. The WX at dfw was clear with all runways in use. The dispatch re-release effectively authority/authorized an 8.0 FOD and our actual fuel on board anticipated a 9.3 FOD. When switched over to the ZFW controller handling the byp corner post, we noticed that pilot controller communications were somewhat frenetic. As we neared our planned top of descent point we had not yet been given a descent clearance and made a request for a lower altitude. Like other aircraft on the frequency we were told, in a rather decisive manner, to stand by. About 20 mi past the descent point, we made another request for a lower level to no avail. Prior to this point we had begun to slow to a more conservative airspeed. Finally, about 35 mi from byp, and with other aircraft beneath us on arrival, we were given a sharp southerly vector with no clearance to descend. We were already slowed to reference +100 KTS, which is the recommended B767 endurance airspeed at FL350. Partway through the turn, we were instructed to turn to a 360 degree heading, followed by some confusing instructions to reverse the direction of the turn. Other aircraft appeared to be having similar ATC difficulties. After a number of mins of continued airspace conflicts, a new controller took over and we were given instructions to proceed back to the east to glove intersection with planned holding. As we approached the holding fix, we advised the new controller that we had minimum fuel and would need to divert if there was any significant length of holding expected. He advised us, and some other aircraft to plan to dive right if that was the case. At this point we had flown some distance away from both our destination, and our planned alternate of dal. Additionally, we expected that the same difficulties we were experiencing getting to dfw would also be encountered if we attempted to divert to dal. At this juncture, shv was very close by and in sight. We were in contact with dispatch regarding our fuel situation and relayed our desire to change our alternate to shv. Within a couple of mins, we had coordinated with ATC and dispatch for the shv diversion, only to find on the ATIS a few moments later the primary runway was closed leaving only a single 6200 ft runway. Since our fuel situation was now critical, and we could not afford to burn fuel while we conducted airport analysis and a search for other suitable alternates, we elected to point the aircraft toward dfw and evaluate the options. We declared an emergency and stated our need to proceed direct to dfw due to our low fuel situation. We programmed the FMC for direct routing to the runway 35C FAF and entered a zero value in the cost index box on the performance page. The FMC calculated a 6.4 FOD, though the totalizer fuel was actually 1.1 thousand pounds lighter than calculated. We reached our glide point approximately 60 mi and requested runway 31R to shorten distance to touchdown. ATC promptly facilitated all our requests and we landed with 5.2 thousand pounds. The 2 external factors that influenced this situation most are an apparent ATC trainee event and my company's fuel reduction program.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 LNDG DFW EXPERIENCED MINIMUM FUEL, IS ISSUED HOLDING, PLANS DIVERT BUT ACCEPTABLE RWY IS CLOSED, REQUIRING FUEL EMER DECLARATION FOR DFW.

Narrative: FROM ZZZZ TO DFW, MY FLT CREW ELECTED TO DECLARE AN EMER DUE TO LOW FUEL. WE HAD A RE-RELEASE FLT PLAN WITH A RE-RELEASE POINT AT BDF. OUR PLANNED FUEL AT BDF WAS 22.3 THOUSAND LBS AND DISPATCH HAD RE-RELEASED US ABOUT 1 HR PRIOR TO BDF WITH 19.7 THOUSAND. ACTUAL FUEL ON BOARD AT BDF WAS 21.0 THOUSAND LBS. THIS 1300 LB HIGH/LOW SPREAD WAS HOLDING STEADY AS WE PASSED OVER RZC, APPROX 40 MINS PRIOR TO PLANNED TOUCHDOWN. THE WX AT DFW WAS CLR WITH ALL RWYS IN USE. THE DISPATCH RE-RELEASE EFFECTIVELY AUTH AN 8.0 FOD AND OUR ACTUAL FUEL ON BOARD ANTICIPATED A 9.3 FOD. WHEN SWITCHED OVER TO THE ZFW CTLR HANDLING THE BYP CORNER POST, WE NOTICED THAT PLT CTLR COMS WERE SOMEWHAT FRENETIC. AS WE NEARED OUR PLANNED TOP OF DSCNT POINT WE HAD NOT YET BEEN GIVEN A DSCNT CLRNC AND MADE A REQUEST FOR A LOWER ALT. LIKE OTHER ACFT ON THE FREQ WE WERE TOLD, IN A RATHER DECISIVE MANNER, TO STAND BY. ABOUT 20 MI PAST THE DSCNT POINT, WE MADE ANOTHER REQUEST FOR A LOWER LEVEL TO NO AVAIL. PRIOR TO THIS POINT WE HAD BEGUN TO SLOW TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE AIRSPD. FINALLY, ABOUT 35 MI FROM BYP, AND WITH OTHER ACFT BENEATH US ON ARR, WE WERE GIVEN A SHARP SOUTHERLY VECTOR WITH NO CLRNC TO DSND. WE WERE ALREADY SLOWED TO REF +100 KTS, WHICH IS THE RECOMMENDED B767 ENDURANCE AIRSPD AT FL350. PARTWAY THROUGH THE TURN, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN TO A 360 DEG HDG, FOLLOWED BY SOME CONFUSING INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE DIRECTION OF THE TURN. OTHER ACFT APPEARED TO BE HAVING SIMILAR ATC DIFFICULTIES. AFTER A NUMBER OF MINS OF CONTINUED AIRSPACE CONFLICTS, A NEW CTLR TOOK OVER AND WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO PROCEED BACK TO THE E TO GLOVE INTXN WITH PLANNED HOLDING. AS WE APCHED THE HOLDING FIX, WE ADVISED THE NEW CTLR THAT WE HAD MINIMUM FUEL AND WOULD NEED TO DIVERT IF THERE WAS ANY SIGNIFICANT LENGTH OF HOLDING EXPECTED. HE ADVISED US, AND SOME OTHER ACFT TO PLAN TO DIVE R IF THAT WAS THE CASE. AT THIS POINT WE HAD FLOWN SOME DISTANCE AWAY FROM BOTH OUR DEST, AND OUR PLANNED ALTERNATE OF DAL. ADDITIONALLY, WE EXPECTED THAT THE SAME DIFFICULTIES WE WERE EXPERIENCING GETTING TO DFW WOULD ALSO BE ENCOUNTERED IF WE ATTEMPTED TO DIVERT TO DAL. AT THIS JUNCTURE, SHV WAS VERY CLOSE BY AND IN SIGHT. WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH DISPATCH REGARDING OUR FUEL SIT AND RELAYED OUR DESIRE TO CHANGE OUR ALTERNATE TO SHV. WITHIN A COUPLE OF MINS, WE HAD COORDINATED WITH ATC AND DISPATCH FOR THE SHV DIVERSION, ONLY TO FIND ON THE ATIS A FEW MOMENTS LATER THE PRIMARY RWY WAS CLOSED LEAVING ONLY A SINGLE 6200 FT RWY. SINCE OUR FUEL SIT WAS NOW CRITICAL, AND WE COULD NOT AFFORD TO BURN FUEL WHILE WE CONDUCTED ARPT ANALYSIS AND A SEARCH FOR OTHER SUITABLE ALTERNATES, WE ELECTED TO POINT THE ACFT TOWARD DFW AND EVALUATE THE OPTIONS. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND STATED OUR NEED TO PROCEED DIRECT TO DFW DUE TO OUR LOW FUEL SIT. WE PROGRAMMED THE FMC FOR DIRECT ROUTING TO THE RWY 35C FAF AND ENTERED A ZERO VALUE IN THE COST INDEX BOX ON THE PERFORMANCE PAGE. THE FMC CALCULATED A 6.4 FOD, THOUGH THE TOTALIZER FUEL WAS ACTUALLY 1.1 THOUSAND LBS LIGHTER THAN CALCULATED. WE REACHED OUR GLIDE POINT APPROX 60 MI AND REQUESTED RWY 31R TO SHORTEN DISTANCE TO TOUCHDOWN. ATC PROMPTLY FACILITATED ALL OUR REQUESTS AND WE LANDED WITH 5.2 THOUSAND LBS. THE 2 EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THIS SIT MOST ARE AN APPARENT ATC TRAINEE EVENT AND MY COMPANY'S FUEL REDUCTION PROGRAM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.