Narrative:

Flight was in contact with columbia approach control and in radar contact. Flight was north of cae, eastbound, descending from 10000 ft to 2500 ft for the visual approach to runway 29 at cae. FMS was set up for ILS runway 29 and ILS runway 29 frequency was tuned and idented in green data. In addition, captain had placed a 4 mi and 10 mi green ring around cae on the FMS. In order to allow time to lose altitude, flight proceeded eastbound out to 10 mi. (Flight was descending at 250 KIAS with flight spoilers deployed.) captain began right turn for base leg and first officer advised to keep it tight, we're in close. Captain continued to turn to a heading of approximately 210 degrees to intercept the localizer for runway 29 at cae. Flaps were lowered to 45 degrees, and landing gear was selected down and before landing check was complete. As flight aligned with extended runway centerline, both captain and first officer noted immediately that the FMS and green data did not agree with the runway that we were aligned with. First officer asked cae approach if the localizer for runway 29 was turned on. Flight had just begun descent for visual approach, when approach control advised that we were lined up with columbia downtown airport (cub), approximately 7 mi east, northeast of cae. Flight was instructed to climb to 2100 ft and proceed to cae. Captain increased thrust and climbed approximately 200 ft to 2100 ft and called for gear retraction and flaps were selected to 20 degrees. Captain purposely called for flaps 20 degrees because of the nearness of cae. Once aligned with localizer for runway 29 at cae, flight landed normally without further incident. I believe that because I was descended from a fairly high altitude, it was difficult to pick out the proper airport in the surrounding lights. My intention was to make my right turn to base and final based on the FMS and ILS localizer. When my first officer advised to, 'keep it tight,' I went with his recommendation because the FMS was dead reckoning by this point. However, because we did have the FMS and localizer set up and tuned, this allowed us to spot our error and question approach control as to our orientation before they even spotted it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 PLT DISCONTINUED A VISUAL APCH TO CUB WITH A CAE DEST FOLLOWING A HIGH APCH.

Narrative: FLT WAS IN CONTACT WITH COLUMBIA APCH CTL AND IN RADAR CONTACT. FLT WAS N OF CAE, EBOUND, DSNDING FROM 10000 FT TO 2500 FT FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 29 AT CAE. FMS WAS SET UP FOR ILS RWY 29 AND ILS RWY 29 FREQ WAS TUNED AND IDENTED IN GREEN DATA. IN ADDITION, CAPT HAD PLACED A 4 MI AND 10 MI GREEN RING AROUND CAE ON THE FMS. IN ORDER TO ALLOW TIME TO LOSE ALT, FLT PROCEEDED EBOUND OUT TO 10 MI. (FLT WAS DSNDING AT 250 KIAS WITH FLT SPOILERS DEPLOYED.) CAPT BEGAN R TURN FOR BASE LEG AND FO ADVISED TO KEEP IT TIGHT, WE'RE IN CLOSE. CAPT CONTINUED TO TURN TO A HDG OF APPROX 210 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR RWY 29 AT CAE. FLAPS WERE LOWERED TO 45 DEGS, AND LNDG GEAR WAS SELECTED DOWN AND BEFORE LNDG CHK WAS COMPLETE. AS FLT ALIGNED WITH EXTENDED RWY CTRLINE, BOTH CAPT AND FO NOTED IMMEDIATELY THAT THE FMS AND GREEN DATA DID NOT AGREE WITH THE RWY THAT WE WERE ALIGNED WITH. FO ASKED CAE APCH IF THE LOC FOR RWY 29 WAS TURNED ON. FLT HAD JUST BEGUN DSCNT FOR VISUAL APCH, WHEN APCH CTL ADVISED THAT WE WERE LINED UP WITH COLUMBIA DOWNTOWN ARPT (CUB), APPROX 7 MI E, NE OF CAE. FLT WAS INSTRUCTED TO CLB TO 2100 FT AND PROCEED TO CAE. CAPT INCREASED THRUST AND CLBED APPROX 200 FT TO 2100 FT AND CALLED FOR GEAR RETRACTION AND FLAPS WERE SELECTED TO 20 DEGS. CAPT PURPOSELY CALLED FOR FLAPS 20 DEGS BECAUSE OF THE NEARNESS OF CAE. ONCE ALIGNED WITH LOC FOR RWY 29 AT CAE, FLT LANDED NORMALLY WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE I WAS DSNDED FROM A FAIRLY HIGH ALT, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PICK OUT THE PROPER ARPT IN THE SURROUNDING LIGHTS. MY INTENTION WAS TO MAKE MY R TURN TO BASE AND FINAL BASED ON THE FMS AND ILS LOC. WHEN MY FO ADVISED TO, 'KEEP IT TIGHT,' I WENT WITH HIS RECOMMENDATION BECAUSE THE FMS WAS DEAD RECKONING BY THIS POINT. HOWEVER, BECAUSE WE DID HAVE THE FMS AND LOC SET UP AND TUNED, THIS ALLOWED US TO SPOT OUR ERROR AND QUESTION APCH CTL AS TO OUR ORIENTATION BEFORE THEY EVEN SPOTTED IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.