Narrative:

I was the captain and PF. When I asked for 'flaps 1 degree' we got an aural warning and EICAS caution message 'leading edge flap disagreement.' I then called for the abnormal checklist and the first officer read and performed the checklist while I flew the airplane and talked to ATC. I requested a level off at 6000 ft MSL and a delay vector. I wanted and thought to ask the first officer if he was running the correct checklist because I thought that flight control checklists were tricky. I did not ask specifically, but I did query him about the fact that we were not 'pushing' the 'alternate leading edge flap' switch. He did not respond. As I was trying to see which checklist he had, I got a 'stick shaker' stall warning because the speed brakes were still out and the autothrottles had not maintained reference airspeed. At that point I concentrated on flying the airplane. The rest of the approach was flown and we landed uneventfully except that ATC automatically dispatched emergency response vehicles. We flew final approach and landed with vref +30 KTS. We taxied uneventfully to the gate and I discovered that we ran the 'leading edge flap asymmetry' checklist instead of the correct 'leading edge flap disagreement' checklist. I pointed this out to the first officer and he felt bad but not as bad as I did. It was just as much my fault because I did not do what was required to ensure the correct checklist was run. The first officer should have pointed to the EICAS message on the screen and then pointed to the heading on the abnormal checklist to ensure they were both the same. I think we felt rushed because we were close to landing and did not do the things required to slow the situation down. I should have asked for a vector for a downwind away from the airport and then told them when we were ready for a base turn.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B757 EXPERIENCE FAULTY CRM AND CHKLIST PROCS WHEN THEY ENCOUNTER A FLAP DISAGREEMENT ON ARR AT ZZZ.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT AND PF. WHEN I ASKED FOR 'FLAPS 1 DEG' WE GOT AN AURAL WARNING AND EICAS CAUTION MESSAGE 'LEADING EDGE FLAP DISAGREEMENT.' I THEN CALLED FOR THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST AND THE FO READ AND PERFORMED THE CHKLIST WHILE I FLEW THE AIRPLANE AND TALKED TO ATC. I REQUESTED A LEVEL OFF AT 6000 FT MSL AND A DELAY VECTOR. I WANTED AND THOUGHT TO ASK THE FO IF HE WAS RUNNING THE CORRECT CHKLIST BECAUSE I THOUGHT THAT FLT CTL CHKLISTS WERE TRICKY. I DID NOT ASK SPECIFICALLY, BUT I DID QUERY HIM ABOUT THE FACT THAT WE WERE NOT 'PUSHING' THE 'ALTERNATE LEADING EDGE FLAP' SWITCH. HE DID NOT RESPOND. AS I WAS TRYING TO SEE WHICH CHKLIST HE HAD, I GOT A 'STICK SHAKER' STALL WARNING BECAUSE THE SPD BRAKES WERE STILL OUT AND THE AUTOTHROTTLES HAD NOT MAINTAINED REF AIRSPD. AT THAT POINT I CONCENTRATED ON FLYING THE AIRPLANE. THE REST OF THE APCH WAS FLOWN AND WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY EXCEPT THAT ATC AUTOMATICALLY DISPATCHED EMER RESPONSE VEHICLES. WE FLEW FINAL APCH AND LANDED WITH VREF +30 KTS. WE TAXIED UNEVENTFULLY TO THE GATE AND I DISCOVERED THAT WE RAN THE 'LEADING EDGE FLAP ASYMMETRY' CHKLIST INSTEAD OF THE CORRECT 'LEADING EDGE FLAP DISAGREEMENT' CHKLIST. I POINTED THIS OUT TO THE FO AND HE FELT BAD BUT NOT AS BAD AS I DID. IT WAS JUST AS MUCH MY FAULT BECAUSE I DID NOT DO WHAT WAS REQUIRED TO ENSURE THE CORRECT CHKLIST WAS RUN. THE FO SHOULD HAVE POINTED TO THE EICAS MESSAGE ON THE SCREEN AND THEN POINTED TO THE HDG ON THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST TO ENSURE THEY WERE BOTH THE SAME. I THINK WE FELT RUSHED BECAUSE WE WERE CLOSE TO LNDG AND DID NOT DO THE THINGS REQUIRED TO SLOW THE SIT DOWN. I SHOULD HAVE ASKED FOR A VECTOR FOR A DOWNWIND AWAY FROM THE ARPT AND THEN TOLD THEM WHEN WE WERE READY FOR A BASE TURN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.