Narrative:

Engine failure on final approach at ZZZ, first officer. To begin, I will state that there were several flight events occurring within a brief period of time, and there was a certain amount of confusion regarding what problem we may have had and what events were occurring. Having said this exact sequence of events and actions taken may have a certain level of unintended inaccuracy. The day before, I cleared myself from the sick list. Because I felt pretty good the past day after coming down with the 'sniffles.' flight was progressing normally with little or nothing to indicate we had a problem. On descent, I did notice a bit of ear blockage but was able to clear it, and no adverse effects remained. The captain and I had discussed landing runway, which is basically SOP both the captain and I were quite familiar with ZZZ, first officer, having flown in often and frequently. We had completed the descent checklist and done most of the landing checklist including putting the autobrakes to 2. On vectors with sju approach, we were told to maintain 250 KTS until further advised, and were cleared for the ILS runway 10 approach at approximately 2 mi from the condo OM, we were advised to switch to tower frequency. I disconnected the autoplt and autothrottles, retarded the throttles to idle, and extended the speed brakes, while the captain doublechked the frequency assigned with that on the approach plate. I had requested flaps 1 degree and received it. The captain contacted tower and requested runway 8 for landing. At this a few things happened at once. We crossed condo OM, I requested flaps 5 degrees, the captain noticed that the left engine oil pressure indicator had turned red, and pointed it out to me, and the tower cleared us to land. (I will state that we both heard clearance to land, but neither of us knew which runway we had actually been cleared to land on, and I for one, thought it had been clearance to land on runway 8.) at this point, I think we were trying to troubleshoot the problem. Both of us noticed that the EPR, N1, and egt matched, which you would expect since they were both at idle, but it didn't really sink in that they should have matched. The captain later stated he looked for the amber left engine oil pressure annunciator light, but it was not illuminated. The captain stated he thought we had an indicator malfunctioning. Simultaneously, I advanced the throttles slightly and noticed that the left engine indications did not respond. At the same time, I had been still flying the approach and beginning a slight offset to the right of the localizer in order to make a more gradual turn onto final for runway 8, and asked for the gear to be extended, and noted that the captain put the gear handle down and I heard the gear coming down. I will state, at this time, I had not noticed any master caution (or warning) light, nor had I seen any EICAS message indications, including 'left engine shutdown' or 'left engine oil pressure,' or any other messages one would associate with an engine failure. There may have been a light or message, but if there was, neither the captain nor I noted it. The captain and I began a short discussion regarding what we had, and I advanced and retarded the left throttle and had him look at the engine indications. We both agreed we had an engine failure. He stated we should go flaps 20 degrees, which I assumed he meant we should select flaps 20 degrees at that point, but it also clicked in me that we would do a flaps 20 degree approach and landing as is dictated in the QRH for a single engine approach/landing/go around. I asked for flaps 20 degrees, and the captain selected it. I also noticed that another aircraft was moving into the takeoff position on runway 8, the runway I thought we were cleared to land on. I asked the captain which runway we were cleared to land on, and he queried the tower. Tower replied that we were cleared to land on runway 10. I began to maneuver the aircraft back to runway 10 final approach course, and mentioned that I thought we should declare an emergency. The captain did so. Neither of us discussed switching and having the captain make the landing, as is required and I'm not sure it would have been prudent to switch controls at that point. At approximately 400 ft, we got aural warnings of 'too low, terrain' or something. I recognized that it was due to the flaps being at 20 degrees instead of 25 degrees or 30 degrees, and I selected the 'ground proximity flap override' switch to 'override.' I had put power up slightly on the good engine, in order to have some spool up in the event of a missed approach, and to make an attempt to be in a stabilized approach by 500 ft. Being light, and not starting the evolution in the classic simulator textbook scenario (ie, at 1 1/2 dots below GS, gear down and flaps 20 degrees) and advancing the throttles to troubleshoot the problem, I ended up crossing the threshold on GS, but about vref 30 +30. The landing was firm as I did not want to float, but the rest of the landing and rollout were normal, and we cleared the runway and taxied toward the gate. As we were taxiing in, I looked down and noticed the landing checklist had open items! Although we accomplished the necessary items, we landed without confirming gear, flaps, and spoilers, and I had selected ground proximity flap override switch to 'override' without first confirming it with the captain. Things happened so fast, were somewhat confusing. We accomplished what had needed to be done, but didn't do our checklists. I also noticed 'status' on the lower EICAS screen. I selected the status page, and there was a message 'left engine lp pump,' which I assume means left engine low pressure fuel pump failed, and the engine simply flamed out due to fuel starvation. Up to that point, we had no idea why the engine failed, whether it was bird strikes into both engines, contaminated fuel, no oil in the left engine, or something else. Several questions come to mind: should I have begun slowing down sooner? It really wouldn't have been a difficult transition and maneuver to accomplish under normal conditions, but we didn't know things were going to go into emergency condition on such short notice. Still, if I had ben slower, we might have had time to analyze and be more firmly in control of what was happening. On the other hand, if the other engine had failed at that point, we probably could have dead-sticked it in if necessary. Should we have xferred control of the aircraft? Why weren't there more clear annunciations of engine failure, or why didn't we recognize them? Should we have gone around and better analyzed what we had and then conducted a more stabilized engine-out approach and landing, even though the runway was straight ahead in clear view? Why did I not make myself more clear when I mentioned that I was selecting the 'ground proximity flap override' switch to the captain? I think I mentioned what I was doing, but did not hear a response from him. Later, he told me he hadn't heard me mention it, nor did he note I had done it. It could have led to dire consequences. Even though we were extremely busy and distraction as we went through 1000 ft, and even though we accomplished the items as necessary, why didn't we take another look and make sure the landing checklist was complete? What would the consequences have been if we hadn't gotten the gear and flaps out, or landed with speed brakes extended? Finally, should we have gone around and better analyzed what hand then conducted our checklists and a more stabilized engine-out approach and landing, even though the runway was straight ahead and in clear view, and we didn't have a clear understanding of what exactly had happened? Which option had the greater likelihood of disaster and severity of disaster, versus the likelihood of positive outcome?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A SUBTLE ENG FLAMEOUT CAUSED BY A FAILED FUEL PUMP DURING APCH TO ZZZZ, FO, RESULTS IN A SUCCESSFUL LNDG, BUT HOW THE SIT WAS HANDLED IS QUESTIONED AND CRITIQUED BY THE PF.

Narrative: ENG FAILURE ON FINAL APCH AT ZZZ, FO. TO BEGIN, I WILL STATE THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL FLT EVENTS OCCURRING WITHIN A BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME, AND THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFUSION REGARDING WHAT PROB WE MAY HAVE HAD AND WHAT EVENTS WERE OCCURRING. HAVING SAID THIS EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND ACTIONS TAKEN MAY HAVE A CERTAIN LEVEL OF UNINTENDED INACCURACY. THE DAY BEFORE, I CLRED MYSELF FROM THE SICK LIST. BECAUSE I FELT PRETTY GOOD THE PAST DAY AFTER COMING DOWN WITH THE 'SNIFFLES.' FLT WAS PROGRESSING NORMALLY WITH LITTLE OR NOTHING TO INDICATE WE HAD A PROB. ON DSCNT, I DID NOTICE A BIT OF EAR BLOCKAGE BUT WAS ABLE TO CLR IT, AND NO ADVERSE EFFECTS REMAINED. THE CAPT AND I HAD DISCUSSED LNDG RWY, WHICH IS BASICALLY SOP BOTH THE CAPT AND I WERE QUITE FAMILIAR WITH ZZZ, FO, HAVING FLOWN IN OFTEN AND FREQUENTLY. WE HAD COMPLETED THE DSCNT CHKLIST AND DONE MOST OF THE LNDG CHKLIST INCLUDING PUTTING THE AUTOBRAKES TO 2. ON VECTORS WITH SJU APCH, WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED, AND WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 10 APCH AT APPROX 2 MI FROM THE CONDO OM, WE WERE ADVISED TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES, RETARDED THE THROTTLES TO IDLE, AND EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKES, WHILE THE CAPT DOUBLECHKED THE FREQ ASSIGNED WITH THAT ON THE APCH PLATE. I HAD REQUESTED FLAPS 1 DEG AND RECEIVED IT. THE CAPT CONTACTED TWR AND REQUESTED RWY 8 FOR LNDG. AT THIS A FEW THINGS HAPPENED AT ONCE. WE CROSSED CONDO OM, I REQUESTED FLAPS 5 DEGS, THE CAPT NOTICED THAT THE L ENG OIL PRESSURE INDICATOR HAD TURNED RED, AND POINTED IT OUT TO ME, AND THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND. (I WILL STATE THAT WE BOTH HEARD CLRNC TO LAND, BUT NEITHER OF US KNEW WHICH RWY WE HAD ACTUALLY BEEN CLRED TO LAND ON, AND I FOR ONE, THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN CLRNC TO LAND ON RWY 8.) AT THIS POINT, I THINK WE WERE TRYING TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB. BOTH OF US NOTICED THAT THE EPR, N1, AND EGT MATCHED, WHICH YOU WOULD EXPECT SINCE THEY WERE BOTH AT IDLE, BUT IT DIDN'T REALLY SINK IN THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE MATCHED. THE CAPT LATER STATED HE LOOKED FOR THE AMBER L ENG OIL PRESSURE ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT, BUT IT WAS NOT ILLUMINATED. THE CAPT STATED HE THOUGHT WE HAD AN INDICATOR MALFUNCTIONING. SIMULTANEOUSLY, I ADVANCED THE THROTTLES SLIGHTLY AND NOTICED THAT THE L ENG INDICATIONS DID NOT RESPOND. AT THE SAME TIME, I HAD BEEN STILL FLYING THE APCH AND BEGINNING A SLIGHT OFFSET TO THE R OF THE LOC IN ORDER TO MAKE A MORE GRADUAL TURN ONTO FINAL FOR RWY 8, AND ASKED FOR THE GEAR TO BE EXTENDED, AND NOTED THAT THE CAPT PUT THE GEAR HANDLE DOWN AND I HEARD THE GEAR COMING DOWN. I WILL STATE, AT THIS TIME, I HAD NOT NOTICED ANY MASTER CAUTION (OR WARNING) LIGHT, NOR HAD I SEEN ANY EICAS MESSAGE INDICATIONS, INCLUDING 'L ENG SHUTDOWN' OR 'L ENG OIL PRESSURE,' OR ANY OTHER MESSAGES ONE WOULD ASSOCIATE WITH AN ENG FAILURE. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A LIGHT OR MESSAGE, BUT IF THERE WAS, NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I NOTED IT. THE CAPT AND I BEGAN A SHORT DISCUSSION REGARDING WHAT WE HAD, AND I ADVANCED AND RETARDED THE L THROTTLE AND HAD HIM LOOK AT THE ENG INDICATIONS. WE BOTH AGREED WE HAD AN ENG FAILURE. HE STATED WE SHOULD GO FLAPS 20 DEGS, WHICH I ASSUMED HE MEANT WE SHOULD SELECT FLAPS 20 DEGS AT THAT POINT, BUT IT ALSO CLICKED IN ME THAT WE WOULD DO A FLAPS 20 DEG APCH AND LNDG AS IS DICTATED IN THE QRH FOR A SINGLE ENG APCH/LNDG/GAR. I ASKED FOR FLAPS 20 DEGS, AND THE CAPT SELECTED IT. I ALSO NOTICED THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS MOVING INTO THE TKOF POS ON RWY 8, THE RWY I THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON. I ASKED THE CAPT WHICH RWY WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON, AND HE QUERIED THE TWR. TWR REPLIED THAT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 10. I BEGAN TO MANEUVER THE ACFT BACK TO RWY 10 FINAL APCH COURSE, AND MENTIONED THAT I THOUGHT WE SHOULD DECLARE AN EMER. THE CAPT DID SO. NEITHER OF US DISCUSSED SWITCHING AND HAVING THE CAPT MAKE THE LNDG, AS IS REQUIRED AND I'M NOT SURE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRUDENT TO SWITCH CTLS AT THAT POINT. AT APPROX 400 FT, WE GOT AURAL WARNINGS OF 'TOO LOW, TERRAIN' OR SOMETHING. I RECOGNIZED THAT IT WAS DUE TO THE FLAPS BEING AT 20 DEGS INSTEAD OF 25 DEGS OR 30 DEGS, AND I SELECTED THE 'GND PROX FLAP OVERRIDE' SWITCH TO 'OVERRIDE.' I HAD PUT PWR UP SLIGHTLY ON THE GOOD ENG, IN ORDER TO HAVE SOME SPOOL UP IN THE EVENT OF A MISSED APCH, AND TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT TO BE IN A STABILIZED APCH BY 500 FT. BEING LIGHT, AND NOT STARTING THE EVOLUTION IN THE CLASSIC SIMULATOR TEXTBOOK SCENARIO (IE, AT 1 1/2 DOTS BELOW GS, GEAR DOWN AND FLAPS 20 DEGS) AND ADVANCING THE THROTTLES TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB, I ENDED UP XING THE THRESHOLD ON GS, BUT ABOUT VREF 30 +30. THE LNDG WAS FIRM AS I DID NOT WANT TO FLOAT, BUT THE REST OF THE LNDG AND ROLLOUT WERE NORMAL, AND WE CLRED THE RWY AND TAXIED TOWARD THE GATE. AS WE WERE TAXIING IN, I LOOKED DOWN AND NOTICED THE LNDG CHKLIST HAD OPEN ITEMS! ALTHOUGH WE ACCOMPLISHED THE NECESSARY ITEMS, WE LANDED WITHOUT CONFIRMING GEAR, FLAPS, AND SPOILERS, AND I HAD SELECTED GND PROX FLAP OVERRIDE SWITCH TO 'OVERRIDE' WITHOUT FIRST CONFIRMING IT WITH THE CAPT. THINGS HAPPENED SO FAST, WERE SOMEWHAT CONFUSING. WE ACCOMPLISHED WHAT HAD NEEDED TO BE DONE, BUT DIDN'T DO OUR CHKLISTS. I ALSO NOTICED 'STATUS' ON THE LOWER EICAS SCREEN. I SELECTED THE STATUS PAGE, AND THERE WAS A MESSAGE 'L ENG LP PUMP,' WHICH I ASSUME MEANS L ENG LOW PRESSURE FUEL PUMP FAILED, AND THE ENG SIMPLY FLAMED OUT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION. UP TO THAT POINT, WE HAD NO IDEA WHY THE ENG FAILED, WHETHER IT WAS BIRD STRIKES INTO BOTH ENGS, CONTAMINATED FUEL, NO OIL IN THE L ENG, OR SOMETHING ELSE. SEVERAL QUESTIONS COME TO MIND: SHOULD I HAVE BEGUN SLOWING DOWN SOONER? IT REALLY WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN A DIFFICULT TRANSITION AND MANEUVER TO ACCOMPLISH UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS, BUT WE DIDN'T KNOW THINGS WERE GOING TO GO INTO EMER CONDITION ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. STILL, IF I HAD BEN SLOWER, WE MIGHT HAVE HAD TIME TO ANALYZE AND BE MORE FIRMLY IN CTL OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE OTHER ENG HAD FAILED AT THAT POINT, WE PROBABLY COULD HAVE DEAD-STICKED IT IN IF NECESSARY. SHOULD WE HAVE XFERRED CTL OF THE ACFT? WHY WEREN'T THERE MORE CLR ANNUNCIATIONS OF ENG FAILURE, OR WHY DIDN'T WE RECOGNIZE THEM? SHOULD WE HAVE GONE AROUND AND BETTER ANALYZED WHAT WE HAD AND THEN CONDUCTED A MORE STABILIZED ENG-OUT APCH AND LNDG, EVEN THOUGH THE RWY WAS STRAIGHT AHEAD IN CLR VIEW? WHY DID I NOT MAKE MYSELF MORE CLR WHEN I MENTIONED THAT I WAS SELECTING THE 'GND PROX FLAP OVERRIDE' SWITCH TO THE CAPT? I THINK I MENTIONED WHAT I WAS DOING, BUT DID NOT HEAR A RESPONSE FROM HIM. LATER, HE TOLD ME HE HADN'T HEARD ME MENTION IT, NOR DID HE NOTE I HAD DONE IT. IT COULD HAVE LED TO DIRE CONSEQUENCES. EVEN THOUGH WE WERE EXTREMELY BUSY AND DISTR AS WE WENT THROUGH 1000 FT, AND EVEN THOUGH WE ACCOMPLISHED THE ITEMS AS NECESSARY, WHY DIDN'T WE TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AND MAKE SURE THE LNDG CHKLIST WAS COMPLETE? WHAT WOULD THE CONSEQUENCES HAVE BEEN IF WE HADN'T GOTTEN THE GEAR AND FLAPS OUT, OR LANDED WITH SPD BRAKES EXTENDED? FINALLY, SHOULD WE HAVE GONE AROUND AND BETTER ANALYZED WHAT HAND THEN CONDUCTED OUR CHKLISTS AND A MORE STABILIZED ENG-OUT APCH AND LNDG, EVEN THOUGH THE RWY WAS STRAIGHT AHEAD AND IN CLR VIEW, AND WE DIDN'T HAVE A CLR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT EXACTLY HAD HAPPENED? WHICH OPTION HAD THE GREATER LIKELIHOOD OF DISASTER AND SEVERITY OF DISASTER, VERSUS THE LIKELIHOOD OF POSITIVE OUTCOME?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.