Narrative:

Before leaving sfo operations, saw aircraft XXX had inoperative APU. APU was fixed, so aircraft accepted and released for flight to cle. At end of leg yvr-den, had to do a go around due to moderate windshear which shortened the time we had for a plane change. Upon arrival at aircraft, about 20 mins to departure, APU was running, so right pack was turned on to 'automatic' position. Within seconds, a strong acrid fuel odor was detected throughout the cabin and cockpit. It was strong enough to sting my eyes. Pack was turned off, maintenance was informed. Mechanic 'a' arrived in cockpit, said no problems were detected, only had worked on APU electrically, nowhere near fuel system. The right pack was turned on. He said 'I don't smell anything.' first officer said something to the effect of 'that is a strong odor, something is not right, I'm not taking this aircraft.' I was in agreement. Mechanic 'a' said 'well, I could inoperative the APU.' I said that wasn't an option as I had already refused the aircraft earlier for an inoperative APU. He suggested that the long term maintenance item regarding the scavenge pump seep could have been causing the smell. A question was raised whether it could be a bad pack. The right pack was turned off, and left pack turned on. No odor was detected coming from the vents using the left pack. We switched back to using the right pack and the odor returned. The pack was turned off. Aircraft was refused. While I was trying an ACARS message to dispatch, another maintenance issue occurred and he wrote it up. While the passenger were leaving, mechanic 'B' came to the cockpit. I don't remember why he was there, but I asked him if there was any new information about the fuel smell. We briefly discussed some other possibilities, and I suggested that we put on the ground air to see if the smell occurred using that air source versus the APU source. He agreed and left. We decided to stay with the aircraft. At some point, not sure exactly when, we noticed the ground air was not producing the fuel smell in the air system. Most of the passenger were off the aircraft by the time mechanic 'C' came on board. I said hello and asked if he was here to look into the fuel odor problem. He said no, he was here to deal with the second write-up. The first officer came up to discuss the second maintenance item to which mechanic 'C,' who had seemed somewhat agitated to start with, now angrily blurted out 'well, what am I supposed to do with it?' after a row, he stormed off the aircraft saying more, including 'and I don't smell anything!' he left without me being able to explain there was no smell because the right pack wasn't on. Eventually, we went to a different aircraft and departed for cle. We never spoke directly to the maintenance supervisor about what happened. The basic reason this whole scenario took place was because mechanics 'a' and 'C' had some pre-existing chips on their shoulders, and neither of them gave us any respect from the start of their arrs on the aircraft. We lost a lot of sleep for the next 2 days of the trip, making/receiving phone calls, writing narratives, and being reassigned to a shorter layover in iah. Fatigue, stress, and distrs were at an all-time high, really pushing us to our limits of job performance. We discussed many aspects of the incident, but still were unable to understand why mechanic 'C' was so opposed at the start to doing such a simple job.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 CREW REFUSED AN ACFT WHEN FUEL FUMES OCCURRED WITH THE OP OF THE R AIR CONDITIONING PACK. THE CREW FELT THE MECHS WERE UNCOOPERATIVE.

Narrative: BEFORE LEAVING SFO OPS, SAW ACFT XXX HAD INOP APU. APU WAS FIXED, SO ACFT ACCEPTED AND RELEASED FOR FLT TO CLE. AT END OF LEG YVR-DEN, HAD TO DO A GAR DUE TO MODERATE WINDSHEAR WHICH SHORTENED THE TIME WE HAD FOR A PLANE CHANGE. UPON ARR AT ACFT, ABOUT 20 MINS TO DEP, APU WAS RUNNING, SO R PACK WAS TURNED ON TO 'AUTO' POS. WITHIN SECONDS, A STRONG ACRID FUEL ODOR WAS DETECTED THROUGHOUT THE CABIN AND COCKPIT. IT WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO STING MY EYES. PACK WAS TURNED OFF, MAINT WAS INFORMED. MECH 'A' ARRIVED IN COCKPIT, SAID NO PROBS WERE DETECTED, ONLY HAD WORKED ON APU ELECTRICALLY, NOWHERE NEAR FUEL SYS. THE R PACK WAS TURNED ON. HE SAID 'I DON'T SMELL ANYTHING.' FO SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'THAT IS A STRONG ODOR, SOMETHING IS NOT RIGHT, I'M NOT TAKING THIS ACFT.' I WAS IN AGREEMENT. MECH 'A' SAID 'WELL, I COULD INOP THE APU.' I SAID THAT WASN'T AN OPTION AS I HAD ALREADY REFUSED THE ACFT EARLIER FOR AN INOP APU. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE LONG TERM MAINT ITEM REGARDING THE SCAVENGE PUMP SEEP COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSING THE SMELL. A QUESTION WAS RAISED WHETHER IT COULD BE A BAD PACK. THE R PACK WAS TURNED OFF, AND L PACK TURNED ON. NO ODOR WAS DETECTED COMING FROM THE VENTS USING THE L PACK. WE SWITCHED BACK TO USING THE R PACK AND THE ODOR RETURNED. THE PACK WAS TURNED OFF. ACFT WAS REFUSED. WHILE I WAS TRYING AN ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH, ANOTHER MAINT ISSUE OCCURRED AND HE WROTE IT UP. WHILE THE PAX WERE LEAVING, MECH 'B' CAME TO THE COCKPIT. I DON'T REMEMBER WHY HE WAS THERE, BUT I ASKED HIM IF THERE WAS ANY NEW INFO ABOUT THE FUEL SMELL. WE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED SOME OTHER POSSIBILITIES, AND I SUGGESTED THAT WE PUT ON THE GND AIR TO SEE IF THE SMELL OCCURRED USING THAT AIR SOURCE VERSUS THE APU SOURCE. HE AGREED AND LEFT. WE DECIDED TO STAY WITH THE ACFT. AT SOME POINT, NOT SURE EXACTLY WHEN, WE NOTICED THE GND AIR WAS NOT PRODUCING THE FUEL SMELL IN THE AIR SYS. MOST OF THE PAX WERE OFF THE ACFT BY THE TIME MECH 'C' CAME ON BOARD. I SAID HELLO AND ASKED IF HE WAS HERE TO LOOK INTO THE FUEL ODOR PROB. HE SAID NO, HE WAS HERE TO DEAL WITH THE SECOND WRITE-UP. THE FO CAME UP TO DISCUSS THE SECOND MAINT ITEM TO WHICH MECH 'C,' WHO HAD SEEMED SOMEWHAT AGITATED TO START WITH, NOW ANGRILY BLURTED OUT 'WELL, WHAT AM I SUPPOSED TO DO WITH IT?' AFTER A ROW, HE STORMED OFF THE ACFT SAYING MORE, INCLUDING 'AND I DON'T SMELL ANYTHING!' HE LEFT WITHOUT ME BEING ABLE TO EXPLAIN THERE WAS NO SMELL BECAUSE THE R PACK WASN'T ON. EVENTUALLY, WE WENT TO A DIFFERENT ACFT AND DEPARTED FOR CLE. WE NEVER SPOKE DIRECTLY TO THE MAINT SUPVR ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED. THE BASIC REASON THIS WHOLE SCENARIO TOOK PLACE WAS BECAUSE MECHS 'A' AND 'C' HAD SOME PRE-EXISTING CHIPS ON THEIR SHOULDERS, AND NEITHER OF THEM GAVE US ANY RESPECT FROM THE START OF THEIR ARRS ON THE ACFT. WE LOST A LOT OF SLEEP FOR THE NEXT 2 DAYS OF THE TRIP, MAKING/RECEIVING PHONE CALLS, WRITING NARRATIVES, AND BEING REASSIGNED TO A SHORTER LAYOVER IN IAH. FATIGUE, STRESS, AND DISTRS WERE AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH, REALLY PUSHING US TO OUR LIMITS OF JOB PERFORMANCE. WE DISCUSSED MANY ASPECTS OF THE INCIDENT, BUT STILL WERE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY MECH 'C' WAS SO OPPOSED AT THE START TO DOING SUCH A SIMPLE JOB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.