Narrative:

I was acting as the PNF on board the aircraft and was on the repositioning flight from bur-crq. This was the second day of my 7 day rotation and my IOE captain was on 4TH day. We were rested 8 hours the night before and on the day of the incident it was our 4TH leg of the day. At this time our flight time was 4 1/2 hours. During the landing phase at crq; aircraft right main tire and wheel assembly sustained damaged due to unknown causes. Prior to departing bur; I had asked the IOE captain if she was comfortable flying from the right seat. IOE captain's response was 'yes.' while proceeding inbound to crq; the socal approach controller vectored us through the ILS runway localizer and then gave us another vector to re-intercept. This put us above the GS. The WX was better than reported 5000 ft broken; 10 mi visibility; light rain; winds were 150 degrees at 7 KTS; enabling us to accept the visual approach. As we switched frequency from socal to crq tower; tower informed us to slow to 140 KTS due to traffic on final approach. On 3/4 mi final; the PAPI lights were indicating all white; giving a clear indication of being too high. I stated; 'we are too high.' the IOE captain replied; 'we'll make it.' I began calling vref and sink rate; which was approximately 1500 FPM. The IOE captain attempted to correct. Above the landing threshold with the aircraft obviously too high; I called vref -1; -2; -3; +1; +2; +3; etc; and the first stall warning indication came on. The IOE captain corrected by adding power and pitching the nose down. Soon after another stall warning came on during flare which was approximately 10 ft above the runway. I was calling for vref and sink rate which was followed by what I felt was landing in a stalled condition. The runway was dry with a 7 KT 90 degree crosswind from the left. After main gear contact with the runway; the aircraft veered sharply toward the right. The IOE captain was fighting the controls as the aircraft was now swinging right and left. The IOE captain put the propellers in reverse in an attempt to regain directional control. This aircraft when put into reverse; has a tendency for the right engine to go into reverse first. In order to maintain symmetric reverse thrust; this aircraft requires the power lever to be split 1/2 inch to 1 inch. The IOE captain had the power lever in the parallel position resulting in asymmetrical thrust favoring the right engine; pulling the aircraft to the right. At this time; the aircraft was severely vibrating; maintaining directional control was extremely difficult. As the aircraft was obviously heading off the right side of the runway; I applied full left rudder. At this time; departure off the runway became imminent; so I engaged the steering system; which enabled the aircraft to stay on the runway and come to a complete stop. I performed an emergency shutdown to secure and avoid further damage to the aircraft. The runway was then shut down as we were informed by the tower that we had blown a right main tire. After securing the airplane; the airport authority/authorized approached us and asked for a signature from the person in charge of the aircraft. The IOE captain stated that I was PIC and was responsible for the aircraft. I was told to sign for the aircraft's removal. I was taken by surprise as I had the understanding the IOE captain was ultimately responsible for the operation of the aircraft until my line training was completed. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated the P180 has no antiskid system and he felt that excessive brake application after touchdown following the unstabilized approach was likely the cause of the tire failure. Reporter advised that his report to the company safety officer regarding the actions of the IOE captain during and subsequent to this incident resulted in the captain's removal from all flight duties. She continues with the company in the capacity of a ground instructor. The sanction was based on both the failure to abandon the unstabilized approach and the impropriety of pressuring the reporter to assume responsibility for the flight and the aircraft contrary to his role as a pilot in training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF PIAGGIO 180 BLOW TIRE ON LNDG FOLLOWING AN UNSTABILIZED APCH PUNCTUATED WITH STALL WARNINGS; ABOVE GS INDICATIONS AS WELL AS EXCESSIVE SINK RATES. LATE INTERCEPT VECTOR BY APCH CTLR CONTRIBUTED TO ABOVE GS CONDITION.

Narrative: I WAS ACTING AS THE PNF ON BOARD THE ACFT AND WAS ON THE REPOSITIONING FLT FROM BUR-CRQ. THIS WAS THE SECOND DAY OF MY 7 DAY ROTATION AND MY IOE CAPT WAS ON 4TH DAY. WE WERE RESTED 8 HRS THE NIGHT BEFORE AND ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT IT WAS OUR 4TH LEG OF THE DAY. AT THIS TIME OUR FLT TIME WAS 4 1/2 HRS. DURING THE LNDG PHASE AT CRQ; ACFT R MAIN TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLY SUSTAINED DAMAGED DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES. PRIOR TO DEPARTING BUR; I HAD ASKED THE IOE CAPT IF SHE WAS COMFORTABLE FLYING FROM THE R SEAT. IOE CAPT'S RESPONSE WAS 'YES.' WHILE PROCEEDING INBOUND TO CRQ; THE SOCAL APCH CTLR VECTORED US THROUGH THE ILS RWY LOC AND THEN GAVE US ANOTHER VECTOR TO RE-INTERCEPT. THIS PUT US ABOVE THE GS. THE WX WAS BETTER THAN RPTED 5000 FT BROKEN; 10 MI VISIBILITY; LIGHT RAIN; WINDS WERE 150 DEGS AT 7 KTS; ENABLING US TO ACCEPT THE VISUAL APCH. AS WE SWITCHED FREQ FROM SOCAL TO CRQ TWR; TWR INFORMED US TO SLOW TO 140 KTS DUE TO TFC ON FINAL APCH. ON 3/4 MI FINAL; THE PAPI LIGHTS WERE INDICATING ALL WHITE; GIVING A CLR INDICATION OF BEING TOO HIGH. I STATED; 'WE ARE TOO HIGH.' THE IOE CAPT REPLIED; 'WE'LL MAKE IT.' I BEGAN CALLING VREF AND SINK RATE; WHICH WAS APPROX 1500 FPM. THE IOE CAPT ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT. ABOVE THE LNDG THRESHOLD WITH THE ACFT OBVIOUSLY TOO HIGH; I CALLED VREF -1; -2; -3; +1; +2; +3; ETC; AND THE FIRST STALL WARNING INDICATION CAME ON. THE IOE CAPT CORRECTED BY ADDING PWR AND PITCHING THE NOSE DOWN. SOON AFTER ANOTHER STALL WARNING CAME ON DURING FLARE WHICH WAS APPROX 10 FT ABOVE THE RWY. I WAS CALLING FOR VREF AND SINK RATE WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY WHAT I FELT WAS LNDG IN A STALLED CONDITION. THE RWY WAS DRY WITH A 7 KT 90 DEG XWIND FROM THE L. AFTER MAIN GEAR CONTACT WITH THE RWY; THE ACFT VEERED SHARPLY TOWARD THE R. THE IOE CAPT WAS FIGHTING THE CTLS AS THE ACFT WAS NOW SWINGING R AND L. THE IOE CAPT PUT THE PROPS IN REVERSE IN AN ATTEMPT TO REGAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL. THIS ACFT WHEN PUT INTO REVERSE; HAS A TENDENCY FOR THE R ENG TO GO INTO REVERSE FIRST. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN SYMMETRIC REVERSE THRUST; THIS ACFT REQUIRES THE PWR LEVER TO BE SPLIT 1/2 INCH TO 1 INCH. THE IOE CAPT HAD THE PWR LEVER IN THE PARALLEL POS RESULTING IN ASYMMETRICAL THRUST FAVORING THE R ENG; PULLING THE ACFT TO THE R. AT THIS TIME; THE ACFT WAS SEVERELY VIBRATING; MAINTAINING DIRECTIONAL CTL WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. AS THE ACFT WAS OBVIOUSLY HEADING OFF THE R SIDE OF THE RWY; I APPLIED FULL L RUDDER. AT THIS TIME; DEP OFF THE RWY BECAME IMMINENT; SO I ENGAGED THE STEERING SYS; WHICH ENABLED THE ACFT TO STAY ON THE RWY AND COME TO A COMPLETE STOP. I PERFORMED AN EMER SHUTDOWN TO SECURE AND AVOID FURTHER DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. THE RWY WAS THEN SHUT DOWN AS WE WERE INFORMED BY THE TWR THAT WE HAD BLOWN A R MAIN TIRE. AFTER SECURING THE AIRPLANE; THE ARPT AUTH APCHED US AND ASKED FOR A SIGNATURE FROM THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE ACFT. THE IOE CAPT STATED THAT I WAS PIC AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACFT. I WAS TOLD TO SIGN FOR THE ACFT'S REMOVAL. I WAS TAKEN BY SURPRISE AS I HAD THE UNDERSTANDING THE IOE CAPT WAS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OP OF THE ACFT UNTIL MY LINE TRAINING WAS COMPLETED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THE P180 HAS NO ANTISKID SYS AND HE FELT THAT EXCESSIVE BRAKE APPLICATION AFTER TOUCHDOWN FOLLOWING THE UNSTABILIZED APCH WAS LIKELY THE CAUSE OF THE TIRE FAILURE. RPTR ADVISED THAT HIS RPT TO THE COMPANY SAFETY OFFICER REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE IOE CAPT DURING AND SUBSEQUENT TO THIS INCIDENT RESULTED IN THE CAPT'S REMOVAL FROM ALL FLT DUTIES. SHE CONTINUES WITH THE COMPANY IN THE CAPACITY OF A GND INSTRUCTOR. THE SANCTION WAS BASED ON BOTH THE FAILURE TO ABANDON THE UNSTABILIZED APCH AND THE IMPROPRIETY OF PRESSURING THE RPTR TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FLT AND THE ACFT CONTRARY TO HIS ROLE AS A PLT IN TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.