Narrative:

The most recent ATIS reported in cle included a ceiling of 800 ft broken and landing on runway 24L. Approximately 30 mi south of the airport; we were cleared directly to caass intersection; which is a waypoint on the ILS runway 24L approach. Approximately 10 mi from the airport; the final approach controller instructed us to expect ILS runway 6R. He then vectored us off of our course and gave us a heading to join the localizer for runway 6R just outside of the OM. In a rush to reprogram the mcdu and get the aircraft down and slowed to safely land on runway 6R; I disconnected the autoplt to get maximum flight spoiler extension and had the first officer quickly brief the important parts of the ILS runway 6R approach. This last min change caused a minor error chain. Approaching the green line on the navigation display; indicating the final approach course; I finally noticed the absence of localizer and GS indications on the pfd. I asked the first officer to verify with the approach/tower controller that they had flipped the switch to turn on the ILS runway 6R and at the same time visually acquired the runway and saw us going through the extended centerline. We reported the field in sight; he reported a new ATIS and VFR conditions; cleared us for a visual approach; admitted and apologized for not having the approach switched around from runway 24L to runway 6R. While all of this was happening; I was asking for confign changes with flaps and gear to get stabilized for landing. At the point that I requested 'managed speed' the magenta speed indicator shot up to 250 KTS. The thrust came up accordingly and we came within 15 KTS of overspding the flaps before I pulled the speed knob to give us a selected speed. This occurred because we skipped the 'activate/confirm' portion of the approach briefing and did not have the FMGS sequenced properly. These errors were caught in time to prevent an incident but were very much avoidable. The controller failed to do his job properly possibly because he was over-tasked with covering all of the communications frequencys (approach; tower; and ground) at XA00. As a flight crew; we fell into the trap of rushing to accommodate ATC and did not follow all airbus SOP's regarding instrument approachs. As an aside; a very similar case occurred to me going into cmh over 1 yr ago early in the morning with some of the same conditions. The controller was operating all frequencys; the airport was changing directions of landing traffic; and the controller failed to FLIP the switch to turn on the appropriate NAVAID for the ILS while we were in IMC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW FAILS TO PROPERLY SEQUENCE THE FMGS ON FINAL APCH DUE TO LAST MIN RWY CHANGE AND CTLR FAILURE TO ACTIVATE ILS FOR THE NEW RWY AT CLE.

Narrative: THE MOST RECENT ATIS RPTED IN CLE INCLUDED A CEILING OF 800 FT BROKEN AND LNDG ON RWY 24L. APPROX 30 MI S OF THE ARPT; WE WERE CLRED DIRECTLY TO CAASS INTXN; WHICH IS A WAYPOINT ON THE ILS RWY 24L APCH. APPROX 10 MI FROM THE ARPT; THE FINAL APCH CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO EXPECT ILS RWY 6R. HE THEN VECTORED US OFF OF OUR COURSE AND GAVE US A HDG TO JOIN THE LOC FOR RWY 6R JUST OUTSIDE OF THE OM. IN A RUSH TO REPROGRAM THE MCDU AND GET THE ACFT DOWN AND SLOWED TO SAFELY LAND ON RWY 6R; I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT TO GET MAX FLT SPOILER EXTENSION AND HAD THE FO QUICKLY BRIEF THE IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE ILS RWY 6R APCH. THIS LAST MIN CHANGE CAUSED A MINOR ERROR CHAIN. APCHING THE GREEN LINE ON THE NAV DISPLAY; INDICATING THE FINAL APCH COURSE; I FINALLY NOTICED THE ABSENCE OF LOC AND GS INDICATIONS ON THE PFD. I ASKED THE FO TO VERIFY WITH THE APCH/TWR CTLR THAT THEY HAD FLIPPED THE SWITCH TO TURN ON THE ILS RWY 6R AND AT THE SAME TIME VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE RWY AND SAW US GOING THROUGH THE EXTENDED CTRLINE. WE RPTED THE FIELD IN SIGHT; HE RPTED A NEW ATIS AND VFR CONDITIONS; CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH; ADMITTED AND APOLOGIZED FOR NOT HAVING THE APCH SWITCHED AROUND FROM RWY 24L TO RWY 6R. WHILE ALL OF THIS WAS HAPPENING; I WAS ASKING FOR CONFIGN CHANGES WITH FLAPS AND GEAR TO GET STABILIZED FOR LNDG. AT THE POINT THAT I REQUESTED 'MANAGED SPD' THE MAGENTA SPD INDICATOR SHOT UP TO 250 KTS. THE THRUST CAME UP ACCORDINGLY AND WE CAME WITHIN 15 KTS OF OVERSPDING THE FLAPS BEFORE I PULLED THE SPD KNOB TO GIVE US A SELECTED SPD. THIS OCCURRED BECAUSE WE SKIPPED THE 'ACTIVATE/CONFIRM' PORTION OF THE APCH BRIEFING AND DID NOT HAVE THE FMGS SEQUENCED PROPERLY. THESE ERRORS WERE CAUGHT IN TIME TO PREVENT AN INCIDENT BUT WERE VERY MUCH AVOIDABLE. THE CTLR FAILED TO DO HIS JOB PROPERLY POSSIBLY BECAUSE HE WAS OVER-TASKED WITH COVERING ALL OF THE COMS FREQS (APCH; TWR; AND GND) AT XA00. AS A FLT CREW; WE FELL INTO THE TRAP OF RUSHING TO ACCOMMODATE ATC AND DID NOT FOLLOW ALL AIRBUS SOP'S REGARDING INST APCHS. AS AN ASIDE; A VERY SIMILAR CASE OCCURRED TO ME GOING INTO CMH OVER 1 YR AGO EARLY IN THE MORNING WITH SOME OF THE SAME CONDITIONS. THE CTLR WAS OPERATING ALL FREQS; THE ARPT WAS CHANGING DIRECTIONS OF LNDG TFC; AND THE CTLR FAILED TO FLIP THE SWITCH TO TURN ON THE APPROPRIATE NAVAID FOR THE ILS WHILE WE WERE IN IMC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.