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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 649353 |
Time | |
Date | 200503 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : isp.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : pdk.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : takeoff roll ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : isp.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 220 flight time total : 13000 flight time type : 6800 |
ASRS Report | 649353 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : company policies non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Company Flight Crew Human Performance FAA |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Performance planning error. Today I began the last day of a 4-DAY pairing and 8TH day of the last 9. My brief began with 'let's not get in a hurry' because our plane had arrived 30 mins late. I was paired with a new first officer (3 months) who was doing an excellent job for his short tenure. According to the ATIS in isp; planes were landing on runway 24 and departing runway 33L. All cockpit checks were normal and I called for the before push checklist and was handed the opc. I glanced at the ATIS sheet on the panel one last time and viewed the landing and departing runway 33L note. The data on the opc was highlighted for runway 24 and performance numbers were briefed for runway 24. The stopping margin was noted and written down. After pushback; I observed a company jet taxiing in for the gate we had just departed. After start checks were completed; and the first officer called for taxi. Ground control asked us if we could sidestep and allow company room to get by and to taxi to runway 33L. We did as requested. After the sidestep maneuver; we were pretty much lined up at the hold short line of runway 33L; as it was an extremely short taxi and had to roll only a few yards. The before takeoff checklist was completed and we were given takeoff clearance for runway 33L. Trying to be a good mentor for the new first officer; I stressed the importance of using all the available runway and informed him I would use a modified static takeoff roll. We back-taxied into position. My mistake of using takeoff data for runway 24 on runway 33L had still not been realized. As I reflect on these events and read my words; my not catching this error is extremely disconcerting. I departed without incident or irregularity. Although the takeoff roll appeared to be normal as compared to other system wide short field departures; a feeling of something in error came over me while climbing through 10000 ft. I handed the aircraft to the first officer and reviewed the load sheet; and found nothing out of order. I reached for the opc to review the takeoff data and it hit me. I had used runway 24 data for runway 33L and had departed over ATOG and had not caught it. Had runway 33L been selected; performance numbers would not have been available. I had taken off on an unbalanced runway and was devastated. I immediately checked to see how many children had boarded and there were only 10. The child weight factored in still did not cover my error. Somehow I had overlooked the runway box on the takeoff performance page. There were probably several contributing factors involved; but none stand out as being a main cause. I understand the severity of my omission and as captain I assume full responsibility. I honestly thought I was using the correct performance numbers. In the future; I will take more time in reviewing the opc takeoff page and then ask for the before push checklist. It has always been my practice to write down and circle on the release the available stopping margin. I think now I will include the actual number of the runway (ie; runway 24; 1310 ft). I believe this will ensure that I always use the performance numbers for the correct runway.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B757 FLT CREW; FATIGUED FROM LONG DAY AND INFREQUENT DUTY BREAKS; FAIL TO RECOMPUTE PERFORMANCE DATA FOR TKOF FROM RWY 33L VICE RWY 24 AT ISP. RESULTING TKOF IS ACCOMPLISHED ALTHOUGH HAD AN ENG FAILED CLOSE TO V1; THE ACFT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO STOP AND OR BECOME AIRBORNE ON THE REMAINING RWY.
Narrative: PERFORMANCE PLANNING ERROR. TODAY I BEGAN THE LAST DAY OF A 4-DAY PAIRING AND 8TH DAY OF THE LAST 9. MY BRIEF BEGAN WITH 'LET'S NOT GET IN A HURRY' BECAUSE OUR PLANE HAD ARRIVED 30 MINS LATE. I WAS PAIRED WITH A NEW FO (3 MONTHS) WHO WAS DOING AN EXCELLENT JOB FOR HIS SHORT TENURE. ACCORDING TO THE ATIS IN ISP; PLANES WERE LNDG ON RWY 24 AND DEPARTING RWY 33L. ALL COCKPIT CHKS WERE NORMAL AND I CALLED FOR THE BEFORE PUSH CHKLIST AND WAS HANDED THE OPC. I GLANCED AT THE ATIS SHEET ON THE PANEL ONE LAST TIME AND VIEWED THE LNDG AND DEPARTING RWY 33L NOTE. THE DATA ON THE OPC WAS HIGHLIGHTED FOR RWY 24 AND PERFORMANCE NUMBERS WERE BRIEFED FOR RWY 24. THE STOPPING MARGIN WAS NOTED AND WRITTEN DOWN. AFTER PUSHBACK; I OBSERVED A COMPANY JET TAXIING IN FOR THE GATE WE HAD JUST DEPARTED. AFTER START CHKS WERE COMPLETED; AND THE FO CALLED FOR TAXI. GND CTL ASKED US IF WE COULD SIDESTEP AND ALLOW COMPANY ROOM TO GET BY AND TO TAXI TO RWY 33L. WE DID AS REQUESTED. AFTER THE SIDESTEP MANEUVER; WE WERE PRETTY MUCH LINED UP AT THE HOLD SHORT LINE OF RWY 33L; AS IT WAS AN EXTREMELY SHORT TAXI AND HAD TO ROLL ONLY A FEW YARDS. THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AND WE WERE GIVEN TKOF CLRNC FOR RWY 33L. TRYING TO BE A GOOD MENTOR FOR THE NEW FO; I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF USING ALL THE AVAILABLE RWY AND INFORMED HIM I WOULD USE A MODIFIED STATIC TKOF ROLL. WE BACK-TAXIED INTO POS. MY MISTAKE OF USING TKOF DATA FOR RWY 24 ON RWY 33L HAD STILL NOT BEEN REALIZED. AS I REFLECT ON THESE EVENTS AND READ MY WORDS; MY NOT CATCHING THIS ERROR IS EXTREMELY DISCONCERTING. I DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT OR IRREGULARITY. ALTHOUGH THE TKOF ROLL APPEARED TO BE NORMAL AS COMPARED TO OTHER SYS WIDE SHORT FIELD DEPS; A FEELING OF SOMETHING IN ERROR CAME OVER ME WHILE CLBING THROUGH 10000 FT. I HANDED THE ACFT TO THE FO AND REVIEWED THE LOAD SHEET; AND FOUND NOTHING OUT OF ORDER. I REACHED FOR THE OPC TO REVIEW THE TKOF DATA AND IT HIT ME. I HAD USED RWY 24 DATA FOR RWY 33L AND HAD DEPARTED OVER ATOG AND HAD NOT CAUGHT IT. HAD RWY 33L BEEN SELECTED; PERFORMANCE NUMBERS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE. I HAD TAKEN OFF ON AN UNBALANCED RWY AND WAS DEVASTATED. I IMMEDIATELY CHKED TO SEE HOW MANY CHILDREN HAD BOARDED AND THERE WERE ONLY 10. THE CHILD WT FACTORED IN STILL DID NOT COVER MY ERROR. SOMEHOW I HAD OVERLOOKED THE RWY BOX ON THE TKOF PERFORMANCE PAGE. THERE WERE PROBABLY SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INVOLVED; BUT NONE STAND OUT AS BEING A MAIN CAUSE. I UNDERSTAND THE SEVERITY OF MY OMISSION AND AS CAPT I ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY. I HONESTLY THOUGHT I WAS USING THE CORRECT PERFORMANCE NUMBERS. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL TAKE MORE TIME IN REVIEWING THE OPC TKOF PAGE AND THEN ASK FOR THE BEFORE PUSH CHKLIST. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN MY PRACTICE TO WRITE DOWN AND CIRCLE ON THE RELEASE THE AVAILABLE STOPPING MARGIN. I THINK NOW I WILL INCLUDE THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF THE RWY (IE; RWY 24; 1310 FT). I BELIEVE THIS WILL ENSURE THAT I ALWAYS USE THE PERFORMANCE NUMBERS FOR THE CORRECT RWY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.