Narrative:

Our day started with a scheduled 8 hour 10 min reduced rest the night before the incident. I had approximately 5 hours 30 mins of sleep during that rest period. All crew members were tired the next morning at our XA00 report. I felt fatigued for the remainder of the day. I was the PNF for this flight. We were #1 landing. A short turn to base was anticipated; so the first officer initiated a rapid rate of descent from 7000 ft to the assigned altitude of 3500 ft. We were turned to base close in to the field; but north of the FAF. The autoplt was on. I noticed company traffic above and in front of us as we rolled out onto the base leg. Because of our close proximity to him; it appeared to me that he was landing on runway 18R; though I knew this was not the case. ATC pointed him out to us and stated that the company traffic was landing runway 18L and then cleared us for the visual. As I was processing this information; our high closure rate with the other aircraft continued to reduce the separation between us. I made a comment about it to the first officer. The first officer replied he would keep the autoplt on to complete the turn to final. By this time it was obvious to me we had overshot the localizer and were left of course. I was looking outside at the parallel traffic. A TA sounded on TCASII. It was at this time I noted our indicated airspeed was 240 KIAS and that we were now positioned between both runways. I realized our high airspeed was resulting in a large turn radius that resulted in a gross overshoot to final. The first officer disconnected the autoplt and increased the bank angle toward the extended centerline. The combination of high indicated airspeed and bank angle briefly triggered the 'bank angle' aural. The aircraft was stabilized and configured for a normal landing. The first officer and I had lost situational awareness as we descended and turned to base. I failed to monitor our aircraft as I was looking outside at the parallel traffic. There was no xchking by myself as the PNF. I firmly believe an important contributing factor was a lack of adequate rest the night before. The company had scheduled a reduced rest after a 12 hour 45 min duty day. We started off the day with a huge deficit in sleep. Simply being on the ground for 8 hours does not provide time for quality rest. The result is an exhausted crew the next day. I'm disappointed that scheduled reduced rest is considered routine by the company and condoned by the FAA. It is not safe; and a hazard to safe flight operations.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 CREW; FOLLOWING A MINIMUM REST OVERNIGHT; OVERSHOT A RWY WITH PARALLEL LNDG TFC DUE TO FATIGUE.

Narrative: OUR DAY STARTED WITH A SCHEDULED 8 HR 10 MIN REDUCED REST THE NIGHT BEFORE THE INCIDENT. I HAD APPROX 5 HRS 30 MINS OF SLEEP DURING THAT REST PERIOD. ALL CREW MEMBERS WERE TIRED THE NEXT MORNING AT OUR XA00 RPT. I FELT FATIGUED FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY. I WAS THE PNF FOR THIS FLT. WE WERE #1 LNDG. A SHORT TURN TO BASE WAS ANTICIPATED; SO THE FO INITIATED A RAPID RATE OF DSCNT FROM 7000 FT TO THE ASSIGNED ALT OF 3500 FT. WE WERE TURNED TO BASE CLOSE IN TO THE FIELD; BUT N OF THE FAF. THE AUTOPLT WAS ON. I NOTICED COMPANY TFC ABOVE AND IN FRONT OF US AS WE ROLLED OUT ONTO THE BASE LEG. BECAUSE OF OUR CLOSE PROX TO HIM; IT APPEARED TO ME THAT HE WAS LNDG ON RWY 18R; THOUGH I KNEW THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. ATC POINTED HIM OUT TO US AND STATED THAT THE COMPANY TFC WAS LNDG RWY 18L AND THEN CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL. AS I WAS PROCESSING THIS INFO; OUR HIGH CLOSURE RATE WITH THE OTHER ACFT CONTINUED TO REDUCE THE SEPARATION BTWN US. I MADE A COMMENT ABOUT IT TO THE FO. THE FO REPLIED HE WOULD KEEP THE AUTOPLT ON TO COMPLETE THE TURN TO FINAL. BY THIS TIME IT WAS OBVIOUS TO ME WE HAD OVERSHOT THE LOC AND WERE L OF COURSE. I WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE AT THE PARALLEL TFC. A TA SOUNDED ON TCASII. IT WAS AT THIS TIME I NOTED OUR INDICATED AIRSPD WAS 240 KIAS AND THAT WE WERE NOW POSITIONED BTWN BOTH RWYS. I REALIZED OUR HIGH AIRSPD WAS RESULTING IN A LARGE TURN RADIUS THAT RESULTED IN A GROSS OVERSHOOT TO FINAL. THE FO DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND INCREASED THE BANK ANGLE TOWARD THE EXTENDED CTRLINE. THE COMBINATION OF HIGH INDICATED AIRSPD AND BANK ANGLE BRIEFLY TRIGGERED THE 'BANK ANGLE' AURAL. THE ACFT WAS STABILIZED AND CONFIGURED FOR A NORMAL LNDG. THE FO AND I HAD LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AS WE DSNDED AND TURNED TO BASE. I FAILED TO MONITOR OUR ACFT AS I WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE AT THE PARALLEL TFC. THERE WAS NO XCHKING BY MYSELF AS THE PNF. I FIRMLY BELIEVE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS A LACK OF ADEQUATE REST THE NIGHT BEFORE. THE COMPANY HAD SCHEDULED A REDUCED REST AFTER A 12 HR 45 MIN DUTY DAY. WE STARTED OFF THE DAY WITH A HUGE DEFICIT IN SLEEP. SIMPLY BEING ON THE GND FOR 8 HRS DOES NOT PROVIDE TIME FOR QUALITY REST. THE RESULT IS AN EXHAUSTED CREW THE NEXT DAY. I'M DISAPPOINTED THAT SCHEDULED REDUCED REST IS CONSIDERED ROUTINE BY THE COMPANY AND CONDONED BY THE FAA. IT IS NOT SAFE; AND A HAZARD TO SAFE FLT OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.