Narrative:

Engineering authority/authorized steps 5.3 and 6.3 (installation of leading edge slat track position sensor targets) were confusing as to what position was being worked. Work was being performed in adverse WX conditions without the convenience of a hangar or additional lighting. I verified all part numbers of targets; bolts; nuts; cotter pins and kit number before installation; but the above steps never stated what position of the installation was being worked (inbound or outbound). The aircraft returned to the departure airport on the second flight after accomplishment of the above noted engineering authority/authorized due to a slat asymmetry anomaly. Inspection revealed the inboard and outboard position targets were installed in the opposite location.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-400 HAD AN ENGINEERING AUTH WORKED ON THE LEADING EDGE SLAT TRACK POS SENSORS. JOB CARD DID NOT STATE WHAT SENSOR POS INBOARD OR OUTBOARD.

Narrative: ENGINEERING AUTH STEPS 5.3 AND 6.3 (INSTALLATION OF LEADING EDGE SLAT TRACK POS SENSOR TARGETS) WERE CONFUSING AS TO WHAT POS WAS BEING WORKED. WORK WAS BEING PERFORMED IN ADVERSE WX CONDITIONS WITHOUT THE CONVENIENCE OF A HANGAR OR ADDITIONAL LIGHTING. I VERIFIED ALL PART NUMBERS OF TARGETS; BOLTS; NUTS; COTTER PINS AND KIT NUMBER BEFORE INSTALLATION; BUT THE ABOVE STEPS NEVER STATED WHAT POS OF THE INSTALLATION WAS BEING WORKED (INBOUND OR OUTBOUND). THE ACFT RETURNED TO THE DEP ARPT ON THE SECOND FLT AFTER ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE ABOVE NOTED ENGINEERING AUTH DUE TO A SLAT ASYMMETRY ANOMALY. INSPECTION REVEALED THE INBOARD AND OUTBOARD POS TARGETS WERE INSTALLED IN THE OPPOSITE LOCATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.