Narrative:

During vectors for a visual approach to runway 18L; ATC cleared us to descend to 5000 ft and slow to 210 KTS on downwind. Abeam FAF; we were directed to turn to heading 270 degrees; descend to 4000 ft; and slow to 180 KTS and report the field and traffic in sight. We reported the field and traffic in sight and were cleared for a visual approach. We were high and fast so I lowered the landing gear and extended the flaps to 15 degrees and used flight spoilers. We were inside of FAF and 2 dots above GS slowing to 170 KTS. I called for flaps 25 degrees and flaps 30 degrees. Tower asked if we 'could make it from there.' we replied 'yes; if we can s-turn.' we were cleared for s-turns to the east. Airspeed increased to 180-184 KTS as we approached GS. Passing 500 ft AGL; we got a 'sink rate' caution followed by a 'too low GS' caution. At all times I was correcting back to GS and landed on centerline in the touchdown zone at approximately 160 KTS. Braking and rollout were normal. The captain noticed an unusual nose high attitude on touchdown which may indicate the flight spoilers were partially extended. I learned from this to not accept an early turn-in unless slowed and configured and most important not to continue inside the FAF unless configured and stabilized on parameters. Supplemental information from acn 654056: in retrospect I should have directed a go around at 1000 ft afe when we were still above GS; fast and descending rapidly towards the GS. I did not do that based on my knowledge of my first officer's backgnd. He was a carrier pilot and landing signal officer; as was I. This was our third day and I knew he could fly well and that knowledge and trust in his skill overshadowed an objective judgement. I knew he could 'hack it;' which he did; but went too far outside the stabilized approach limits. Stabilized approach windows are published for a reason and they apply to us all; whether we can 'hack it;' or just think we can. I know that my personal window for stabilized approachs just got a lot tighter after this experience. One last thought. I believe I became too engaged with trying to make this approach work. As PNF; particularly as a captain; PNF; I should -- and will -- try to remain a bit more removed from the goal of making the approach work. I will be more committed to ensuring our operation remains within established safety windows. When we can't make a window on the approach; I will direct; or fly; a missed approach -- no exceptions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-800 CREW RPTS CONTINUING AN UNSTABILIZED APCH WITH GS AND TAIL STRIKE WARNINGS. BOTH FORMER CARRIER PLTS WITH 'CAN DO' ATTITUDE.

Narrative: DURING VECTORS FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18L; ATC CLRED US TO DSND TO 5000 FT AND SLOW TO 210 KTS ON DOWNWIND. ABEAM FAF; WE WERE DIRECTED TO TURN TO HDG 270 DEGS; DSND TO 4000 FT; AND SLOW TO 180 KTS AND RPT THE FIELD AND TFC IN SIGHT. WE RPTED THE FIELD AND TFC IN SIGHT AND WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. WE WERE HIGH AND FAST SO I LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR AND EXTENDED THE FLAPS TO 15 DEGS AND USED FLT SPOILERS. WE WERE INSIDE OF FAF AND 2 DOTS ABOVE GS SLOWING TO 170 KTS. I CALLED FOR FLAPS 25 DEGS AND FLAPS 30 DEGS. TWR ASKED IF WE 'COULD MAKE IT FROM THERE.' WE REPLIED 'YES; IF WE CAN S-TURN.' WE WERE CLRED FOR S-TURNS TO THE E. AIRSPD INCREASED TO 180-184 KTS AS WE APCHED GS. PASSING 500 FT AGL; WE GOT A 'SINK RATE' CAUTION FOLLOWED BY A 'TOO LOW GS' CAUTION. AT ALL TIMES I WAS CORRECTING BACK TO GS AND LANDED ON CTRLINE IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE AT APPROX 160 KTS. BRAKING AND ROLLOUT WERE NORMAL. THE CAPT NOTICED AN UNUSUAL NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE ON TOUCHDOWN WHICH MAY INDICATE THE FLT SPOILERS WERE PARTIALLY EXTENDED. I LEARNED FROM THIS TO NOT ACCEPT AN EARLY TURN-IN UNLESS SLOWED AND CONFIGURED AND MOST IMPORTANT NOT TO CONTINUE INSIDE THE FAF UNLESS CONFIGURED AND STABILIZED ON PARAMETERS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 654056: IN RETROSPECT I SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A GAR AT 1000 FT AFE WHEN WE WERE STILL ABOVE GS; FAST AND DSNDING RAPIDLY TOWARDS THE GS. I DID NOT DO THAT BASED ON MY KNOWLEDGE OF MY FO'S BACKGND. HE WAS A CARRIER PLT AND LNDG SIGNAL OFFICER; AS WAS I. THIS WAS OUR THIRD DAY AND I KNEW HE COULD FLY WELL AND THAT KNOWLEDGE AND TRUST IN HIS SKILL OVERSHADOWED AN OBJECTIVE JUDGEMENT. I KNEW HE COULD 'HACK IT;' WHICH HE DID; BUT WENT TOO FAR OUTSIDE THE STABILIZED APCH LIMITS. STABILIZED APCH WINDOWS ARE PUBLISHED FOR A REASON AND THEY APPLY TO US ALL; WHETHER WE CAN 'HACK IT;' OR JUST THINK WE CAN. I KNOW THAT MY PERSONAL WINDOW FOR STABILIZED APCHS JUST GOT A LOT TIGHTER AFTER THIS EXPERIENCE. ONE LAST THOUGHT. I BELIEVE I BECAME TOO ENGAGED WITH TRYING TO MAKE THIS APCH WORK. AS PNF; PARTICULARLY AS A CAPT; PNF; I SHOULD -- AND WILL -- TRY TO REMAIN A BIT MORE REMOVED FROM THE GOAL OF MAKING THE APCH WORK. I WILL BE MORE COMMITTED TO ENSURING OUR OP REMAINS WITHIN ESTABLISHED SAFETY WINDOWS. WHEN WE CAN'T MAKE A WINDOW ON THE APCH; I WILL DIRECT; OR FLY; A MISSED APCH -- NO EXCEPTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.