Narrative:

We pushed back from the gate and I instructed the first officer to start both engines; anticipating a short taxi. We performed the after start checklist and the first officer called for taxi. As we started the taxi; I called for the taxi checklist; but immediately became confused about the route and queried the first officer to help me clear up the discrepancy. We discussed the route and continued the taxi. We were cleared to cross runway 4; and I asked the first officer to situation the flight attendants. He made the appropriate PA. We were cleared for takeoff runway 1; but the flight attendant call chime wasn't working. I had called for the before takeoff checklist; but this was interrupted by the communications glitch. After affirming the flight attendants ready; we verbally confirmed before takeoff checklist complete. On takeoff; rotation and liftoff were sluggish. At 100-150 ft as I continued to rotate; we got the stick shaker. The first officer noticed the no flap condition and placed the flaps to 5 degrees. The rest of the flight was uneventful. We wrote up the takeoff warning horn but found the circuit breaker popped at the gate. The cause of this potentially dangerous situation was a breakdown in checklist discipline attributable to cockpit distraction. The taxi checklist was interrupted by my taxi route confusion. The before takeoff checklist was interrupted by a flight attendant communication problem. And for some reason; the takeoff warning horn circuit breaker popped; removing the last check on this type of thing. Both of us feel ourselves to be highly diligent professionals. We got ourselves in a box by allowing ourselves to be distraction from the checklist. From now on; if I am interrupted while performing a checklist; I intend to do the whole thing over again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B737-800 TAKES OFF WITH FLAPS UP.

Narrative: WE PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE AND I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO START BOTH ENGS; ANTICIPATING A SHORT TAXI. WE PERFORMED THE AFTER START CHKLIST AND THE FO CALLED FOR TAXI. AS WE STARTED THE TAXI; I CALLED FOR THE TAXI CHKLIST; BUT IMMEDIATELY BECAME CONFUSED ABOUT THE RTE AND QUERIED THE FO TO HELP ME CLEAR UP THE DISCREPANCY. WE DISCUSSED THE RTE AND CONTINUED THE TAXI. WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 4; AND I ASKED THE FO TO SIT THE FLT ATTENDANTS. HE MADE THE APPROPRIATE PA. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF RWY 1; BUT THE FLT ATTENDANT CALL CHIME WASN'T WORKING. I HAD CALLED FOR THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST; BUT THIS WAS INTERRUPTED BY THE COMS GLITCH. AFTER AFFIRMING THE FLT ATTENDANTS READY; WE VERBALLY CONFIRMED BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST COMPLETE. ON TKOF; ROTATION AND LIFTOFF WERE SLUGGISH. AT 100-150 FT AS I CONTINUED TO ROTATE; WE GOT THE STICK SHAKER. THE FO NOTICED THE NO FLAP CONDITION AND PLACED THE FLAPS TO 5 DEGS. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE WROTE UP THE TKOF WARNING HORN BUT FOUND THE CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPED AT THE GATE. THE CAUSE OF THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SIT WAS A BREAKDOWN IN CHKLIST DISCIPLINE ATTRIBUTABLE TO COCKPIT DISTR. THE TAXI CHKLIST WAS INTERRUPTED BY MY TAXI RTE CONFUSION. THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WAS INTERRUPTED BY A FLT ATTENDANT COM PROB. AND FOR SOME REASON; THE TKOF WARNING HORN CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPED; REMOVING THE LAST CHK ON THIS TYPE OF THING. BOTH OF US FEEL OURSELVES TO BE HIGHLY DILIGENT PROFESSIONALS. WE GOT OURSELVES IN A BOX BY ALLOWING OURSELVES TO BE DISTR FROM THE CHKLIST. FROM NOW ON; IF I AM INTERRUPTED WHILE PERFORMING A CHKLIST; I INTEND TO DO THE WHOLE THING OVER AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.