Narrative:

We were being vectored for a visual approach to runway 7 and were just breaking out of the cloud bases approximately 4 NM wnw. The autoplt was on and flying a heading. Without warning; the autoplt and autothrottles disconnected themselves. As this was happening; approach put us on a heading to intercept the localizer for runway 7 and I began hand flying the airplane per the ECAM warnings. The first officer began running the ECAM's while acknowledging the approach clearance and I intercepted the ILS manually. At this point we could see the runway through rain showers just inside IAF. The first officer had or was just completing the ECAM's when the airplane started rolling and pitching due to; I believe; windshear at our location. I looked at my window arrow and it showed a 50 KT tailwind. That; plus the movement of the aircraft and the rudder load limiter ECAM (which appeared; I believe; after we put the gear down); led me to initiate a go around and tower put us on a 350 heading and climbed us to 9000 ft MSL. I believe it was during the go around (I did go to toga) that more ECAM's appeared including adr disagreement ECAM's which said to turn off the adr displaying a fault but no adr fault lights on the overhead were displayed. We also now noticed that our airspeed indicators were 10 KTS different (mine was lower). This difference widened to nearly 20 KIAS before we landed. We also had an ECAM which directed us to cycle #1 and #2 facility's; which we did but without effect. The WX was an issue throughout this event with thunderstorms approaching from the west. I think we lost the airspeed tape information as we were joining final. As we were climbing out on the 350 degree heading; I noticed an alternate law ECAM advisory which had not been there before. We also had a #1 bleed fault ECAM appear at this time with the corresponding fault light on the overhead and the #1 pack fault light. Between the WX; the flight control and airspeed issues we were having with the plane at this time; I decided to declare an emergency to get priority handling back to the airport. We discussed the WX approaching the airport and the fact that it was still VFR and the flight control and flight instrument problems and decided it was best to get the airplane on the ground as soon as we could. Since my airspeed gauge was reading lower; I used it for the approach rather than get too slow. We did not think to xchk the standby airspeed indicator till after landing. To the best of my remembrance we had the following ECAM's: autoplt and autothrottle off; rudder load limiter (or rudder travel limiter); flight controller alternate law; flight controller direct law; #1 engine bleed fault; adr disagreement; avionics system fault.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 EXPERIENCED MULTIPLE FAULTS FOLLOWING AN ADR #1 FAULT ON FINAL APCH. CREW EXECUTED A GAR; DECLARED AN EMER AND CONTINUED IN ALT LAW. THE ACFT LANDED IN DIRECT LAW.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 7 AND WERE JUST BREAKING OUT OF THE CLOUD BASES APPROX 4 NM WNW. THE AUTOPLT WAS ON AND FLYING A HDG. WITHOUT WARNING; THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES DISCONNECTED THEMSELVES. AS THIS WAS HAPPENING; APCH PUT US ON A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR RWY 7 AND I BEGAN HAND FLYING THE AIRPLANE PER THE ECAM WARNINGS. THE FO BEGAN RUNNING THE ECAM'S WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE APCH CLRNC AND I INTERCEPTED THE ILS MANUALLY. AT THIS POINT WE COULD SEE THE RWY THROUGH RAIN SHOWERS JUST INSIDE IAF. THE FO HAD OR WAS JUST COMPLETING THE ECAM'S WHEN THE AIRPLANE STARTED ROLLING AND PITCHING DUE TO; I BELIEVE; WINDSHEAR AT OUR LOCATION. I LOOKED AT MY WINDOW ARROW AND IT SHOWED A 50 KT TAILWIND. THAT; PLUS THE MOVEMENT OF THE ACFT AND THE RUDDER LOAD LIMITER ECAM (WHICH APPEARED; I BELIEVE; AFTER WE PUT THE GEAR DOWN); LED ME TO INITIATE A GAR AND TWR PUT US ON A 350 HDG AND CLBED US TO 9000 FT MSL. I BELIEVE IT WAS DURING THE GAR (I DID GO TO TOGA) THAT MORE ECAM'S APPEARED INCLUDING ADR DISAGREEMENT ECAM'S WHICH SAID TO TURN OFF THE ADR DISPLAYING A FAULT BUT NO ADR FAULT LIGHTS ON THE OVERHEAD WERE DISPLAYED. WE ALSO NOW NOTICED THAT OUR AIRSPD INDICATORS WERE 10 KTS DIFFERENT (MINE WAS LOWER). THIS DIFFERENCE WIDENED TO NEARLY 20 KIAS BEFORE WE LANDED. WE ALSO HAD AN ECAM WHICH DIRECTED US TO CYCLE #1 AND #2 FAC'S; WHICH WE DID BUT WITHOUT EFFECT. THE WX WAS AN ISSUE THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT WITH TSTMS APCHING FROM THE W. I THINK WE LOST THE AIRSPD TAPE INFO AS WE WERE JOINING FINAL. AS WE WERE CLBING OUT ON THE 350 DEG HDG; I NOTICED AN ALTERNATE LAW ECAM ADVISORY WHICH HAD NOT BEEN THERE BEFORE. WE ALSO HAD A #1 BLEED FAULT ECAM APPEAR AT THIS TIME WITH THE CORRESPONDING FAULT LIGHT ON THE OVERHEAD AND THE #1 PACK FAULT LIGHT. BTWN THE WX; THE FLT CTL AND AIRSPD ISSUES WE WERE HAVING WITH THE PLANE AT THIS TIME; I DECIDED TO DECLARE AN EMER TO GET PRIORITY HANDLING BACK TO THE ARPT. WE DISCUSSED THE WX APCHING THE ARPT AND THE FACT THAT IT WAS STILL VFR AND THE FLT CTL AND FLT INST PROBS AND DECIDED IT WAS BEST TO GET THE AIRPLANE ON THE GND AS SOON AS WE COULD. SINCE MY AIRSPD GAUGE WAS READING LOWER; I USED IT FOR THE APCH RATHER THAN GET TOO SLOW. WE DID NOT THINK TO XCHK THE STANDBY AIRSPD INDICATOR TILL AFTER LNDG. TO THE BEST OF MY REMEMBRANCE WE HAD THE FOLLOWING ECAM'S: AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE OFF; RUDDER LOAD LIMITER (OR RUDDER TRAVEL LIMITER); FLT CONTROLLER ALTERNATE LAW; FLT CONTROLLER DIRECT LAW; #1 ENG BLEED FAULT; ADR DISAGREEMENT; AVIONICS SYS FAULT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.