Narrative:

VFR flight from dnv to 935D. WX briefing indicated ceilings in area between 3500 ft broken and 1800 ft broken with visibility 10 SM in occasional light rain. Departed dnv and encountered conditions as forecast: broken to overcast at 3000 ft; but visibility was good. Transiting sbn class C airspace revealed similar conditions but with occasional light rain. Sbn approach gave vectors to avoid traffic conflicts and then released me to continue own navigation. As I approached elx VOR; I encountered rapidly deteriorating WX: lowering ceiling and lowering visibility in light rain and moderate turbulence. As the ceiling lowered to uncomfortable level; I contacted ZAU; advised of my location and that VFR was rapidly deteriorating and asked for IFR clearance into 35D. ZAU gave me a squawk and a climb to 3000 ft and I was turned over to kalamazoo approach. Approach offered me my own navigation to the 35D VOR approach IAF. While setting up for the approach; I was given a vector and I turned to the heading. As I continued to brief the approach; I discovered I had vertigo as the plane was in a banked descent; but I felt I was straight and level. Focusing on the instruments; I recovered to level flight and climbed back to 3000 ft. By that time; I had lost my situational awareness: I could not seem to orient my location in relation to the approach. I believe I informed approach of my experiencing vertigo; but at this point; I am not positive that I clearly explained my predicament to approach control. Approach issued me vectors to the IAF and I made the approach into 35D. Contributing factors: although I am instrument rated and IFR current; I am a pilot from the desert southwest with little actual IMC experience. Most of my experience has been 'hood time.' I believe this lack of IMC training/experience was a contributing factor to my experiencing vertigo. As a pilot unfamiliar with the area; I was surprised at how rapidly the WX can change in michigan. This was a contributing factor to finding myself in IMC on a VFR flight plan. Contributing factors to my loss of situational awareness included the fact that during my vertigo event; I had made descending turns after having been given vectors for the approach. My unfamiliarity of the territory also contributed to the loss of situational awareness. Corrective action: when the ceilings lowered to unsafe levels; I immediately contacted center for an IFR clearance. When I discovered the instruments were not agreeing with my sense of balance; I relied on the instruments. When I discovered I was in a descending bank; I recovered by focusing on the instruments and using unusual attitude recovery training to return to straight and level flight (throttle back; level wings and bring the nose up). Human performance: the weakest portion of my performance was not articulating to approach that I had experienced vertigo and subsequent loss of situational awareness. I further did not articulate the immediate need for vectors because of this. The controller did recognize that I was having difficulty getting to the IAF and offered vectors; which were gratefully accepted. Points learned: 1) if marginal VFR is forecast; always file IFR in unfamiliar territory. 2) practice IFR in actual IMC rather than just hood time. This is difficult in the southwest; but critical to safe IFR in IMC. 3) loss of situational awareness requires prompt notification to ATC and a request for vectors. 4) emphasis on unusual attitude recovery in IFR and vertigo recognition/recovery are a critical part of IFR and VFR recurrent training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF PA28 ENCOUNTERS WORSE THAN FORECAST WX AND FINDS HIMSELF IN IMC CONDITIONS AND SUFFERING VERTIGO. SALVAGES SIT BY STRICT ADHERENCE TO AVIATING SKILLS AND COMMUNICATING HIS NEEDS TO ATC.

Narrative: VFR FLT FROM DNV TO 935D. WX BRIEFING INDICATED CEILINGS IN AREA BTWN 3500 FT BROKEN AND 1800 FT BROKEN WITH VISIBILITY 10 SM IN OCCASIONAL LIGHT RAIN. DEPARTED DNV AND ENCOUNTERED CONDITIONS AS FORECAST: BROKEN TO OVCST AT 3000 FT; BUT VISIBILITY WAS GOOD. TRANSITING SBN CLASS C AIRSPACE REVEALED SIMILAR CONDITIONS BUT WITH OCCASIONAL LIGHT RAIN. SBN APCH GAVE VECTORS TO AVOID TFC CONFLICTS AND THEN RELEASED ME TO CONTINUE OWN NAV. AS I APCHED ELX VOR; I ENCOUNTERED RAPIDLY DETERIORATING WX: LOWERING CEILING AND LOWERING VISIBILITY IN LIGHT RAIN AND MODERATE TURB. AS THE CEILING LOWERED TO UNCOMFORTABLE LEVEL; I CONTACTED ZAU; ADVISED OF MY LOCATION AND THAT VFR WAS RAPIDLY DETERIORATING AND ASKED FOR IFR CLRNC INTO 35D. ZAU GAVE ME A SQUAWK AND A CLB TO 3000 FT AND I WAS TURNED OVER TO KALAMAZOO APCH. APCH OFFERED ME MY OWN NAV TO THE 35D VOR APCH IAF. WHILE SETTING UP FOR THE APCH; I WAS GIVEN A VECTOR AND I TURNED TO THE HDG. AS I CONTINUED TO BRIEF THE APCH; I DISCOVERED I HAD VERTIGO AS THE PLANE WAS IN A BANKED DSCNT; BUT I FELT I WAS STRAIGHT AND LEVEL. FOCUSING ON THE INSTS; I RECOVERED TO LEVEL FLT AND CLBED BACK TO 3000 FT. BY THAT TIME; I HAD LOST MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: I COULD NOT SEEM TO ORIENT MY LOCATION IN RELATION TO THE APCH. I BELIEVE I INFORMED APCH OF MY EXPERIENCING VERTIGO; BUT AT THIS POINT; I AM NOT POSITIVE THAT I CLRLY EXPLAINED MY PREDICAMENT TO APCH CTL. APCH ISSUED ME VECTORS TO THE IAF AND I MADE THE APCH INTO 35D. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ALTHOUGH I AM INST RATED AND IFR CURRENT; I AM A PLT FROM THE DESERT SW WITH LITTLE ACTUAL IMC EXPERIENCE. MOST OF MY EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN 'HOOD TIME.' I BELIEVE THIS LACK OF IMC TRAINING/EXPERIENCE WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO MY EXPERIENCING VERTIGO. AS A PLT UNFAMILIAR WITH THE AREA; I WAS SURPRISED AT HOW RAPIDLY THE WX CAN CHANGE IN MICHIGAN. THIS WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO FINDING MYSELF IN IMC ON A VFR FLT PLAN. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO MY LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS INCLUDED THE FACT THAT DURING MY VERTIGO EVENT; I HAD MADE DSNDING TURNS AFTER HAVING BEEN GIVEN VECTORS FOR THE APCH. MY UNFAMILIARITY OF THE TERRITORY ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. CORRECTIVE ACTION: WHEN THE CEILINGS LOWERED TO UNSAFE LEVELS; I IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED CTR FOR AN IFR CLRNC. WHEN I DISCOVERED THE INSTS WERE NOT AGREEING WITH MY SENSE OF BAL; I RELIED ON THE INSTS. WHEN I DISCOVERED I WAS IN A DSNDING BANK; I RECOVERED BY FOCUSING ON THE INSTS AND USING UNUSUAL ATTITUDE RECOVERY TRAINING TO RETURN TO STRAIGHT AND LEVEL FLT (THROTTLE BACK; LEVEL WINGS AND BRING THE NOSE UP). HUMAN PERFORMANCE: THE WEAKEST PORTION OF MY PERFORMANCE WAS NOT ARTICULATING TO APCH THAT I HAD EXPERIENCED VERTIGO AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. I FURTHER DID NOT ARTICULATE THE IMMEDIATE NEED FOR VECTORS BECAUSE OF THIS. THE CTLR DID RECOGNIZE THAT I WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY GETTING TO THE IAF AND OFFERED VECTORS; WHICH WERE GRATEFULLY ACCEPTED. POINTS LEARNED: 1) IF MARGINAL VFR IS FORECAST; ALWAYS FILE IFR IN UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY. 2) PRACTICE IFR IN ACTUAL IMC RATHER THAN JUST HOOD TIME. THIS IS DIFFICULT IN THE SW; BUT CRITICAL TO SAFE IFR IN IMC. 3) LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REQUIRES PROMPT NOTIFICATION TO ATC AND A REQUEST FOR VECTORS. 4) EMPHASIS ON UNUSUAL ATTITUDE RECOVERY IN IFR AND VERTIGO RECOGNITION/RECOVERY ARE A CRITICAL PART OF IFR AND VFR RECURRENT TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.