Narrative:

On jun/wed/05 at XA00 I was assigned; along with a fellow mechanic; to work aircraft X installing #1 engine hydraulic pump to replace one that had been robbed from the aircraft to replace a failed pump on another aircraft. We found the cowl to the engine open; all lines capped. I printed the aircraft maintenance manual for engine hydraulic pump removal and installation. We verified the pump numbers and effectivity for installation on the aircraft. We proceeded to swap on the work table we had available to us; the fittings that would need to be removed from the failed unit of the other aircraft onto the new pump. When we completed those actions we installed the pump following the procedures as stated in the installation portion of the amm. As we neared the end of the installation we informed the lead mechanic that we would need to leak check the lines that had been disturbed during removal and installation. Around XC10 our lead informed us another mechanic would be available shortly to motor the engine. At that time; I went to the hydraulic service panel to check the level of the green hydraulic system. I found the level to be above the green service band. When the third mechanic arrived he motored the engine as we checked the pump and related lines for leaks. We found none. During the motoring; I broke away from checking the lines for leaks (as there didn't appear to be any); to go back to the service panel to check the hydraulic level of the green system. To my surprise I found it to be below the normal service band and proceeded to hand signal to my lead mechanic (who had stopped by to observe the motoring of the engine) that servicing would be in order. As the engine shut down; I came forward to confirm with my fellow mechanic that there were no leaks; at which time I verbally confirmed to the lead mechanic that the green hydraulic system was low and would require service. He told me to make a write-up; as it was near to the end of the shift. I told him I would do so. I then proceeded to assist the other mechanic in closing up the engine. After we closed up the engine; I cleaned off my tools. I then went into the office with the other mechanic to sign off the installation of the pump. The next day I was notified that aircraft had landed under an amber alert due to low hydraulic levels in the green system. I should have written write-up to cover servicing system before signing off original write-up.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 RETURNED TO THE FIELD DUE TO LOW QUANTITY IN GREEN HYD SYS. THE TECHNICIAN NOTED THE LOW HYD QUANTITY AND ADVISED THE LEAD TECHNICIAN TWICE; BUT FAILED TO WRITE A CARD FOR SVCING THE GREEN SYS.

Narrative: ON JUN/WED/05 AT XA00 I WAS ASSIGNED; ALONG WITH A FELLOW MECH; TO WORK ACFT X INSTALLING #1 ENG HYD PUMP TO REPLACE ONE THAT HAD BEEN ROBBED FROM THE ACFT TO REPLACE A FAILED PUMP ON ANOTHER ACFT. WE FOUND THE COWL TO THE ENG OPEN; ALL LINES CAPPED. I PRINTED THE ACFT MAINT MANUAL FOR ENG HYD PUMP REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION. WE VERIFIED THE PUMP NUMBERS AND EFFECTIVITY FOR INSTALLATION ON THE ACFT. WE PROCEEDED TO SWAP ON THE WORK TABLE WE HAD AVAILABLE TO US; THE FITTINGS THAT WOULD NEED TO BE REMOVED FROM THE FAILED UNIT OF THE OTHER ACFT ONTO THE NEW PUMP. WHEN WE COMPLETED THOSE ACTIONS WE INSTALLED THE PUMP FOLLOWING THE PROCS AS STATED IN THE INSTALLATION PORTION OF THE AMM. AS WE NEARED THE END OF THE INSTALLATION WE INFORMED THE LEAD MECH THAT WE WOULD NEED TO LEAK CHK THE LINES THAT HAD BEEN DISTURBED DURING REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION. AROUND XC10 OUR LEAD INFORMED US ANOTHER MECH WOULD BE AVAILABLE SHORTLY TO MOTOR THE ENG. AT THAT TIME; I WENT TO THE HYD SVC PANEL TO CHK THE LEVEL OF THE GREEN HYD SYS. I FOUND THE LEVEL TO BE ABOVE THE GREEN SVC BAND. WHEN THE THIRD MECH ARRIVED HE MOTORED THE ENG AS WE CHKED THE PUMP AND RELATED LINES FOR LEAKS. WE FOUND NONE. DURING THE MOTORING; I BROKE AWAY FROM CHKING THE LINES FOR LEAKS (AS THERE DIDN'T APPEAR TO BE ANY); TO GO BACK TO THE SVC PANEL TO CHK THE HYD LEVEL OF THE GREEN SYS. TO MY SURPRISE I FOUND IT TO BE BELOW THE NORMAL SVC BAND AND PROCEEDED TO HAND SIGNAL TO MY LEAD MECH (WHO HAD STOPPED BY TO OBSERVE THE MOTORING OF THE ENG) THAT SVCING WOULD BE IN ORDER. AS THE ENG SHUT DOWN; I CAME FORWARD TO CONFIRM WITH MY FELLOW MECH THAT THERE WERE NO LEAKS; AT WHICH TIME I VERBALLY CONFIRMED TO THE LEAD MECH THAT THE GREEN HYD SYS WAS LOW AND WOULD REQUIRE SVC. HE TOLD ME TO MAKE A WRITE-UP; AS IT WAS NEAR TO THE END OF THE SHIFT. I TOLD HIM I WOULD DO SO. I THEN PROCEEDED TO ASSIST THE OTHER MECH IN CLOSING UP THE ENG. AFTER WE CLOSED UP THE ENG; I CLEANED OFF MY TOOLS. I THEN WENT INTO THE OFFICE WITH THE OTHER MECH TO SIGN OFF THE INSTALLATION OF THE PUMP. THE NEXT DAY I WAS NOTIFIED THAT ACFT HAD LANDED UNDER AN AMBER ALERT DUE TO LOW HYD LEVELS IN THE GREEN SYS. I SHOULD HAVE WRITTEN WRITE-UP TO COVER SERVICING SYS BEFORE SIGNING OFF ORIGINAL WRITE-UP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.