Narrative:

I was captain of an EMS helicopter on a mission from ZZZ1 medical center to an accident scene. Our hospital pad is located within the ZZZ airport class D airspace boundaries. We coordination at takeoff by radio with tower to transition through the airspace for each departure. Upon return; I called tower 12 mi south of ZZZ at 2500 ft for the transition; northbound; to the hospital and used the lifeguard prefix to my call sign. I was given the normal transition instructions through the class D airspace direct to the pad. As I approached ZZZ; tower gave an IFR inbound challenger bizjet clearance for a visual approach to runway 25 and asked if I had the jet in sight. I responded that I did; and was advised to maintain visual contact and separation from the jet. I did so; and continued my direct flight to the hospital. The challenger flew a standard rectangular pattern after passing overhead the airport; using left turns. As the challenger turned final; it became apparent that our combined speed and ground tracks would bring us closer together than is normally desired. I called tower to advise that I had the traffic in sight and was initiating a descent into the hospital pad to ensure adequate separation. Apparently based on a subsequent phone call with the tower controller; he had become busy and distraction and did not see our convergence developing. When he did re-establish visual contact; his viewing angle down runway 25 caused him to think that an near midair collision was possible. The controller was moderately upset with me; in spite of the fact that I had complied with his instructions and had initiated corrective action to ensure adequate; if minimal; separation. I feel that the situation; while upsetting to the controller; was not in fact as potentially hazardous as his perception; and that the entire situation developed due to his inappropriate handling of VFR traffic. His instructions to both aircraft resulted in a foreseeable; and thus avoidable; conflict. As a lifeguard aircraft; I realize that I am not to expect special handling. In this case; compliance with tower instructions to proceed direct placed my aircraft in conflict with another arriving aircraft. By simply amending my clearance/instructions; or by asking the challenger to extend his downwind leg slightly; the controller could have avoided this conflict altogether. The challenger crew might have been more aware and simply extended their downwind too; but as a non local crew; they could not be expected to do so and; in my opinion; are not at fault. My judgement is that the controller became distraction by other duties; after giving clrncs to 2 aircraft that he should have known would result in a collision hazard. Failing to recognize his initial error; his diverted attention allowed the convergence to develop until I felt that action was necessary. Having taken the appropriate action to ensure the safety of both aircraft; and having advised the controller of that action; the controller now seems to hold the opinion that he did nothing wrong; that any potential hazard was my fault; and that my actions to reduce the hazard were inappropriate. Given the current regulatory/enforcement climate; a useful dialogue with ATC regarding improved and safer procedures is not possible. No one can afford to acknowledge an error or accept responsibility; because it could cost them their job. I want to help; but this is the only mechanism that I trust.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EC135 HELI PLT LNDG AT LCL HOSPITAL EXPERIENCED CONFLICT WITH CL60 ON VISUAL APCH AT ZZZ ARPT.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT OF AN EMS HELI ON A MISSION FROM ZZZ1 MEDICAL CTR TO AN ACCIDENT SCENE. OUR HOSPITAL PAD IS LOCATED WITHIN THE ZZZ ARPT CLASS D AIRSPACE BOUNDARIES. WE COORD AT TKOF BY RADIO WITH TWR TO TRANSITION THROUGH THE AIRSPACE FOR EACH DEP. UPON RETURN; I CALLED TWR 12 MI S OF ZZZ AT 2500 FT FOR THE TRANSITION; NBOUND; TO THE HOSPITAL AND USED THE LIFEGUARD PREFIX TO MY CALL SIGN. I WAS GIVEN THE NORMAL TRANSITION INSTRUCTIONS THROUGH THE CLASS D AIRSPACE DIRECT TO THE PAD. AS I APCHED ZZZ; TWR GAVE AN IFR INBOUND CHALLENGER BIZJET CLRNC FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 25 AND ASKED IF I HAD THE JET IN SIGHT. I RESPONDED THAT I DID; AND WAS ADVISED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT AND SEPARATION FROM THE JET. I DID SO; AND CONTINUED MY DIRECT FLT TO THE HOSPITAL. THE CHALLENGER FLEW A STANDARD RECTANGULAR PATTERN AFTER PASSING OVERHEAD THE ARPT; USING L TURNS. AS THE CHALLENGER TURNED FINAL; IT BECAME APPARENT THAT OUR COMBINED SPD AND GND TRACKS WOULD BRING US CLOSER TOGETHER THAN IS NORMALLY DESIRED. I CALLED TWR TO ADVISE THAT I HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT AND WAS INITIATING A DSCNT INTO THE HOSPITAL PAD TO ENSURE ADEQUATE SEPARATION. APPARENTLY BASED ON A SUBSEQUENT PHONE CALL WITH THE TWR CTLR; HE HAD BECOME BUSY AND DISTR AND DID NOT SEE OUR CONVERGENCE DEVELOPING. WHEN HE DID RE-ESTABLISH VISUAL CONTACT; HIS VIEWING ANGLE DOWN RWY 25 CAUSED HIM TO THINK THAT AN NMAC WAS POSSIBLE. THE CTLR WAS MODERATELY UPSET WITH ME; IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT I HAD COMPLIED WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND HAD INITIATED CORRECTIVE ACTION TO ENSURE ADEQUATE; IF MINIMAL; SEPARATION. I FEEL THAT THE SIT; WHILE UPSETTING TO THE CTLR; WAS NOT IN FACT AS POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS AS HIS PERCEPTION; AND THAT THE ENTIRE SIT DEVELOPED DUE TO HIS INAPPROPRIATE HANDLING OF VFR TFC. HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO BOTH ACFT RESULTED IN A FORESEEABLE; AND THUS AVOIDABLE; CONFLICT. AS A LIFEGUARD ACFT; I REALIZE THAT I AM NOT TO EXPECT SPECIAL HANDLING. IN THIS CASE; COMPLIANCE WITH TWR INSTRUCTIONS TO PROCEED DIRECT PLACED MY ACFT IN CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER ARRIVING ACFT. BY SIMPLY AMENDING MY CLRNC/INSTRUCTIONS; OR BY ASKING THE CHALLENGER TO EXTEND HIS DOWNWIND LEG SLIGHTLY; THE CTLR COULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS CONFLICT ALTOGETHER. THE CHALLENGER CREW MIGHT HAVE BEEN MORE AWARE AND SIMPLY EXTENDED THEIR DOWNWIND TOO; BUT AS A NON LCL CREW; THEY COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO DO SO AND; IN MY OPINION; ARE NOT AT FAULT. MY JUDGEMENT IS THAT THE CTLR BECAME DISTR BY OTHER DUTIES; AFTER GIVING CLRNCS TO 2 ACFT THAT HE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN WOULD RESULT IN A COLLISION HAZARD. FAILING TO RECOGNIZE HIS INITIAL ERROR; HIS DIVERTED ATTN ALLOWED THE CONVERGENCE TO DEVELOP UNTIL I FELT THAT ACTION WAS NECESSARY. HAVING TAKEN THE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF BOTH ACFT; AND HAVING ADVISED THE CTLR OF THAT ACTION; THE CTLR NOW SEEMS TO HOLD THE OPINION THAT HE DID NOTHING WRONG; THAT ANY POTENTIAL HAZARD WAS MY FAULT; AND THAT MY ACTIONS TO REDUCE THE HAZARD WERE INAPPROPRIATE. GIVEN THE CURRENT REGULATORY/ENFORCEMENT CLIMATE; A USEFUL DIALOGUE WITH ATC REGARDING IMPROVED AND SAFER PROCS IS NOT POSSIBLE. NO ONE CAN AFFORD TO ACKNOWLEDGE AN ERROR OR ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY; BECAUSE IT COULD COST THEM THEIR JOB. I WANT TO HELP; BUT THIS IS THE ONLY MECHANISM THAT I TRUST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.