Narrative:

Intercepted final to runway 14 about 7 NM from kansy (ILS 6.1 DME) at about 4000 ft while descending at about 210 KTS. Was told by tower to cross north shore of cook inlet 'at or about 1600 ft.' chose to put touchdown zone elevation in altitude window at GS capture versus 1600 ft due to falsely thinking that tower would not force us into an above GS condition and failing to notice that that clearance would put us about 300-400 ft above GS at the shoreline; thus I saw no urgency to change my descent/speed profile. Captured GS at about 3000 ft; approximately 5 NM from kansy at about 210 KTS (still feeling that I would have time to slow and finish configuring for landing). Reduced descent rate to track GS and to slow but failed; initially; to notice that autothrottle had engaged upon GS capture and that speed wasn't decreasing below the 200 KTS in the speed window. PNF made comment that I was low just prior to kansy and I realized that I had forgotten the altitude restr placed on us by tower and saw that I was descending through approximately 1500 ft; I slowed the descent but failed to stop it crossing the shoreline approximately 250 ft low. Somewhere in there; I realized that speed was not slowing; disconnected autothrottle and pulled power to idle and asked for 'flaps to 5 degrees' and 'gear down; final descent checklist.' I was able to get the confign to flaps 25 degrees at about 160 KTS but got high on the glide path. Decided to use speed brakes at this point to assist in descent/deceleration. Failed to monitor descent rate adequately as I was focusing on getting speed down. Heard PNF call 'watch descent rate' which was immediately followed by a 'sink rate' GPWS. Descent rate at this point was about 1800-2000 FPM at about 2 NM from the runway and about 700 ft radio altimeter. Speed brake was stowed and descent rate immediately arrested as I prepared to execute a go around. Not hearing a confirming call from PNF to execute a go around and moving back onto GS I continued my descent and finished configuring and slowing for landing. By approximately 400 ft radio altimeter; was within stabilized approach criteria. In VMC; I tend to fly most of my approachs on the slightly 'aggressive' side; trying not to get myself into a low; slow; drag-it-in situation in hopes of being more fuel efficient. Early in my B757 career that would result in some high; fast approachs. As my experience in this aircraft increased; I had been doing a much better job of using normal confign changes with occasional use of speed brakes to bleed off excess speed and/or altitude. On this date; I failed to see and react properly to several factors which ultimately put me into a high and fast position. I then; improperly; attempted to 'save the day' by using speed brakes below the 'limit' altitude (not knowingly; at this point my situational awareness had deteriorated enough to not realize just how low I was) resulting in the GPWS warning. To top it off; I failed to maintain an ATC assigned altitude restr or execute the go around that I knew was in order. Why? Was it the 3 hours of sleep that I had the night before? Was it that we were finishing up an almost 10 hour duty day including about 7.5 hours of flight time? Was it that we were on day #4 of a scheduled 5 day trip? Or was I just being lazy and relying on the approach to be just like any other? Sadly; I do believe that each of these causes; and probably some others; ultimately had an effect on my judgement and decision making process. Better planning; proper use of the altitude window to protect in an altitude bust; an honest evaluation of the approach and execution of a go around when not properly stabilized were in order on this date and any future day of flying. Supplemental information from acn 663265: first officer was flying a nice approach into anc. He has just about 2000 hours as an first officer on the B757. At about 3500 ft; we were cleared for a visual approach to runway 14 with a restr to cross the north shore of the knik arm inlet at or above 1600 ft. I mentioned to the first officer that I have never received that clearance here and I did not know if that would put us above the GS or not. I figured it might. First officer said he would keep an eye on it. He was maintainingabout 200 KTS descending through 3000 ft. I felt I would have probably been trying to get the plane preloaded with drag to cross the 1600 ft restr with gear down and 160 KTS. The first officer did not make a concerted effort to bleed the speed. In fact; he seemed to not be able to get the speed below 200 KTS. Approaching the 1600 ft restr; it became apparent to me that he would have to level off from the GS in order to make the restr. Approaching 1700 ft; I mentioned that he was approaching 1600 ft. Ultimately; he did not level off and crossed the restr 250 ft low at approximately 185 KTS. At about 1100 ft radio altitude; he realized that his speed was not bleeding off fast enough and he grabbed for the speed brake. He was about 1/2 to 1 full DOT high on the GS at this point. He did not adjust the pitch rapidly enough to maintain the GS; as he passed through it to a DOT low before coming back onto the GS. He developed a high enough sink rate to get a couple 'sink rate' GPWS warnings before that was corrected and back to the GS. He was finally in what I would call a stabilized position by 300 ft. Obviously; not only did we miss the altitude restr the tower wanted; this was a very unstabilized approach. I never thought I would be put into this position and writing a narrative of this type while flying with someone I considered fairly experienced in the aircraft. I don't know why I did not command a go around. I know it crossed my mind as he was grabbing for the speed brakes at 1100 ft. I was thinking it would be a good time to hit the GA switches on the thrust levers; but I just did not get those words out of my lips. I am very disappointed in my performance as the captain of this flight. I was the safety valve and I failed. After he started the high sink rate; I felt very task saturated to get the aircraft back under flight path control. I think I was not mentally prepared for a go around even though we briefed it. Most of us think of a go around from IFR minimums; not above 1000 ft. I know I will never be put into a similar situation with the same outcome; a go around is a must.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B757-200 LAND OUT OF AN UNSTABILIZED APCH TO RWY 14 AT ANC.

Narrative: INTERCEPTED FINAL TO RWY 14 ABOUT 7 NM FROM KANSY (ILS 6.1 DME) AT ABOUT 4000 FT WHILE DSNDING AT ABOUT 210 KTS. WAS TOLD BY TWR TO CROSS N SHORE OF COOK INLET 'AT OR ABOUT 1600 FT.' CHOSE TO PUT TOUCHDOWN ZONE ELEVATION IN ALT WINDOW AT GS CAPTURE VERSUS 1600 FT DUE TO FALSELY THINKING THAT TWR WOULD NOT FORCE US INTO AN ABOVE GS CONDITION AND FAILING TO NOTICE THAT THAT CLRNC WOULD PUT US ABOUT 300-400 FT ABOVE GS AT THE SHORELINE; THUS I SAW NO URGENCY TO CHANGE MY DSCNT/SPD PROFILE. CAPTURED GS AT ABOUT 3000 FT; APPROX 5 NM FROM KANSY AT ABOUT 210 KTS (STILL FEELING THAT I WOULD HAVE TIME TO SLOW AND FINISH CONFIGURING FOR LNDG). REDUCED DSCNT RATE TO TRACK GS AND TO SLOW BUT FAILED; INITIALLY; TO NOTICE THAT AUTOTHROTTLE HAD ENGAGED UPON GS CAPTURE AND THAT SPD WASN'T DECREASING BELOW THE 200 KTS IN THE SPD WINDOW. PNF MADE COMMENT THAT I WAS LOW JUST PRIOR TO KANSY AND I REALIZED THAT I HAD FORGOTTEN THE ALT RESTR PLACED ON US BY TWR AND SAW THAT I WAS DSNDING THROUGH APPROX 1500 FT; I SLOWED THE DSCNT BUT FAILED TO STOP IT XING THE SHORELINE APPROX 250 FT LOW. SOMEWHERE IN THERE; I REALIZED THAT SPD WAS NOT SLOWING; DISCONNECTED AUTOTHROTTLE AND PULLED PWR TO IDLE AND ASKED FOR 'FLAPS TO 5 DEGS' AND 'GEAR DOWN; FINAL DSCNT CHKLIST.' I WAS ABLE TO GET THE CONFIGN TO FLAPS 25 DEGS AT ABOUT 160 KTS BUT GOT HIGH ON THE GLIDE PATH. DECIDED TO USE SPD BRAKES AT THIS POINT TO ASSIST IN DSCNT/DECELERATION. FAILED TO MONITOR DSCNT RATE ADEQUATELY AS I WAS FOCUSING ON GETTING SPD DOWN. HEARD PNF CALL 'WATCH DSCNT RATE' WHICH WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A 'SINK RATE' GPWS. DSCNT RATE AT THIS POINT WAS ABOUT 1800-2000 FPM AT ABOUT 2 NM FROM THE RWY AND ABOUT 700 FT RADIO ALTIMETER. SPD BRAKE WAS STOWED AND DSCNT RATE IMMEDIATELY ARRESTED AS I PREPARED TO EXECUTE A GAR. NOT HEARING A CONFIRMING CALL FROM PNF TO EXECUTE A GAR AND MOVING BACK ONTO GS I CONTINUED MY DSCNT AND FINISHED CONFIGURING AND SLOWING FOR LNDG. BY APPROX 400 FT RADIO ALTIMETER; WAS WITHIN STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA. IN VMC; I TEND TO FLY MOST OF MY APCHS ON THE SLIGHTLY 'AGGRESSIVE' SIDE; TRYING NOT TO GET MYSELF INTO A LOW; SLOW; DRAG-IT-IN SITUATION IN HOPES OF BEING MORE FUEL EFFICIENT. EARLY IN MY B757 CAREER THAT WOULD RESULT IN SOME HIGH; FAST APCHS. AS MY EXPERIENCE IN THIS ACFT INCREASED; I HAD BEEN DOING A MUCH BETTER JOB OF USING NORMAL CONFIGN CHANGES WITH OCCASIONAL USE OF SPD BRAKES TO BLEED OFF EXCESS SPD AND/OR ALT. ON THIS DATE; I FAILED TO SEE AND REACT PROPERLY TO SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH ULTIMATELY PUT ME INTO A HIGH AND FAST POS. I THEN; IMPROPERLY; ATTEMPTED TO 'SAVE THE DAY' BY USING SPD BRAKES BELOW THE 'LIMIT' ALT (NOT KNOWINGLY; AT THIS POINT MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS HAD DETERIORATED ENOUGH TO NOT REALIZE JUST HOW LOW I WAS) RESULTING IN THE GPWS WARNING. TO TOP IT OFF; I FAILED TO MAINTAIN AN ATC ASSIGNED ALT RESTR OR EXECUTE THE GAR THAT I KNEW WAS IN ORDER. WHY? WAS IT THE 3 HRS OF SLEEP THAT I HAD THE NIGHT BEFORE? WAS IT THAT WE WERE FINISHING UP AN ALMOST 10 HR DUTY DAY INCLUDING ABOUT 7.5 HRS OF FLT TIME? WAS IT THAT WE WERE ON DAY #4 OF A SCHEDULED 5 DAY TRIP? OR WAS I JUST BEING LAZY AND RELYING ON THE APCH TO BE JUST LIKE ANY OTHER? SADLY; I DO BELIEVE THAT EACH OF THESE CAUSES; AND PROBABLY SOME OTHERS; ULTIMATELY HAD AN EFFECT ON MY JUDGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS. BETTER PLANNING; PROPER USE OF THE ALT WINDOW TO PROTECT IN AN ALT BUST; AN HONEST EVALUATION OF THE APCH AND EXECUTION OF A GAR WHEN NOT PROPERLY STABILIZED WERE IN ORDER ON THIS DATE AND ANY FUTURE DAY OF FLYING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 663265: FO WAS FLYING A NICE APCH INTO ANC. HE HAS JUST ABOUT 2000 HRS AS AN FO ON THE B757. AT ABOUT 3500 FT; WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 14 WITH A RESTR TO CROSS THE N SHORE OF THE KNIK ARM INLET AT OR ABOVE 1600 FT. I MENTIONED TO THE FO THAT I HAVE NEVER RECEIVED THAT CLRNC HERE AND I DID NOT KNOW IF THAT WOULD PUT US ABOVE THE GS OR NOT. I FIGURED IT MIGHT. FO SAID HE WOULD KEEP AN EYE ON IT. HE WAS MAINTAININGABOUT 200 KTS DSNDING THROUGH 3000 FT. I FELT I WOULD HAVE PROBABLY BEEN TRYING TO GET THE PLANE PRELOADED WITH DRAG TO CROSS THE 1600 FT RESTR WITH GEAR DOWN AND 160 KTS. THE FO DID NOT MAKE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO BLEED THE SPD. IN FACT; HE SEEMED TO NOT BE ABLE TO GET THE SPD BELOW 200 KTS. APCHING THE 1600 FT RESTR; IT BECAME APPARENT TO ME THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO LEVEL OFF FROM THE GS IN ORDER TO MAKE THE RESTR. APCHING 1700 FT; I MENTIONED THAT HE WAS APCHING 1600 FT. ULTIMATELY; HE DID NOT LEVEL OFF AND CROSSED THE RESTR 250 FT LOW AT APPROX 185 KTS. AT ABOUT 1100 FT RADIO ALT; HE REALIZED THAT HIS SPD WAS NOT BLEEDING OFF FAST ENOUGH AND HE GRABBED FOR THE SPD BRAKE. HE WAS ABOUT 1/2 TO 1 FULL DOT HIGH ON THE GS AT THIS POINT. HE DID NOT ADJUST THE PITCH RAPIDLY ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN THE GS; AS HE PASSED THROUGH IT TO A DOT LOW BEFORE COMING BACK ONTO THE GS. HE DEVELOPED A HIGH ENOUGH SINK RATE TO GET A COUPLE 'SINK RATE' GPWS WARNINGS BEFORE THAT WAS CORRECTED AND BACK TO THE GS. HE WAS FINALLY IN WHAT I WOULD CALL A STABILIZED POS BY 300 FT. OBVIOUSLY; NOT ONLY DID WE MISS THE ALT RESTR THE TWR WANTED; THIS WAS A VERY UNSTABILIZED APCH. I NEVER THOUGHT I WOULD BE PUT INTO THIS POS AND WRITING A NARRATIVE OF THIS TYPE WHILE FLYING WITH SOMEONE I CONSIDERED FAIRLY EXPERIENCED IN THE ACFT. I DON'T KNOW WHY I DID NOT COMMAND A GAR. I KNOW IT CROSSED MY MIND AS HE WAS GRABBING FOR THE SPD BRAKES AT 1100 FT. I WAS THINKING IT WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO HIT THE GA SWITCHES ON THE THRUST LEVERS; BUT I JUST DID NOT GET THOSE WORDS OUT OF MY LIPS. I AM VERY DISAPPOINTED IN MY PERFORMANCE AS THE CAPT OF THIS FLT. I WAS THE SAFETY VALVE AND I FAILED. AFTER HE STARTED THE HIGH SINK RATE; I FELT VERY TASK SATURATED TO GET THE ACFT BACK UNDER FLT PATH CTL. I THINK I WAS NOT MENTALLY PREPARED FOR A GAR EVEN THOUGH WE BRIEFED IT. MOST OF US THINK OF A GAR FROM IFR MINIMUMS; NOT ABOVE 1000 FT. I KNOW I WILL NEVER BE PUT INTO A SIMILAR SITUATION WITH THE SAME OUTCOME; A GAR IS A MUST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.