Narrative:

Rejected takeoff at ZZZ due to amber cas; single chime; for bleed valve 2 fail. At approximately 50 KTS we had the single chime and master caution alert for the above message. The alert went out within 1 to 2 seconds without any action being taken by us; and prior to any reject. The takeoff continued normally for another few seconds (5 to 8?) whereupon the alert re-occurred. Rejected takeoff procedures were accomplished at somewhere around 80 to 90 KIAS. Brakes never entered the amber zone and the taxi back to the gate was uneventful. A rejected takeoff would have likely occurred again with the next takeoff has we simply followed maintenance and embraer tech order guidance. Per maintenance request; we ran several tests; to include the embraer test profile tech order guidance for this condition; as faxed to the a & P technician. The aircraft passed all without problem. Being a skeptical sort; however; I requested clearance from tower to advance the #2 engine to takeoff power. With a ground ramper monitoring as well (at the front of the aircraft) we were able to ensure a safe test. Within 4 or 5 seconds we had the same cas message; master caution and single chime. This re-occurred five times; with each advance of the #2 engine to anywhere near takeoff -1 power levels (at or above approximately 73% and approximately 93% N2). I strongly recommend we advise the FAA and embraer that the test for this situation; as published in the material we received; is insufficiently thorough. If this condition presents itself at takeoff power settings; then the test should be accomplished; repeatedly and for several seconds; at those thrust settings as well. (Current guidance has all testing done at idle thrust.)

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMJ PIC CONDUCTS RTO FOR BLEED VALVE FAILURE ANNUNCIATION BUT BELIEVES FOLLOW ON MAINT TEST PROCS DO NOT ACCURATELY SIMULATE TKOF PWR BEING USED WHEN ANNUNCIATION OCCURRED.

Narrative: REJECTED TKOF AT ZZZ DUE TO AMBER CAS; SINGLE CHIME; FOR BLEED VALVE 2 FAIL. AT APPROX 50 KTS WE HAD THE SINGLE CHIME AND MASTER CAUTION ALERT FOR THE ABOVE MESSAGE. THE ALERT WENT OUT WITHIN 1 TO 2 SECONDS WITHOUT ANY ACTION BEING TAKEN BY US; AND PRIOR TO ANY REJECT. THE TKOF CONTINUED NORMALLY FOR ANOTHER FEW SECONDS (5 TO 8?) WHEREUPON THE ALERT RE-OCCURRED. REJECTED TKOF PROCS WERE ACCOMPLISHED AT SOMEWHERE AROUND 80 TO 90 KIAS. BRAKES NEVER ENTERED THE AMBER ZONE AND THE TAXI BACK TO THE GATE WAS UNEVENTFUL. A REJECTED TKOF WOULD HAVE LIKELY OCCURRED AGAIN WITH THE NEXT TKOF HAS WE SIMPLY FOLLOWED MAINT AND EMBRAER TECH ORDER GUIDANCE. PER MAINT REQUEST; WE RAN SEVERAL TESTS; TO INCLUDE THE EMBRAER TEST PROFILE TECH ORDER GUIDANCE FOR THIS CONDITION; AS FAXED TO THE A & P TECHNICIAN. THE ACFT PASSED ALL WITHOUT PROB. BEING A SKEPTICAL SORT; HOWEVER; I REQUESTED CLRNC FROM TWR TO ADVANCE THE #2 ENG TO TKOF POWER. WITH A GND RAMPER MONITORING AS WELL (AT THE FRONT OF THE ACFT) WE WERE ABLE TO ENSURE A SAFE TEST. WITHIN 4 OR 5 SECONDS WE HAD THE SAME CAS MESSAGE; MASTER CAUTION AND SINGLE CHIME. THIS RE-OCCURRED FIVE TIMES; WITH EACH ADVANCE OF THE #2 ENG TO ANYWHERE NEAR TKOF -1 POWER LEVELS (AT OR ABOVE APPROX 73% AND APPROX 93% N2). I STRONGLY RECOMMEND WE ADVISE THE FAA AND EMBRAER THAT THE TEST FOR THIS SIT; AS PUBLISHED IN THE MATERIAL WE RECEIVED; IS INSUFFICIENTLY THOROUGH. IF THIS CONDITION PRESENTS ITSELF AT TKOF POWER SETTINGS; THEN THE TEST SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED; REPEATEDLY AND FOR SEVERAL SECONDS; AT THOSE THRUST SETTINGS AS WELL. (CURRENT GUIDANCE HAS ALL TESTING DONE AT IDLE THRUST.)

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.