Narrative:

Due to poor checklist provided by the company; our aircraft struck a push back tug. Due to mechanical problems; we were required to do a battery engine start followed by a cross-bleed start. The checklist assumes that you have ground dc power and you are able to establish hydraulic power for the brakes. However; no dc power was available; so following the checklist hydraulic power was not established. When the cross-bleed start was begun; the aircraft jumped its chocks and rolled into a tug. With no hydraulic power; there was no brakes and we could not stop the aircraft. Some damage occurred to the aircraft. No one was hurt on the ground. No passenger were on board. The company needs to review their procedures and checklist so this will not happen to other pilots. Supplemental information from acn 666506: the APU would not start and a ground power unit was called for. After unsuccessfully trying to connect ground power with 2 different carts; company maintenance was called. Maintenance instructed us to do a battery start. Per the QRH procedure; we started the #1 (left) engine. The checklist then leads you to a cross-bleed start of the #2 (right) engine. When power was applied to attain the necessary pressure to start the #2 (right) engine; parking brake and toe brake pressure did not hold the aircraft. The plane went over the nose chocks; over the unconnected tow bar and struck the tug. When the aircraft first started to move; both the captain and myself applied full toe brake pressure. When the aircraft stopped; power was immediately taken out and taken to fuel shut-off. We exited the aircraft after doing a shutdown check to verify all personnel on the ground were ok. The battery start that was performed is an extremely rare procedure. Hydraulic power would have given the necessary brake pressure to hold us in place. The procedure did not lead us in that direction. Too much emphasis was placed on trusting the checklist in this situation. Callback conversation with reporter acn 666421 revealed the following information: reporter stated that the initial start of the left engine was accomplished with the use of bottled compressed air. The 'battery' start procedure refers only to the use of the battery to power basic dc systems to activate the starter; instruments to monitor the engine start; and provide for fire detection and protection. He stated the battery start procedure is silent on the need for aircraft restraint. He further stated that the source for brake pressure is from the right engine hydraulic pump. His company; during review of the incident; is considering changes to the checklist including specific aircraft restraint as well as starting the right engine first to ensure brake capability prior to subsequent crossbleed start.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE PERFORMING A BATTERY/CROSS-BLEED START PROC PER COMPANY CHKLISTS; A CARJ-200 ROLLS FORWARD OVER WHEEL CHOCKS AND COLLIDES WITH PUSH BACK TUG.

Narrative: DUE TO POOR CHKLIST PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY; OUR ACFT STRUCK A PUSH BACK TUG. DUE TO MECHANICAL PROBS; WE WERE REQUIRED TO DO A BATTERY ENG START FOLLOWED BY A CROSS-BLEED START. THE CHKLIST ASSUMES THAT YOU HAVE GROUND DC POWER AND YOU ARE ABLE TO ESTABLISH HYDRAULIC POWER FOR THE BRAKES. HOWEVER; NO DC POWER WAS AVAILABLE; SO FOLLOWING THE CHKLIST HYDRAULIC POWER WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. WHEN THE CROSS-BLEED START WAS BEGUN; THE ACFT JUMPED ITS CHOCKS AND ROLLED INTO A TUG. WITH NO HYDRAULIC POWER; THERE WAS NO BRAKES AND WE COULD NOT STOP THE ACFT. SOME DAMAGE OCCURRED TO THE ACFT. NO ONE WAS HURT ON THE GND. NO PAX WERE ON BOARD. THE COMPANY NEEDS TO REVIEW THEIR PROCS AND CHKLIST SO THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN TO OTHER PLTS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 666506: THE APU WOULD NOT START AND A GND POWER UNIT WAS CALLED FOR. AFTER UNSUCCESSFULLY TRYING TO CONNECT GND POWER WITH 2 DIFFERENT CARTS; COMPANY MAINT WAS CALLED. MAINT INSTRUCTED US TO DO A BATTERY START. PER THE QRH PROC; WE STARTED THE #1 (L) ENG. THE CHKLIST THEN LEADS YOU TO A CROSS-BLEED START OF THE #2 (R) ENG. WHEN POWER WAS APPLIED TO ATTAIN THE NECESSARY PRESSURE TO START THE #2 (R) ENG; PARKING BRAKE AND TOE BRAKE PRESSURE DID NOT HOLD THE ACFT. THE PLANE WENT OVER THE NOSE CHOCKS; OVER THE UNCONNECTED TOW BAR AND STRUCK THE TUG. WHEN THE ACFT FIRST STARTED TO MOVE; BOTH THE CAPT AND MYSELF APPLIED FULL TOE BRAKE PRESSURE. WHEN THE ACFT STOPPED; POWER WAS IMMEDIATELY TAKEN OUT AND TAKEN TO FUEL SHUT-OFF. WE EXITED THE ACFT AFTER DOING A SHUTDOWN CHK TO VERIFY ALL PERSONNEL ON THE GND WERE OK. THE BATTERY START THAT WAS PERFORMED IS AN EXTREMELY RARE PROC. HYDRAULIC POWER WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE NECESSARY BRAKE PRESSURE TO HOLD US IN PLACE. THE PROC DID NOT LEAD US IN THAT DIRECTION. TOO MUCH EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON TRUSTING THE CHKLIST IN THIS SIT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 666421 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE INITIAL START OF THE L ENG WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE USE OF BOTTLED COMPRESSED AIR. THE 'BATTERY' START PROC REFERS ONLY TO THE USE OF THE BATTERY TO POWER BASIC DC SYSTEMS TO ACTIVATE THE STARTER; INSTRUMENTS TO MONITOR THE ENG START; AND PROVIDE FOR FIRE DETECTION AND PROTECTION. HE STATED THE BATTERY START PROC IS SILENT ON THE NEED FOR ACFT RESTRAINT. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE SOURCE FOR BRAKE PRESSURE IS FROM THE R ENG HYDRAULIC PUMP. HIS COMPANY; DURING REVIEW OF THE INCIDENT; IS CONSIDERING CHANGES TO THE CHKLIST INCLUDING SPECIFIC ACFT RESTRAINT AS WELL AS STARTING THE R ENG FIRST TO ENSURE BRAKE CAPABILITY PRIOR TO SUBSEQUENT CROSSBLEED START.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.