Narrative:

We were on a 2 scope; east operation at pbi. On this confign; our airspace is divided north and south; with the final approach for runway 9L being the dividing line. I was working the south arrival/departure radar position; another controller was working the north arrival/departure position. There was a heavy line of WX extending from just south of the stuart witham airport (sua) all the way south to the ft lauderdale (fll) mia (mia) area. There was a break in the WX about 8 mi wide along the final approach course for runway 9L at pbi. This was where most of our arrs were going through. I had an MU2 depart from pbi VFR requesting services to pahokee airport (phk); one of our satellite airports. It is located just about due west of pbi. The only place I could get the aircraft through the WX was the same area the arrs were going through. I had initially climbed the MU2 to 4500 ft. The pilot said he would need to maintain 2500 ft because of clouds. The airspace on the final is owned by the other controller. I initiated an automated pointout and also verbally told the other controller my intentions with the MU2. He said 'pointout approved.' there was a B737 inbound for the ILS approach to runway 9L who was descending to 2000 ft; the approach altitude for the ILS. The B737 was approximately 18 mi west of pbi at this time. The pilot of the MU2 told me he needed to go right to avoid the WX; he was only about 1.5 mi south of the final approach course. I asked the other controller to stop the B737 at 3000 ft because of the traffic. His response was 'no; the B737 was already on the approach. Although the B737 was not cleared for the approach yet; I asked the other controller again to stop the B737 at 3000 ft. His answer again was 'no.' I issued traffic to the MU2 a second time. The pilot stated 'not in sight but we're looking; we will move a little farther to the left.' at approximately 4 mi the MU2 reported the B737 in sight. I instructed the pilot to maintain visual separation with the B737. When the aircraft passed; they were about 1 mi apart and approximately 100-200 ft vertically separated. With the WX being such a factor; the best separation to use in this case was vertical. There is no guarantee that an aircraft is going to be able to fly the vector or be able to maintain the altitude issued. Our job as ATC controllers is the separation of aircraft and the safe; orderly expeditious flow of air traffic. Regardless of whether the aircraft is on an IFR or VFR flight plan; it is not our job to put aircraft into unsafe or hazardous conditions. Thanks to my fellow controller; I do not feel any of our job duties were safely executed in this situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PBI CTLR DESCRIBES CONFLICT AS VFR ACFT IS CLRED TO DEPART ARPT NEAR ILS ARR PATH BECAUSE OF WX CONDITIONS.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A 2 SCOPE; E OP AT PBI. ON THIS CONFIGN; OUR AIRSPACE IS DIVIDED N AND S; WITH THE FINAL APCH FOR RWY 9L BEING THE DIVIDING LINE. I WAS WORKING THE S ARR/DEP RADAR POS; ANOTHER CTLR WAS WORKING THE N ARR/DEP POS. THERE WAS A HVY LINE OF WX EXTENDING FROM JUST S OF THE STUART WITHAM ARPT (SUA) ALL THE WAY S TO THE FT LAUDERDALE (FLL) MIA (MIA) AREA. THERE WAS A BREAK IN THE WX ABOUT 8 MI WIDE ALONG THE FINAL APCH COURSE FOR RWY 9L AT PBI. THIS WAS WHERE MOST OF OUR ARRS WERE GOING THROUGH. I HAD AN MU2 DEPART FROM PBI VFR REQUESTING SVCS TO PAHOKEE ARPT (PHK); ONE OF OUR SATELLITE ARPTS. IT IS LOCATED JUST ABOUT DUE W OF PBI. THE ONLY PLACE I COULD GET THE ACFT THROUGH THE WX WAS THE SAME AREA THE ARRS WERE GOING THROUGH. I HAD INITIALLY CLBED THE MU2 TO 4500 FT. THE PLT SAID HE WOULD NEED TO MAINTAIN 2500 FT BECAUSE OF CLOUDS. THE AIRSPACE ON THE FINAL IS OWNED BY THE OTHER CTLR. I INITIATED AN AUTOMATED POINTOUT AND ALSO VERBALLY TOLD THE OTHER CTLR MY INTENTIONS WITH THE MU2. HE SAID 'POINTOUT APPROVED.' THERE WAS A B737 INBOUND FOR THE ILS APCH TO RWY 9L WHO WAS DSNDING TO 2000 FT; THE APCH ALT FOR THE ILS. THE B737 WAS APPROX 18 MI W OF PBI AT THIS TIME. THE PLT OF THE MU2 TOLD ME HE NEEDED TO GO R TO AVOID THE WX; HE WAS ONLY ABOUT 1.5 MI S OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE. I ASKED THE OTHER CTLR TO STOP THE B737 AT 3000 FT BECAUSE OF THE TFC. HIS RESPONSE WAS 'NO; THE B737 WAS ALREADY ON THE APCH. ALTHOUGH THE B737 WAS NOT CLRED FOR THE APCH YET; I ASKED THE OTHER CTLR AGAIN TO STOP THE B737 AT 3000 FT. HIS ANSWER AGAIN WAS 'NO.' I ISSUED TFC TO THE MU2 A SECOND TIME. THE PLT STATED 'NOT IN SIGHT BUT WE'RE LOOKING; WE WILL MOVE A LITTLE FARTHER TO THE L.' AT APPROX 4 MI THE MU2 RPTED THE B737 IN SIGHT. I INSTRUCTED THE PLT TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH THE B737. WHEN THE ACFT PASSED; THEY WERE ABOUT 1 MI APART AND APPROX 100-200 FT VERTICALLY SEPARATED. WITH THE WX BEING SUCH A FACTOR; THE BEST SEPARATION TO USE IN THIS CASE WAS VERT. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT AN ACFT IS GOING TO BE ABLE TO FLY THE VECTOR OR BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THE ALT ISSUED. OUR JOB AS ATC CTLRS IS THE SEPARATION OF ACFT AND THE SAFE; ORDERLY EXPEDITIOUS FLOW OF AIR TFC. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE ACFT IS ON AN IFR OR VFR FLT PLAN; IT IS NOT OUR JOB TO PUT ACFT INTO UNSAFE OR HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS. THANKS TO MY FELLOW CTLR; I DO NOT FEEL ANY OF OUR JOB DUTIES WERE SAFELY EXECUTED IN THIS SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.