37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 668341 |
Time | |
Date | 200508 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | SF 340B |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel |
Qualification | other |
ASRS Report | 668341 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel other |
Events | |
Anomaly | maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : company policies non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : 2 |
Resolutory Action | controller : provided flight assist other |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
This incident represents just one of a number of 'close call' weight and balance problems -- problems that in and of themselves may be inconsequential; but that nevertheless represent an overall issue where known risks are not being managed as effectively as we'd all like. Our airline has instituted what is rapidly becoming a very fast; flexible; and effective load control program -- however; it still has glitches. When the program operates as intended; our revenue flts do not push back until the flight crew is in possession of final weight and balance numbers. However; there are incidents such as this one where a PIC gets out of the gate without accurate numbers. From where I'm sitting; it's not so much failure on the part of the flight crews -- it's confusion up and down the load control workflow; and; in particular in the coordination or lack of coordination between load control in the operations control and the baggage handlers and ramp agents at the gate. In this case; a load planner came to my position to inform me that one of my flts was nose heavy. The load planner had calculated the fix -- basically; no passenger forward of row 11 -- but was unsure as to whether the crew had received the loading correction. The bad news was the plane had left the gate; and was on its way to the runway. As seems to be the case so often in these scenarios; the load planner hadn't been able to get hold of anyone to convey the information or get verification that the crew was complying with the last loading instructions transmitted. Relaying information via the station agent and the tower on the field; I managed to raise the flight; and a brief exchange on the radio settled everything. However; the unanswered question remains -- in a system that's supposed to prevent planes from pushing back without accurate; reliable; 'final' weight and balance numbers; how are so many planes managing to get so close to takeoff before mistakes are caught and corrected?
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: DISPATCHER RPTS AN SF340 DEP UNDER HIS CONTROL AND NEARING TKOF WAS IMPROPERLY LOADED. THE LOAD PLANNING DEPARTMENT WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT THE FLT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY HAD RECEIVED THE LAST MINUTE REVISION.
Narrative: THIS INCIDENT REPRESENTS JUST ONE OF A NUMBER OF 'CLOSE CALL' WT AND BALANCE PROBLEMS -- PROBLEMS THAT IN AND OF THEMSELVES MAY BE INCONSEQUENTIAL; BUT THAT NEVERTHELESS REPRESENT AN OVERALL ISSUE WHERE KNOWN RISKS ARE NOT BEING MANAGED AS EFFECTIVELY AS WE'D ALL LIKE. OUR AIRLINE HAS INSTITUTED WHAT IS RAPIDLY BECOMING A VERY FAST; FLEXIBLE; AND EFFECTIVE LOAD CONTROL PROGRAM -- HOWEVER; IT STILL HAS GLITCHES. WHEN THE PROGRAM OPERATES AS INTENDED; OUR REVENUE FLTS DO NOT PUSH BACK UNTIL THE FLT CREW IS IN POSSESSION OF FINAL WT AND BALANCE NUMBERS. HOWEVER; THERE ARE INCIDENTS SUCH AS THIS ONE WHERE A PIC GETS OUT OF THE GATE WITHOUT ACCURATE NUMBERS. FROM WHERE I'M SITTING; IT'S NOT SO MUCH FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE FLT CREWS -- IT'S CONFUSION UP AND DOWN THE LOAD CONTROL WORKFLOW; AND; IN PARTICULAR IN THE COORDINATION OR LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN LOAD CONTROL IN THE OPS CTL AND THE BAGGAGE HANDLERS AND RAMP AGENTS AT THE GATE. IN THIS CASE; A LOAD PLANNER CAME TO MY POSITION TO INFORM ME THAT ONE OF MY FLTS WAS NOSE HEAVY. THE LOAD PLANNER HAD CALCULATED THE FIX -- BASICALLY; NO PAX FORWARD OF ROW 11 -- BUT WAS UNSURE AS TO WHETHER THE CREW HAD RECEIVED THE LOADING CORRECTION. THE BAD NEWS WAS THE PLANE HAD LEFT THE GATE; AND WAS ON ITS WAY TO THE RWY. AS SEEMS TO BE THE CASE SO OFTEN IN THESE SCENARIOS; THE LOAD PLANNER HADN'T BEEN ABLE TO GET HOLD OF ANYONE TO CONVEY THE INFO OR GET VERIFICATION THAT THE CREW WAS COMPLYING WITH THE LAST LOADING INSTRUCTIONS TRANSMITTED. RELAYING INFO VIA THE STATION AGENT AND THE TWR ON THE FIELD; I MANAGED TO RAISE THE FLT; AND A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON THE RADIO SETTLED EVERYTHING. HOWEVER; THE UNANSWERED QUESTION REMAINS -- IN A SYSTEM THAT'S SUPPOSED TO PREVENT PLANES FROM PUSHING BACK WITHOUT ACCURATE; RELIABLE; 'FINAL' WT AND BALANCE NUMBERS; HOW ARE SO MANY PLANES MANAGING TO GET SO CLOSE TO TKOF BEFORE MISTAKES ARE CAUGHT AND CORRECTED?
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.