Narrative:

At approximately XA45 on aug/wed/05 I was inbound for landing at boerne stage airport. My non pilot rated passenger (who is familiar with aircraft operations) was making the radio calls for me; as she usually does. We were en route and per the airport owner's request (for noise abatement) planned to make a straight-in approach to runway 17. While monitoring CTAF we heard several aircraft taking off and landing on runway 17; including gliders and the tow plane. The winds also favored runway 17. 10 mi from the airport; my passenger announced on the CTAF that we were 10 mi to the north; inbound for runway 17. About 2 mins later; tow plane xxa announced that they were departing runway 17 with a glider in tow. We continued our approach and announced; 'bourne stage traffic; baron xxab is on a 3 mi final for runway 17 at boerne stage.' an unidented person radioed in and stated 'aircraft inbound for boerne; glider operations in the area use caution; we have a glider staging on the displaced threshold.' we responded 'roger that' at which point we were on a 1 1/2 - 2 mi final. At that point the tow plane pilot announced 'boerne traffic; tow plane xxa is inbound for runway 35; boerne stage.' again; we continued our approach; because nothing in the tow plane's radio transmission indicated that he was even in the traffic pattern at that point. I did wonder why he was calling inbound for the non active; downwind runway; but chose to continue the approach since we were over the displaced threshold at that point; could see the glider that was on the displaced threshold and could not see any other traffic or aircraft in the area. As we passed over the threshold of runway 17 the tow plane came into view; on the runway; rolling fast opposite our direction. Before I had time to react the tow plane passed underneath my aircraft (we were approximately 25 ft AGL) and pulled into the grass on the side of the runway behind us. I could see that the remainder of the runway was clear and elected to land the aircraft; despite being somewhat shaken by the event; and the fact that my passenger was visibly quite upset. After bringing the baron to a stop; we made a 180 degree turn on the runway and announced 'boerne stage traffic; baron xxab is back-taxiing runway 17;' then the tow plane announced 'tow plane xxa is back-taxiing runway 35.' we cleared the runway and announced the same; and the tow plane took off with another glider using the active runway 17. I put the baron in the hangar and waited for the tow plane to finish his tows for the afternoon (about 2 more tows) at which point I approached the pilot to gather his thoughts on the situation. He introduced himself and immediately became belligerent about the event. He stated that they were practicing a 'rope break' maneuver and that landing downwind was a normal operation for gliders. The pilot who had been in the glider then announced that he knew nothing about the rope break; before it was initiated. Mr abc (yelling at this point) sarcastically said that he was 'really sorry he delayed our landing by 3 seconds' and that 'stuff like this is why we CFI's teach go around maneuvers.' mr abc continued to lash out at me verbally; defending his position. I explained that I felt his actions were clearly careless and reckless and had only come to speak with him in an attempt to better understand what had happened and to hopefully receive an apology; at least for my passenger who was practically in tears at this point. Mr abc indicated that he felt his actions were prudent and had placed no one at any undue risk. It was obvious that he was not open to discussing the matter in a mature manner so I excused myself and left the airport. I believe that this matter arose through several causes. Firstly; there was the poor radio communication on the part of mr abc. Instead of announcing that he was 'inbound for runway 35' which to me indicated that he was still several mi from the airport and not preparing for an immediate landing. Secondly; I believe that the situation would have been avoided if either the glider or the tow plane had made an announcement on the CTAF that they were practicing an emergency maneuver (or even experiencing an actual emergency). Had there been any indication that traffic around the airport would be acting in a manner contrary to normal operations I would have elected to remain clear of the traffic pattern until the maneuvers were complete. I also explained my willingness to do this to mr abc and he seemed to indicate that it was not his responsibility to notify me of such actions. The angle of the sun and haze in the area certainly played some role in our inability to locate and identify the traffic which was landing in the downwind direction. Knowing these kinds of operations go on at this airport makes it clear that in the future pilots who are approaching the field should make sure that they positively know the location of all traffic on and around the field before committing themselves to a landing. I believe that this was a very close call that could have easily resulted in an incident or accident and I will certainly operate more vigilantly in the future; to protect myself and my passenger from the risks which are apparently inherent to operating in the vicinity of the gliders and tow planes at this airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A LIGHT TWIN PLT RPTS AN NMAC WITH A GLIDER TOW ACFT THAT LANDED OPPOSITE DIRECTION WITH LITTLE CTAF NOTIFICATION AT BOERNE STAGE ARPT (5C1).

Narrative: AT APPROX XA45 ON AUG/WED/05 I WAS INBOUND FOR LNDG AT BOERNE STAGE ARPT. MY NON PLT RATED PAX (WHO IS FAMILIAR WITH ACFT OPS) WAS MAKING THE RADIO CALLS FOR ME; AS SHE USUALLY DOES. WE WERE ENRTE AND PER THE ARPT OWNER'S REQUEST (FOR NOISE ABATEMENT) PLANNED TO MAKE A STRAIGHT-IN APCH TO RWY 17. WHILE MONITORING CTAF WE HEARD SEVERAL ACFT TAKING OFF AND LNDG ON RWY 17; INCLUDING GLIDERS AND THE TOW PLANE. THE WINDS ALSO FAVORED RWY 17. 10 MI FROM THE ARPT; MY PAX ANNOUNCED ON THE CTAF THAT WE WERE 10 MI TO THE N; INBOUND FOR RWY 17. ABOUT 2 MINS LATER; TOW PLANE XXA ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE DEPARTING RWY 17 WITH A GLIDER IN TOW. WE CONTINUED OUR APCH AND ANNOUNCED; 'BOURNE STAGE TFC; BARON XXAB IS ON A 3 MI FINAL FOR RWY 17 AT BOERNE STAGE.' AN UNIDENTED PERSON RADIOED IN AND STATED 'ACFT INBOUND FOR BOERNE; GLIDER OPS IN THE AREA USE CAUTION; WE HAVE A GLIDER STAGING ON THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD.' WE RESPONDED 'ROGER THAT' AT WHICH POINT WE WERE ON A 1 1/2 - 2 MI FINAL. AT THAT POINT THE TOW PLANE PLT ANNOUNCED 'BOERNE TFC; TOW PLANE XXA IS INBOUND FOR RWY 35; BOERNE STAGE.' AGAIN; WE CONTINUED OUR APCH; BECAUSE NOTHING IN THE TOW PLANE'S RADIO XMISSION INDICATED THAT HE WAS EVEN IN THE TFC PATTERN AT THAT POINT. I DID WONDER WHY HE WAS CALLING INBOUND FOR THE NON ACTIVE; DOWNWIND RWY; BUT CHOSE TO CONTINUE THE APCH SINCE WE WERE OVER THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD AT THAT POINT; COULD SEE THE GLIDER THAT WAS ON THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD AND COULD NOT SEE ANY OTHER TFC OR ACFT IN THE AREA. AS WE PASSED OVER THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 17 THE TOW PLANE CAME INTO VIEW; ON THE RWY; ROLLING FAST OPPOSITE OUR DIRECTION. BEFORE I HAD TIME TO REACT THE TOW PLANE PASSED UNDERNEATH MY ACFT (WE WERE APPROX 25 FT AGL) AND PULLED INTO THE GRASS ON THE SIDE OF THE RWY BEHIND US. I COULD SEE THAT THE REMAINDER OF THE RWY WAS CLR AND ELECTED TO LAND THE ACFT; DESPITE BEING SOMEWHAT SHAKEN BY THE EVENT; AND THE FACT THAT MY PAX WAS VISIBLY QUITE UPSET. AFTER BRINGING THE BARON TO A STOP; WE MADE A 180 DEG TURN ON THE RWY AND ANNOUNCED 'BOERNE STAGE TFC; BARON XXAB IS BACK-TAXIING RWY 17;' THEN THE TOW PLANE ANNOUNCED 'TOW PLANE XXA IS BACK-TAXIING RWY 35.' WE CLRED THE RWY AND ANNOUNCED THE SAME; AND THE TOW PLANE TOOK OFF WITH ANOTHER GLIDER USING THE ACTIVE RWY 17. I PUT THE BARON IN THE HANGAR AND WAITED FOR THE TOW PLANE TO FINISH HIS TOWS FOR THE AFTERNOON (ABOUT 2 MORE TOWS) AT WHICH POINT I APCHED THE PLT TO GATHER HIS THOUGHTS ON THE SITUATION. HE INTRODUCED HIMSELF AND IMMEDIATELY BECAME BELLIGERENT ABOUT THE EVENT. HE STATED THAT THEY WERE PRACTICING A 'ROPE BREAK' MANEUVER AND THAT LNDG DOWNWIND WAS A NORMAL OP FOR GLIDERS. THE PLT WHO HAD BEEN IN THE GLIDER THEN ANNOUNCED THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE ROPE BREAK; BEFORE IT WAS INITIATED. MR ABC (YELLING AT THIS POINT) SARCASTICALLY SAID THAT HE WAS 'REALLY SORRY HE DELAYED OUR LNDG BY 3 SECONDS' AND THAT 'STUFF LIKE THIS IS WHY WE CFI'S TEACH GAR MANEUVERS.' MR ABC CONTINUED TO LASH OUT AT ME VERBALLY; DEFENDING HIS POS. I EXPLAINED THAT I FELT HIS ACTIONS WERE CLRLY CARELESS AND RECKLESS AND HAD ONLY COME TO SPEAK WITH HIM IN AN ATTEMPT TO BETTER UNDERSTAND WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND TO HOPEFULLY RECEIVE AN APOLOGY; AT LEAST FOR MY PAX WHO WAS PRACTICALLY IN TEARS AT THIS POINT. MR ABC INDICATED THAT HE FELT HIS ACTIONS WERE PRUDENT AND HAD PLACED NO ONE AT ANY UNDUE RISK. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT HE WAS NOT OPEN TO DISCUSSING THE MATTER IN A MATURE MANNER SO I EXCUSED MYSELF AND LEFT THE ARPT. I BELIEVE THAT THIS MATTER AROSE THROUGH SEVERAL CAUSES. FIRSTLY; THERE WAS THE POOR RADIO COM ON THE PART OF MR ABC. INSTEAD OF ANNOUNCING THAT HE WAS 'INBOUND FOR RWY 35' WHICH TO ME INDICATED THAT HE WAS STILL SEVERAL MI FROM THE ARPT AND NOT PREPARING FOR AN IMMEDIATE LNDG. SECONDLY; I BELIEVE THAT THE SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF EITHER THE GLIDER OR THE TOW PLANE HAD MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE CTAF THAT THEY WERE PRACTICING AN EMER MANEUVER (OR EVEN EXPERIENCING AN ACTUAL EMER). HAD THERE BEEN ANY INDICATION THAT TFC AROUND THE ARPT WOULD BE ACTING IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO NORMAL OPS I WOULD HAVE ELECTED TO REMAIN CLR OF THE TFC PATTERN UNTIL THE MANEUVERS WERE COMPLETE. I ALSO EXPLAINED MY WILLINGNESS TO DO THIS TO MR ABC AND HE SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS NOT HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO NOTIFY ME OF SUCH ACTIONS. THE ANGLE OF THE SUN AND HAZE IN THE AREA CERTAINLY PLAYED SOME ROLE IN OUR INABILITY TO LOCATE AND IDENT THE TFC WHICH WAS LNDG IN THE DOWNWIND DIRECTION. KNOWING THESE KINDS OF OPS GO ON AT THIS ARPT MAKES IT CLR THAT IN THE FUTURE PLTS WHO ARE APCHING THE FIELD SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THEY POSITIVELY KNOW THE LOCATION OF ALL TFC ON AND AROUND THE FIELD BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO A LNDG. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS A VERY CLOSE CALL THAT COULD HAVE EASILY RESULTED IN AN INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT AND I WILL CERTAINLY OPERATE MORE VIGILANTLY IN THE FUTURE; TO PROTECT MYSELF AND MY PAX FROM THE RISKS WHICH ARE APPARENTLY INHERENT TO OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF THE GLIDERS AND TOW PLANES AT THIS ARPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.