Narrative:

Arrived at aircraft 10 minutes prior to scheduled departure because of security breach delay. Agent had boarded the airplane already. Cabin was extremely hot because we were not there to monitor and adjust temperature. APU bleed valve was deferred; no packs available on ground. We needed to discuss start procedure with a mechanic; either an external air start or an APU bleed start using manual open and close of an APU bleed valve. The man on interphone did not know enough english to understand our request for a mechanic. When he finally got a mechanic; it was a ground equipment mechanic; not an aircraft mechanic. We talked to maintenance on the radio and got a mechanic who advised us that we would do an external air start. When external air was applied it pressurized both sides of the air duct; contrary to procedure. When we asked the guy on interphone he did not understand our concern. We tried a start; the pressure dropped off and we had to abandon the start. Called maintenance; told them the problem; they got another truck. Again; both sides of the duct were pressurized; causing us to lose lots of air volume needlessly. Man on interphone did not understand our concerns. Called for a real mechanic; he advised us that the air hose had an airbus 'Y' duct attached to both ducts; contrary to B747 procedure. Man on interphone still did not understand our concerns. Started one at the gate; then pushback for crossbleed start. Man on interphone did not understand the need to clear area behind engine for crossbleed start. He also did not understand when to stop abeam gate. I had to tell him 'stop the airplane' 3 times before he stopped pulling us forward. The only english he seemed to understand was for normal operations and nothing else. He was completely unfamiliar with abnormal start and pushback procedures. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter; who is a check airman for his company; had just returned from a meeting of his peers where he addressed exactly this issue. He proposed that either they need to train the existing personnel more in depth on abnormal procedures or should modify their manning requirements to require a licensed aircraft mechanic to perform the pushback whenever any sort of abnormal condition exists that requires a fundamental understanding of aircraft systems and/or operational needs; regarding deicing; etc. He was very dismayed that; even in domestic operations at a station with hundreds of employees; his dispatch was placed in the hands of an employee with whom he was unable to communicate even rudimentary needs beyond 'set the brakes.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF B747-400 RPTS THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE EFFECTIVELY WITH PUSHBACK CREW AT IAD DUE TO LANGUAGE BARRIER AND GND CREW'S LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH ABNORMAL START PROCS REQUIRED DUE TO INOP APU.

Narrative: ARRIVED AT ACFT 10 MINUTES PRIOR TO SCHEDULED DEP BECAUSE OF SECURITY BREACH DELAY. AGENT HAD BOARDED THE AIRPLANE ALREADY. CABIN WAS EXTREMELY HOT BECAUSE WE WERE NOT THERE TO MONITOR AND ADJUST TEMP. APU BLEED VALVE WAS DEFERRED; NO PACKS AVAILABLE ON GND. WE NEEDED TO DISCUSS START PROC WITH A MECHANIC; EITHER AN EXTERNAL AIR START OR AN APU BLEED START USING MANUAL OPEN AND CLOSE OF AN APU BLEED VALVE. THE MAN ON INTERPHONE DID NOT KNOW ENOUGH ENGLISH TO UNDERSTAND OUR REQUEST FOR A MECHANIC. WHEN HE FINALLY GOT A MECHANIC; IT WAS A GND EQUIP MECHANIC; NOT AN ACFT MECHANIC. WE TALKED TO MAINT ON THE RADIO AND GOT A MECHANIC WHO ADVISED US THAT WE WOULD DO AN EXTERNAL AIR START. WHEN EXTERNAL AIR WAS APPLIED IT PRESSURIZED BOTH SIDES OF THE AIR DUCT; CONTRARY TO PROC. WHEN WE ASKED THE GUY ON INTERPHONE HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND OUR CONCERN. WE TRIED A START; THE PRESSURE DROPPED OFF AND WE HAD TO ABANDON THE START. CALLED MAINT; TOLD THEM THE PROB; THEY GOT ANOTHER TRUCK. AGAIN; BOTH SIDES OF THE DUCT WERE PRESSURIZED; CAUSING US TO LOSE LOTS OF AIR VOLUME NEEDLESSLY. MAN ON INTERPHONE DID NOT UNDERSTAND OUR CONCERNS. CALLED FOR A REAL MECHANIC; HE ADVISED US THAT THE AIR HOSE HAD AN AIRBUS 'Y' DUCT ATTACHED TO BOTH DUCTS; CONTRARY TO B747 PROC. MAN ON INTERPHONE STILL DID NOT UNDERSTAND OUR CONCERNS. STARTED ONE AT THE GATE; THEN PUSHBACK FOR CROSSBLEED START. MAN ON INTERPHONE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO CLEAR AREA BEHIND ENG FOR CROSSBLEED START. HE ALSO DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHEN TO STOP ABEAM GATE. I HAD TO TELL HIM 'STOP THE AIRPLANE' 3 TIMES BEFORE HE STOPPED PULLING US FORWARD. THE ONLY ENGLISH HE SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND WAS FOR NORMAL OPS AND NOTHING ELSE. HE WAS COMPLETELY UNFAMILIAR WITH ABNORMAL START AND PUSHBACK PROCS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR; WHO IS A CHECK AIRMAN FOR HIS COMPANY; HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A MEETING OF HIS PEERS WHERE HE ADDRESSED EXACTLY THIS ISSUE. HE PROPOSED THAT EITHER THEY NEED TO TRAIN THE EXISTING PERSONNEL MORE IN DEPTH ON ABNORMAL PROCS OR SHOULD MODIFY THEIR MANNING REQUIREMENTS TO REQUIRE A LICENSED ACFT MECHANIC TO PERFORM THE PUSHBACK WHENEVER ANY SORT OF ABNORMAL CONDITION EXISTS THAT REQUIRES A FUNDAMENTAL UNDERSTANDING OF ACFT SYSTEMS AND/OR OPERATIONAL NEEDS; REGARDING DEICING; ETC. HE WAS VERY DISMAYED THAT; EVEN IN DOMESTIC OPS AT A STATION WITH HUNDREDS OF EMPLOYEES; HIS DISPATCH WAS PLACED IN THE HANDS OF AN EMPLOYEE WITH WHOM HE WAS UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE EVEN RUDIMENTARY NEEDS BEYOND 'SET THE BRAKES.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.