Narrative:

The trip was a continuous duty overnight trip. On arrival at the gate; we found out the flight was weight critical. Eventually; we had to remove 2 passenger from the aircraft. On the weight critical notice; the zero fuel weight was understated by 1000 pounds. The flight to msp required an alternate and additional fuel. In conferring with dispatch; I was told of showers between lse and msp. On taxi out; we were 300 pounds over xtog. We had to hold short of the runway 3/36 threshold to burn off fuel. After xtog was reached; we contacted ZMP for our IFR clearance to msp; as the tower at lse was closed and the field uncontrolled. Upon receiving our clearance; I taxied onto the first runway (runway 3) and failed to verify the proper heading; thrust levers were advanced to the flex takeoff thrust setting; and we began our takeoff roll. About 2/3 of the way down the runway; I realized the yellow 2000 ft lights were much closer than they should have been. It was at that point I realized we were on the wrong runway. As we were already over 100 KTS and accelerating; I made the decision to continue the takeoff; rather than attempt a high speed abort. Thrust levers were advanced to the full thrust position to increase the acceleration. Vr was reached with about 1000 ft left on the runway; the aircraft was rotated and the takeoff and flight were completed normally. Contributing factors: 1) complacency and familiarity with the airport. Led to failure to review the airport diagram. 2) extended time off and resulting lack of practice with procedures. 3) first trip with first officer. 4) lack of sleep due to cdo. 5) distrs of weight critical/overweight flight. 6) close intersection of runways 3 and 36; with displaced threshold of runway 36. Runway lights for runway 36 did not begin at end of runway. Hold short line for both runways short of runway 3. This led to a lack of external visual cues of the intersecting runways. 7) failure to verify the proper heading on taking the runway. Corrective actions: 1) deal with departure before landing. The flight is short and I was more concerned with landing at msp than departure from lse. Review airport diagram for every departure; regardless of familiarity with airport. 2) always verify runway heading.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TIRED FROM A SHORT OVERNIGHT AND DISTR BY OTHER EVENTS; CL65 FLT CREW TAKES OFF FROM RWY 3 VICE RWY 36 AT LSE.

Narrative: THE TRIP WAS A CONTINUOUS DUTY OVERNIGHT TRIP. ON ARR AT THE GATE; WE FOUND OUT THE FLT WAS WT CRITICAL. EVENTUALLY; WE HAD TO REMOVE 2 PAX FROM THE ACFT. ON THE WT CRITICAL NOTICE; THE ZERO FUEL WT WAS UNDERSTATED BY 1000 LBS. THE FLT TO MSP REQUIRED AN ALTERNATE AND ADDITIONAL FUEL. IN CONFERRING WITH DISPATCH; I WAS TOLD OF SHOWERS BTWN LSE AND MSP. ON TAXI OUT; WE WERE 300 LBS OVER XTOG. WE HAD TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY 3/36 THRESHOLD TO BURN OFF FUEL. AFTER XTOG WAS REACHED; WE CONTACTED ZMP FOR OUR IFR CLRNC TO MSP; AS THE TWR AT LSE WAS CLOSED AND THE FIELD UNCTLED. UPON RECEIVING OUR CLRNC; I TAXIED ONTO THE FIRST RWY (RWY 3) AND FAILED TO VERIFY THE PROPER HDG; THRUST LEVERS WERE ADVANCED TO THE FLEX TKOF THRUST SETTING; AND WE BEGAN OUR TKOF ROLL. ABOUT 2/3 OF THE WAY DOWN THE RWY; I REALIZED THE YELLOW 2000 FT LIGHTS WERE MUCH CLOSER THAN THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN. IT WAS AT THAT POINT I REALIZED WE WERE ON THE WRONG RWY. AS WE WERE ALREADY OVER 100 KTS AND ACCELERATING; I MADE THE DECISION TO CONTINUE THE TKOF; RATHER THAN ATTEMPT A HIGH SPD ABORT. THRUST LEVERS WERE ADVANCED TO THE FULL THRUST POS TO INCREASE THE ACCELERATION. VR WAS REACHED WITH ABOUT 1000 FT LEFT ON THE RWY; THE ACFT WAS ROTATED AND THE TKOF AND FLT WERE COMPLETED NORMALLY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) COMPLACENCY AND FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT. LED TO FAILURE TO REVIEW THE ARPT DIAGRAM. 2) EXTENDED TIME OFF AND RESULTING LACK OF PRACTICE WITH PROCS. 3) FIRST TRIP WITH FO. 4) LACK OF SLEEP DUE TO CDO. 5) DISTRS OF WT CRITICAL/OVERWT FLT. 6) CLOSE INTXN OF RWYS 3 AND 36; WITH DISPLACED THRESHOLD OF RWY 36. RWY LIGHTS FOR RWY 36 DID NOT BEGIN AT END OF RWY. HOLD SHORT LINE FOR BOTH RWYS SHORT OF RWY 3. THIS LED TO A LACK OF EXTERNAL VISUAL CUES OF THE INTERSECTING RWYS. 7) FAILURE TO VERIFY THE PROPER HDG ON TAKING THE RWY. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) DEAL WITH DEP BEFORE LNDG. THE FLT IS SHORT AND I WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH LNDG AT MSP THAN DEP FROM LSE. REVIEW ARPT DIAGRAM FOR EVERY DEP; REGARDLESS OF FAMILIARITY WITH ARPT. 2) ALWAYS VERIFY RWY HDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.