Captain of A320 reports discrepancies in maintenance attention to anomalies incurred during engine s...

Narrative:

Our flight was dispatched without an APU; thus requiring a start of #1 engine at the gate prior to pushback. Maintenance connected the 'huffer type' gpu to the aircraft and indicated ready to start. We started #1 engine and shortly afterwards; we experienced an ECAM: '#1 engine bleed fault.' co-pilot and I discussed the nature of this ECAM and performed according to the fom. We informed maintenance of the problem and subsequently shut down the engine to investigate. Maintenance came aboard the aircraft and wanted to restart the engine. I asked why? Maintenance indicated he wanted to see if it repeated itself and if it didn't then he would defer it and enter the problem into the logbook as 'could not duplicate;' thus releasing the aircraft to fly. I indicated that this would not be acceptable and regardless of the repeat; a proper investigation into the ECAM would be necessary. I would not agree to 'pencil whip' this issue and subject my crew and passenger to unsafe condition. The maintenance person left the cockpit and then another maintenance person boarded the aircraft and entered the cockpit to further investigate. He troubleshot the ECAM and indicated a problem in the avionics bay relating to a computer. During the ECAM: bleed air fault repair; flight attendant entered the cockpit and indicated hot water coming from the cold water spigot in the aft galley. She indicated that she had never had hot water come from the spigot and thought it would be a problem. We passed her concerns on to maintenance. Maintenance then opened door 2L without notification; startling the crew located in aft galley. Mechanic did not possess any air carrier identifiable uniform. When asked if the mechanic was company or contract; the mechanic left the aircraft and to the best of my knowledge; did not return. Soon thereafter; a gate agent appeared and closed the aircraft cabin door and began to pull the jetway away from the aircraft. I opened the cabin door and indicated we have not received word that the maintenance items were completed. She said the station said everything was complete and push back the aircraft. I directed the jetbridge not be removed and subsequently asked for maintenance clarification. He now indicated the heating element in the hot water system overheated and will be sending me a release via ACARS and may proceed. We thought it prudent to inquire with maintenance control about the cold water spigot system and the heating element. Maintenance control wrote us back and indicated there was no heating element in the cold water system and it should not be heated at all. We then passed this information to maintenance and asked for further clarification. Soon thereafter; we saw yet another maintenance person come back the aircraft to repair this problem and further explain the situation. As a result; the coffeemaker circuit breaker's were pulled suspecting hot water coming from the coffeemaker system. In the course of troubleshooting the 'bleed air fault' issue; mechanics requested that the flight crew conduct 4 engine start and shutdowns. Afterwards the avionics bay door was opened and further troubleshooting conducted. A few moments later; another ECAM appeared: left wing bleed leak. We asked the mechanic in the cockpit at the time why this would now appear. He indicated that the 'huffer' type gpu was used for air conditioning and was not supposed to be hooked up to the aircraft for passenger air conditioning. He thought the wing bleed leak was due to this gpu and would not be a problem and asked us to take the aircraft. At this point; we were very apprehensive to take the aircraft based on the previous analysis of poor maintenance; attempt to undermine the troubleshooting aspect of a mechanical item and sign off the logbook as 'could not duplicate;' no communication between maintenance; operations; and working crewmembers. We agreed to take the aircraft; however; we acknowledged; that if another bleed air issue evolves; then we will return this aircraft to maintenance. No further incidents occurred and we proceeded to destination.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF A320 RPTS DISCREPANCIES IN MAINT ATTENTION TO ANOMALIES INCURRED DURING ENGINE START. SUGGESTS SCHEDULE PRESSURE RATHER THAN REQUIRED MAINT DROVE THE MANNER IN WHICH THE PROBS WERE ADDRESSED.

Narrative: OUR FLT WAS DISPATCHED WITHOUT AN APU; THUS REQUIRING A START OF #1 ENGINE AT THE GATE PRIOR TO PUSHBACK. MAINT CONNECTED THE 'HUFFER TYPE' GPU TO THE ACFT AND INDICATED READY TO START. WE STARTED #1 ENGINE AND SHORTLY AFTERWARDS; WE EXPERIENCED AN ECAM: '#1 ENGINE BLEED FAULT.' CO-PLT AND I DISCUSSED THE NATURE OF THIS ECAM AND PERFORMED ACCORDING TO THE FOM. WE INFORMED MAINT OF THE PROB AND SUBSEQUENTLY SHUT DOWN THE ENGINE TO INVESTIGATE. MAINT CAME ABOARD THE ACFT AND WANTED TO RESTART THE ENGINE. I ASKED WHY? MAINT INDICATED HE WANTED TO SEE IF IT REPEATED ITSELF AND IF IT DIDN'T THEN HE WOULD DEFER IT AND ENTER THE PROB INTO THE LOGBOOK AS 'COULD NOT DUPLICATE;' THUS RELEASING THE ACFT TO FLY. I INDICATED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE AND REGARDLESS OF THE REPEAT; A PROPER INVESTIGATION INTO THE ECAM WOULD BE NECESSARY. I WOULD NOT AGREE TO 'PENCIL WHIP' THIS ISSUE AND SUBJECT MY CREW AND PAX TO UNSAFE CONDITION. THE MAINT PERSON LEFT THE COCKPIT AND THEN ANOTHER MAINT PERSON BOARDED THE ACFT AND ENTERED THE COCKPIT TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE. HE TROUBLESHOT THE ECAM AND INDICATED A PROB IN THE AVIONICS BAY RELATING TO A COMPUTER. DURING THE ECAM: BLEED AIR FAULT REPAIR; FLT ATTENDANT ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND INDICATED HOT WATER COMING FROM THE COLD WATER SPIGOT IN THE AFT GALLEY. SHE INDICATED THAT SHE HAD NEVER HAD HOT WATER COME FROM THE SPIGOT AND THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A PROB. WE PASSED HER CONCERNS ON TO MAINT. MAINT THEN OPENED DOOR 2L WITHOUT NOTIFICATION; STARTLING THE CREW LOCATED IN AFT GALLEY. MECHANIC DID NOT POSSESS ANY ACR IDENTIFIABLE UNIFORM. WHEN ASKED IF THE MECHANIC WAS COMPANY OR CONTRACT; THE MECHANIC LEFT THE ACFT AND TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE; DID NOT RETURN. SOON THEREAFTER; A GATE AGENT APPEARED AND CLOSED THE ACFT CABIN DOOR AND BEGAN TO PULL THE JETWAY AWAY FROM THE ACFT. I OPENED THE CABIN DOOR AND INDICATED WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED WORD THAT THE MAINT ITEMS WERE COMPLETED. SHE SAID THE STATION SAID EVERYTHING WAS COMPLETE AND PUSH BACK THE ACFT. I DIRECTED THE JETBRIDGE NOT BE REMOVED AND SUBSEQUENTLY ASKED FOR MAINT CLARIFICATION. HE NOW INDICATED THE HEATING ELEMENT IN THE HOT WATER SYSTEM OVERHEATED AND WILL BE SENDING ME A RELEASE VIA ACARS AND MAY PROCEED. WE THOUGHT IT PRUDENT TO INQUIRE WITH MAINT CTL ABOUT THE COLD WATER SPIGOT SYSTEM AND THE HEATING ELEMENT. MAINT CTL WROTE US BACK AND INDICATED THERE WAS NO HEATING ELEMENT IN THE COLD WATER SYSTEM AND IT SHOULD NOT BE HEATED AT ALL. WE THEN PASSED THIS INFO TO MAINT AND ASKED FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION. SOON THEREAFTER; WE SAW YET ANOTHER MAINT PERSON COME BACK THE ACFT TO REPAIR THIS PROB AND FURTHER EXPLAIN THE SIT. AS A RESULT; THE COFFEEMAKER CB'S WERE PULLED SUSPECTING HOT WATER COMING FROM THE COFFEEMAKER SYSTEM. IN THE COURSE OF TROUBLESHOOTING THE 'BLEED AIR FAULT' ISSUE; MECHANICS REQUESTED THAT THE FLT CREW CONDUCT 4 ENGINE START AND SHUTDOWNS. AFTERWARDS THE AVIONICS BAY DOOR WAS OPENED AND FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING CONDUCTED. A FEW MOMENTS LATER; ANOTHER ECAM APPEARED: L WING BLEED LEAK. WE ASKED THE MECHANIC IN THE COCKPIT AT THE TIME WHY THIS WOULD NOW APPEAR. HE INDICATED THAT THE 'HUFFER' TYPE GPU WAS USED FOR AIR CONDITIONING AND WAS NOT SUPPOSED TO BE HOOKED UP TO THE ACFT FOR PAX AIR CONDITIONING. HE THOUGHT THE WING BLEED LEAK WAS DUE TO THIS GPU AND WOULD NOT BE A PROB AND ASKED US TO TAKE THE ACFT. AT THIS POINT; WE WERE VERY APPREHENSIVE TO TAKE THE ACFT BASED ON THE PREVIOUS ANALYSIS OF POOR MAINT; ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE THE TROUBLESHOOTING ASPECT OF A MECHANICAL ITEM AND SIGN OFF THE LOGBOOK AS 'COULD NOT DUPLICATE;' NO COM BETWEEN MAINT; OPS; AND WORKING CREWMEMBERS. WE AGREED TO TAKE THE ACFT; HOWEVER; WE ACKNOWLEDGED; THAT IF ANOTHER BLEED AIR ISSUE EVOLVES; THEN WE WILL RETURN THIS ACFT TO MAINT. NO FURTHER INCIDENTS OCCURRED AND WE PROCEEDED TO DEST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	671309
Time
Date	200509
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : phl.airport
State Reference	PA
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	A320
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	ground : parked
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 9000 flight time type : 3500
ASRS Report	671309
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies
Resolutory Action	none taken : unable
Consequence	other other
Factors
Maintenance	contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : repair performance deficiency : unqualified personnel performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : fault isolation
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Company Maintenance Human Performance Aircraft
Primary Problem	Maintenance Human Performance

Captain of A320 reports discrepancies in maintenance attention to anomalies incurred during engine start. Suggests schedule pressure rather than required maintenance drove the manner in which the problems were addressed.