Narrative:

This 'occurrence' actually represents an unknown number of fueling violations. This report concludes with a list of promising corrective actions. My shift started out on a desk that includes flts from all 3 of our operational hubs. For a dispatcher with about 60 days' operational experience; the desk has a feeling of being entirely 'random' in that sense. I have dispatched quite a number of trips where a mere 200 pounds of holding (supposedly enough for at least 10 mins holding; according to the computer) and perhaps another 100-200 pounds of extra fuel were on board in order to avoid bumping revenue or a 'denied boarding.' it is a relatively rare event for a PIC to call and challenge this type of fueling; by the way. I have even advised PIC's that I tend to operate on a 'squeaky wheel' basis -- and apologized for that fact. The dispatch supervisor for ZZZ -- theoretically 'not' my manager for this shift; as I was on a ZZZ1 desk -- spotted this; came to my desk; and confronted me directly; indicating my fuel plans for several flts were too thin for conditions; that he would rather have 1 flight correctly fueled than 100 flts fueled improperly; and concluded with the assertion that what I was doing was 'highly illegal.' this; from an individual known for making totally contradictory statements on fueling practices; sometimes in the same breath (it may be a running 'inside' joke -- I haven't been here quite long enough to tell for sure). He has; in fact; teased dispatchers (me among them) for over-fueling flts. In a recent incident; he started to criticize a fueling of mine only to catch himself mid-sentence when his review of the WX indicated my plan; including my alternate; was totally appropriate for the forecasted conditions. The other immediate corrective action taken during the remainder of my shift included a quick review of releases on the desk and issuing a fair number of fuel amendments; several of which resulted in bumping revenue -- in no case that I can recall did I allow or did my supervisor allow anyone to get off the ground where any combination of known or likely ATC delays and WX might dictate that fuel become a priority over revenue-carrying. I have; individually and on my own; tried to cultivate a heightened fuel consciousness; and am fairly certain a survey of my releases would reveal increasing consistency over time and a defensible level of caution and prudence any time the plan was built with an awareness of WX issues. It's been the combination of the saab aircraft; at or very near maximum zero fuel weight on a longer trip leg when I've failed to see the volatility of the WX (versus what one might adduce from the official forecasts available at that point in time) that has the trap I kept falling into. I get now that there's a need to see beyond the forecasts and respect the limitations inherent in all WX products. The most significant corrective action; however -- one that I believe addresses the underlying problem; which is a lack of any specific; coherent; rationalized policy designed to actually guide dispatchers and flight crews on fueling practices -- is the company's imposition of a fuel management policy effective oct/xa/05. I say 'addresses' because the policy definitely frames the issues -- its stated objective; however; is cost-driven. It is to reduce the average amount of fuel on board the aircraft on arrival; bringing it more in line with national averages. To be clear; I will quote from a memo to pilots and dispatchers from our vice president of flight operations: '...we currently average a 65-min contingency fuel load on one aircraft type upon landing while air carrier Y and air carrier Z average between 15-18 mins respectively. Another aircraft type average is higher than the national average as well.' nowhere do I read anything that purports to correlate arrival fuel figures with safety performance -- for example; I'm fairly confident that our airline's overall safety performance exceeds the national average; and my suspicion is whatever culture we have that tends to put rather more fuel on agiven flight than less fuel also tends to keep us safer than the average bear. Contributing factors: inexperience. 'Double messages' on fuel practices. Deficient awareness of WX product limitations. Cost pressures. Lack of explicit fuel management guidelines. PIC and dispatcher subjectivity. Management subjectivity. PIC's uncritical acceptance of dispatch releases. 'Turbulent' or 'chaotic' nature of WX phenomena. Failure to develop and apply integrated understanding of the full range of conditions affecting safety of flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR STATES THAT AS DISPATCHER HE VIOLATES FAR 121 PT 639 AND 121 PT 647 BY NOT GIVING FLTS ENOUGH CONTINGENCY FUEL FOR KNOWN OR EXPECTED DELAYS.

Narrative: THIS 'OCCURRENCE' ACTUALLY REPRESENTS AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF FUELING VIOLATIONS. THIS RPT CONCLUDES WITH A LIST OF PROMISING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. MY SHIFT STARTED OUT ON A DESK THAT INCLUDES FLTS FROM ALL 3 OF OUR OPERATIONAL HUBS. FOR A DISPATCHER WITH ABOUT 60 DAYS' OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE; THE DESK HAS A FEELING OF BEING ENTIRELY 'RANDOM' IN THAT SENSE. I HAVE DISPATCHED QUITE A NUMBER OF TRIPS WHERE A MERE 200 LBS OF HOLDING (SUPPOSEDLY ENOUGH FOR AT LEAST 10 MINS HOLDING; ACCORDING TO THE COMPUTER) AND PERHAPS ANOTHER 100-200 LBS OF EXTRA FUEL WERE ON BOARD IN ORDER TO AVOID BUMPING REVENUE OR A 'DENIED BOARDING.' IT IS A RELATIVELY RARE EVENT FOR A PIC TO CALL AND CHALLENGE THIS TYPE OF FUELING; BY THE WAY. I HAVE EVEN ADVISED PIC'S THAT I TEND TO OPERATE ON A 'SQUEAKY WHEEL' BASIS -- AND APOLOGIZED FOR THAT FACT. THE DISPATCH SUPVR FOR ZZZ -- THEORETICALLY 'NOT' MY MGR FOR THIS SHIFT; AS I WAS ON A ZZZ1 DESK -- SPOTTED THIS; CAME TO MY DESK; AND CONFRONTED ME DIRECTLY; INDICATING MY FUEL PLANS FOR SEVERAL FLTS WERE TOO THIN FOR CONDITIONS; THAT HE WOULD RATHER HAVE 1 FLT CORRECTLY FUELED THAN 100 FLTS FUELED IMPROPERLY; AND CONCLUDED WITH THE ASSERTION THAT WHAT I WAS DOING WAS 'HIGHLY ILLEGAL.' THIS; FROM AN INDIVIDUAL KNOWN FOR MAKING TOTALLY CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS ON FUELING PRACTICES; SOMETIMES IN THE SAME BREATH (IT MAY BE A RUNNING 'INSIDE' JOKE -- I HAVEN'T BEEN HERE QUITE LONG ENOUGH TO TELL FOR SURE). HE HAS; IN FACT; TEASED DISPATCHERS (ME AMONG THEM) FOR OVER-FUELING FLTS. IN A RECENT INCIDENT; HE STARTED TO CRITICIZE A FUELING OF MINE ONLY TO CATCH HIMSELF MID-SENTENCE WHEN HIS REVIEW OF THE WX INDICATED MY PLAN; INCLUDING MY ALTERNATE; WAS TOTALLY APPROPRIATE FOR THE FORECASTED CONDITIONS. THE OTHER IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN DURING THE REMAINDER OF MY SHIFT INCLUDED A QUICK REVIEW OF RELEASES ON THE DESK AND ISSUING A FAIR NUMBER OF FUEL AMENDMENTS; SEVERAL OF WHICH RESULTED IN BUMPING REVENUE -- IN NO CASE THAT I CAN RECALL DID I ALLOW OR DID MY SUPVR ALLOW ANYONE TO GET OFF THE GND WHERE ANY COMBINATION OF KNOWN OR LIKELY ATC DELAYS AND WX MIGHT DICTATE THAT FUEL BECOME A PRIORITY OVER REVENUE-CARRYING. I HAVE; INDIVIDUALLY AND ON MY OWN; TRIED TO CULTIVATE A HEIGHTENED FUEL CONSCIOUSNESS; AND AM FAIRLY CERTAIN A SURVEY OF MY RELEASES WOULD REVEAL INCREASING CONSISTENCY OVER TIME AND A DEFENSIBLE LEVEL OF CAUTION AND PRUDENCE ANY TIME THE PLAN WAS BUILT WITH AN AWARENESS OF WX ISSUES. IT'S BEEN THE COMBINATION OF THE SAAB ACFT; AT OR VERY NEAR MAX ZERO FUEL WT ON A LONGER TRIP LEG WHEN I'VE FAILED TO SEE THE VOLATILITY OF THE WX (VERSUS WHAT ONE MIGHT ADDUCE FROM THE OFFICIAL FORECASTS AVAILABLE AT THAT POINT IN TIME) THAT HAS THE TRAP I KEPT FALLING INTO. I GET NOW THAT THERE'S A NEED TO SEE BEYOND THE FORECASTS AND RESPECT THE LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN ALL WX PRODUCTS. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CORRECTIVE ACTION; HOWEVER -- ONE THAT I BELIEVE ADDRESSES THE UNDERLYING PROB; WHICH IS A LACK OF ANY SPECIFIC; COHERENT; RATIONALIZED POLICY DESIGNED TO ACTUALLY GUIDE DISPATCHERS AND FLT CREWS ON FUELING PRACTICES -- IS THE COMPANY'S IMPOSITION OF A FUEL MGMNT POLICY EFFECTIVE OCT/XA/05. I SAY 'ADDRESSES' BECAUSE THE POLICY DEFINITELY FRAMES THE ISSUES -- ITS STATED OBJECTIVE; HOWEVER; IS COST-DRIVEN. IT IS TO REDUCE THE AVERAGE AMOUNT OF FUEL ON BOARD THE ACFT ON ARR; BRINGING IT MORE IN LINE WITH NATIONAL AVERAGES. TO BE CLEAR; I WILL QUOTE FROM A MEMO TO PLTS AND DISPATCHERS FROM OUR VICE PRESIDENT OF FLT OPS: '...WE CURRENTLY AVERAGE A 65-MIN CONTINGENCY FUEL LOAD ON ONE ACFT TYPE UPON LNDG WHILE ACR Y AND ACR Z AVERAGE BTWN 15-18 MINS RESPECTIVELY. ANOTHER ACFT TYPE AVERAGE IS HIGHER THAN THE NATIONAL AVERAGE AS WELL.' NOWHERE DO I READ ANYTHING THAT PURPORTS TO CORRELATE ARR FUEL FIGURES WITH SAFETY PERFORMANCE -- FOR EXAMPLE; I'M FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT OUR AIRLINE'S OVERALL SAFETY PERFORMANCE EXCEEDS THE NATIONAL AVERAGE; AND MY SUSPICION IS WHATEVER CULTURE WE HAVE THAT TENDS TO PUT RATHER MORE FUEL ON AGIVEN FLT THAN LESS FUEL ALSO TENDS TO KEEP US SAFER THAN THE AVERAGE BEAR. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: INEXPERIENCE. 'DOUBLE MESSAGES' ON FUEL PRACTICES. DEFICIENT AWARENESS OF WX PRODUCT LIMITATIONS. COST PRESSURES. LACK OF EXPLICIT FUEL MGMNT GUIDELINES. PIC AND DISPATCHER SUBJECTIVITY. MGMNT SUBJECTIVITY. PIC'S UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF DISPATCH RELEASES. 'TURBULENT' OR 'CHAOTIC' NATURE OF WX PHENOMENA. FAILURE TO DEVELOP AND APPLY INTEGRATED UNDERSTANDING OF THE FULL RANGE OF CONDITIONS AFFECTING SAFETY OF FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.