Narrative:

The captain and I were starting the first leg of our trip; a flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2; and were delayed about 90 mins due to a late inbound aircraft and flow control into ZZZ2. We were finalizing our preparations for pushback and had hazmat paperwork for 4 boxes of material with some minor radiation content. The crew chief came up to the cockpit and told the captain he was removing the hazmat and wanted the paperwork back. He said he put it on our flight by mistake and was moving it to a later flight. The captain gave him the paperwork and we departed the gate about 10 mins later. We taxied to runway 30L with a load closeout that did not reflect any restr articles aboard. This coincided with the encounter with the crew chief. During the taxi we were given a new route to ZZZ2 for WX avoidance and spent the rest of the taxi finishing the checklist and loading and verifying the new route. We were then given a clearance to position and hold on runway 30L. As we did so; a message came up on the printer that said we should request a new closeout. I did that using the ACARS system and the new closeout indicated that we had restr articles aboard. I pointed this out to the captain and at the same time we received our takeoff clearance. I asked him; 'what do you want to do about this?' he said we would work it out after takeoff. We acknowledged the takeoff clearance and departed. We subsequently received a message from the dispatcher that said he thought we had restr articles aboard. The captain contacted dispatch on the radio and the dispatcher said he had been informed of hazmat aboard; but that he could neither confirm nor deny that it was actually aboard. Upon landing at ZZZ2; I went down to talk to the local crew chief who confirmed that 4 boxes of hazmat had been removed and sent to a connecting flight. The company has plenty of written guidance about having and carrying hazmat; but nothing about how to verify it has been removed after being placed aboard. The crew chief in ZZZ1 told us he was removing the hazmat and the original load closeout confirmed that no hazmat was aboard; thus setting up the opportunity to depart without required paperwork. I can't say for certain why the captain elected to take off. Maybe he thought the second closeout was a mistake because he had a face-to-face conversation with someone who told him the hazmat was coming off the plane. Any of the following factors could have influenced his decision: 1) late departure; connecting passenger. 2) task saturation on taxi out due to route change. 3) late notice of new load closeout. 4) confusion about whom to believe; someone you see and talk to versus a printout from someone twice removed (cargo; crew chief; load control; if that's the correct chain). 5) urgency of takeoff clearance considering traffic flow at major airports. 6) focus on a critical phase of flight. As far as my actions are concerned; I think the only thing I could have done differently would be to say 'I don't think we should take off;' instead of 'what do you want to do about this?' once the decision was made to go; I had to focus on a successful takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 CREW DEPARTED WITHOUT ENSURING ACTUAL HAZMAT REMOVAL AFTER PAPERWORK REMOVAL WHILE DISPATCH INDICATED THE HAZMAT REMAINED ABOARD.

Narrative: THE CAPT AND I WERE STARTING THE FIRST LEG OF OUR TRIP; A FLT FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2; AND WERE DELAYED ABOUT 90 MINS DUE TO A LATE INBOUND ACFT AND FLOW CTL INTO ZZZ2. WE WERE FINALIZING OUR PREPARATIONS FOR PUSHBACK AND HAD HAZMAT PAPERWORK FOR 4 BOXES OF MATERIAL WITH SOME MINOR RADIATION CONTENT. THE CREW CHIEF CAME UP TO THE COCKPIT AND TOLD THE CAPT HE WAS REMOVING THE HAZMAT AND WANTED THE PAPERWORK BACK. HE SAID HE PUT IT ON OUR FLT BY MISTAKE AND WAS MOVING IT TO A LATER FLT. THE CAPT GAVE HIM THE PAPERWORK AND WE DEPARTED THE GATE ABOUT 10 MINS LATER. WE TAXIED TO RWY 30L WITH A LOAD CLOSEOUT THAT DID NOT REFLECT ANY RESTR ARTICLES ABOARD. THIS COINCIDED WITH THE ENCOUNTER WITH THE CREW CHIEF. DURING THE TAXI WE WERE GIVEN A NEW RTE TO ZZZ2 FOR WX AVOIDANCE AND SPENT THE REST OF THE TAXI FINISHING THE CHKLIST AND LOADING AND VERIFYING THE NEW RTE. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A CLRNC TO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 30L. AS WE DID SO; A MESSAGE CAME UP ON THE PRINTER THAT SAID WE SHOULD REQUEST A NEW CLOSEOUT. I DID THAT USING THE ACARS SYS AND THE NEW CLOSEOUT INDICATED THAT WE HAD RESTR ARTICLES ABOARD. I POINTED THIS OUT TO THE CAPT AND AT THE SAME TIME WE RECEIVED OUR TKOF CLRNC. I ASKED HIM; 'WHAT DO YOU WANT TO DO ABOUT THIS?' HE SAID WE WOULD WORK IT OUT AFTER TKOF. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE TKOF CLRNC AND DEPARTED. WE SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE DISPATCHER THAT SAID HE THOUGHT WE HAD RESTR ARTICLES ABOARD. THE CAPT CONTACTED DISPATCH ON THE RADIO AND THE DISPATCHER SAID HE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF HAZMAT ABOARD; BUT THAT HE COULD NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY THAT IT WAS ACTUALLY ABOARD. UPON LNDG AT ZZZ2; I WENT DOWN TO TALK TO THE LCL CREW CHIEF WHO CONFIRMED THAT 4 BOXES OF HAZMAT HAD BEEN REMOVED AND SENT TO A CONNECTING FLT. THE COMPANY HAS PLENTY OF WRITTEN GUIDANCE ABOUT HAVING AND CARRYING HAZMAT; BUT NOTHING ABOUT HOW TO VERIFY IT HAS BEEN REMOVED AFTER BEING PLACED ABOARD. THE CREW CHIEF IN ZZZ1 TOLD US HE WAS REMOVING THE HAZMAT AND THE ORIGINAL LOAD CLOSEOUT CONFIRMED THAT NO HAZMAT WAS ABOARD; THUS SETTING UP THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEPART WITHOUT REQUIRED PAPERWORK. I CAN'T SAY FOR CERTAIN WHY THE CAPT ELECTED TO TAKE OFF. MAYBE HE THOUGHT THE SECOND CLOSEOUT WAS A MISTAKE BECAUSE HE HAD A FACE-TO-FACE CONVERSATION WITH SOMEONE WHO TOLD HIM THE HAZMAT WAS COMING OFF THE PLANE. ANY OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS COULD HAVE INFLUENCED HIS DECISION: 1) LATE DEP; CONNECTING PAX. 2) TASK SATURATION ON TAXI OUT DUE TO RTE CHANGE. 3) LATE NOTICE OF NEW LOAD CLOSEOUT. 4) CONFUSION ABOUT WHOM TO BELIEVE; SOMEONE YOU SEE AND TALK TO VERSUS A PRINTOUT FROM SOMEONE TWICE REMOVED (CARGO; CREW CHIEF; LOAD CTL; IF THAT'S THE CORRECT CHAIN). 5) URGENCY OF TKOF CLRNC CONSIDERING TFC FLOW AT MAJOR ARPTS. 6) FOCUS ON A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. AS FAR AS MY ACTIONS ARE CONCERNED; I THINK THE ONLY THING I COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY WOULD BE TO SAY 'I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD TAKE OFF;' INSTEAD OF 'WHAT DO YOU WANT TO DO ABOUT THIS?' ONCE THE DECISION WAS MADE TO GO; I HAD TO FOCUS ON A SUCCESSFUL TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.