Narrative:

While cruising straight and level at 0.79 mach at FL350; the right side window (first officer side) shattered. A loud bang was heard. The first officer was PF at time of incident and the autoplt system was engaged. Window heats (r-hand/left-hand windshield) were selected to the low position at time of incident. A subsequent right window heat caution was displayed on EICAS primary page; after failure of window pane. R-hand windshield switch was selected to the 'off' position and remained there for the duration of flight. No warnings; audible or visual; were given prior to impending failure; but a very loud bang was heard at the time of failure. PF and PNF were not able to determine what pane or panes had failed during flight; except that it was not the inner pane of the 3 window panes. An emergency was declared with ATC and a descent of approximately 1500-2000 FPM was conducted towards an initial requested altitude of FL250 to lower cabin differential pressure and decrease true airspeed. Ultimately; the descent was continued to an ATC cleared altitude of 13000 ft to set up for initial arrival and landing. Airplane indicated airspeed was kept below 290 KTS during descent. Cabin pressurization and descent rate were normal throughout flight as noted on EICAS status page. The captain was the PNF and informed dispatch and maintenance control of incident and intentions. Subsequent postflt inspection on failed side window from the outside determined the failed pane was limited to the middle pane of the 3 window panes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ700 IN CRUISE AT FL350 HAD THE R SIDE FO'S WINDOW SHATTER. ON GND; FOUND CTR PANE FAILED.

Narrative: WHILE CRUISING STRAIGHT AND LEVEL AT 0.79 MACH AT FL350; THE R SIDE WINDOW (FO SIDE) SHATTERED. A LOUD BANG WAS HEARD. THE FO WAS PF AT TIME OF INCIDENT AND THE AUTOPLT SYS WAS ENGAGED. WINDOW HEATS (R-HAND/L-HAND WINDSHIELD) WERE SELECTED TO THE LOW POS AT TIME OF INCIDENT. A SUBSEQUENT R WINDOW HEAT CAUTION WAS DISPLAYED ON EICAS PRIMARY PAGE; AFTER FAILURE OF WINDOW PANE. R-HAND WINDSHIELD SWITCH WAS SELECTED TO THE 'OFF' POS AND REMAINED THERE FOR THE DURATION OF FLT. NO WARNINGS; AUDIBLE OR VISUAL; WERE GIVEN PRIOR TO IMPENDING FAILURE; BUT A VERY LOUD BANG WAS HEARD AT THE TIME OF FAILURE. PF AND PNF WERE NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT PANE OR PANES HAD FAILED DURING FLT; EXCEPT THAT IT WAS NOT THE INNER PANE OF THE 3 WINDOW PANES. AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH ATC AND A DSCNT OF APPROX 1500-2000 FPM WAS CONDUCTED TOWARDS AN INITIAL REQUESTED ALT OF FL250 TO LOWER CABIN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE AND DECREASE TRUE AIRSPD. ULTIMATELY; THE DSCNT WAS CONTINUED TO AN ATC CLRED ALT OF 13000 FT TO SET UP FOR INITIAL ARR AND LNDG. AIRPLANE INDICATED AIRSPD WAS KEPT BELOW 290 KTS DURING DSCNT. CABIN PRESSURIZATION AND DSCNT RATE WERE NORMAL THROUGHOUT FLT AS NOTED ON EICAS STATUS PAGE. THE CAPT WAS THE PNF AND INFORMED DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL OF INCIDENT AND INTENTIONS. SUBSEQUENT POSTFLT INSPECTION ON FAILED SIDE WINDOW FROM THE OUTSIDE DETERMINED THE FAILED PANE WAS LIMITED TO THE MIDDLE PANE OF THE 3 WINDOW PANES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.