Narrative:

Flight was dispatched with MEL 30-119; anti ice valve. However; after the flight it was determined that the maintenance tech had not properly prepared the aircraft in compliance of MEL; even though it was signed off. The contract maintenance tech in ZZZ did not secure the correct valve open; and in fact; secured a different valve closed. Did his test and signed the write-up off as being in compliance with the MEL; when it was not. During the flight; the first officer and I became suspicious of the aircraft system that had been deferred. On descent into dfw other EICAS messages appeared that should not have. ZZZ1 maintenance was notified and an additional write-up was made. After maintenance had looked at the valves in question; it was determined that the valve that should have been wired open was not and a different valve was in fact wired closed. If we as an airline are going to use contract maintenance; perhaps they should have specific training on our aircraft and procedures. Callback conversation revealed the following information: the reporter stated the problem was that the contract tech was not able to run the engine and it was not operationally checked. The technician rptedly did not have the experience or training to perform the minimum equipment list special procedure for wiring the anti-ice valve open. The reporter stated they took the airplane only to find out in-flight things were not right as pulling back the throttle revealed the 14TH stage bleed valve was not opening. The reporter stated that with the airplane on the ground at a maintenance station; it was confirmed the wrong valve was wired closed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB140 DISPATCH MEL REQUIRED THE ENG ANTI-ICE VALVE TO BE WIRED OPEN. THE WRONG VALVE; THE 14TH STAGE BLEED; WAS WIRED CLOSED.

Narrative: FLT WAS DISPATCHED WITH MEL 30-119; ANTI ICE VALVE. HOWEVER; AFTER THE FLT IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE MAINT TECH HAD NOT PROPERLY PREPARED THE ACFT IN COMPLIANCE OF MEL; EVEN THOUGH IT WAS SIGNED OFF. THE CONTRACT MAINT TECH IN ZZZ DID NOT SECURE THE CORRECT VALVE OPEN; AND IN FACT; SECURED A DIFFERENT VALVE CLOSED. DID HIS TEST AND SIGNED THE WRITE-UP OFF AS BEING IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE MEL; WHEN IT WAS NOT. DURING THE FLT; THE FO AND I BECAME SUSPICIOUS OF THE ACFT SYSTEM THAT HAD BEEN DEFERRED. ON DSCNT INTO DFW OTHER EICAS MESSAGES APPEARED THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE. ZZZ1 MAINT WAS NOTIFIED AND AN ADDITIONAL WRITE-UP WAS MADE. AFTER MAINT HAD LOOKED AT THE VALVES IN QUESTION; IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE VALVE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN WIRED OPEN WAS NOT AND A DIFFERENT VALVE WAS IN FACT WIRED CLOSED. IF WE AS AN AIRLINE ARE GOING TO USE CONTRACT MAINT; PERHAPS THEY SHOULD HAVE SPECIFIC TRAINING ON OUR ACFT AND PROCS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE PROB WAS THAT THE CONTRACT TECH WAS NOT ABLE TO RUN THE ENG AND IT WAS NOT OPERATIONALLY CHKED. THE TECHNICIAN RPTEDLY DID NOT HAVE THE EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING TO PERFORM THE MINIMUM EQUIP LIST SPECIAL PROC FOR WIRING THE ANTI-ICE VALVE OPEN. THE RPTR STATED THEY TOOK THE AIRPLANE ONLY TO FIND OUT INFLT THINGS WERE NOT RIGHT AS PULLING BACK THE THROTTLE REVEALED THE 14TH STAGE BLEED VALVE WAS NOT OPENING. THE RPTR STATED THAT WITH THE AIRPLANE ON THE GND AT A MAINT STATION; IT WAS CONFIRMED THE WRONG VALVE WAS WIRED CLOSED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.