Narrative:

My detroit to white plains flight diverted to ewr; nj; without consulting me or declaring an emergency; as required by our operations specifications. 121.533 assigns joint responsibility for preflight planning; delay; and dispatch release to the dispatcher and the PIC. As part of this requirement; both PIC and dispatcher must comply not only with the applicable provisions of crash fire rescue equipment chapter 14; they must also comply with their carrier's operations specifications. This event involved a breakdown in the collaboration between flight crew and dispatch; as well as a concern with the provisions of 121.627. I first became specifically aware of my detroit to white plains flight when its flight crew sent me an ACARS message. It posed a stark question in telegraphic prose: should they divert to newark or allentown? They did mention that they were carrying 5700 pounds of fuel on board. Since I had not built the original release; my initial reaction was to check the records on the desk -- indeed; the dispatcher who had built the release had not listed any alternate. I did recall that she had mentioned gusty winds reported at a number of our east coast destinations; and I had repeatedly verified that for myself both during the initial WX familiarization period that is built into our 'turnover' and in the course of my normal flight planning duties. At no time; however; in any communication with me did this flight crew cite adverse xwinds or windshear as a factor in this diversion -- or any other reason for that matter. Quickly; I located the flight on my aircraft situation display; and verified the fact that it was wnw of white plains; about 30 odd NM from ewr; with allentown lying approximately 50 NM further to the wsw of its position. I did a review for both ewr and allentown; and sent the crew an ACARS indicating that while ewr was closer; but allentown offered much better wind conditions; again; I assumed that wind was the issue. Next; I ran a 'diversion' scenario using the aircraft diversion function and cmk as the divert point -- cmk lying actually somewhat farther from allentown than my flight was; and thus representing a conservative choice for verifying the plane was carrying sufficient fuel to reach that airport. My figures indicated a burnoff of 1498 pounds; added to the mandatory 45 min reserve; the result was a minimum fuel of 4998 pounds -- by these calculations; the 'pad' or extra fuel included over 700 pounds. I could divert the flight to allentown; confident they could go the distance with no safety or legality issues whatsoever. I was about to communicate this to the crew when I received a second ACARS from them informing me they were committed to ewr. At this point; the dispatch supervisors on duty had taken notice and began advising me to instruct the flight to go to allentown. Neither of these individuals thought ewr made sense: there had been considerable ATC delays both into and out of ewr all that day. Even if our flight did not get a prohibitively long hold; they were very likely to end up trapped on the ramp; victims of either a ground delay or a full blown ground stop. Unable to re-establish communications with the flight crew either by radio or ACARS; we shifted gears to planning for the aftermath. At XA56 white plains was reporting winds at 320 degrees at 25 KTS gusting to a peak of 36 KTS. By XB56 the wind had shifted 10 degrees to 330 degrees at 23 KTS gusting to 33 KTS with a 34 KT peak recorded at XB03Z. Ewr reported winds of 290 degrees at 22 KTS; gusting to 35 KTS at XA51. By XB51 winds there were 310 degrees at 22 KTS; gusting to 30 KTS. Allentown's winds at XA51 were reported as 290 degrees at 15 KTS; gusting to 22 KTS. 1 hour later; they were reporting 290 degrees at 19 KTS; gusting to 26 KTS. If the winds at white plains were cause for concern; winds at ewr hardly offered any consolation. Still; it's possible the crew took my initial response as a sort of 'take your pick' answer. I could have been more direct with them. I also could have involved either or both dispatch supervisors sooner -- and I admit to having a certain ego investment in proving I could solve my own problems. It is interesting to note that during this same time period; several major air carrier's all had aircraft land successfully at white plains. And; in case you think that's simply a function of these carriers operating heavier aircraft better able to fight xwinds and windshear than our RJ85; I should add that another air carrier got one of its little crj's in (albeit on the second attempt). It is also interesting to note that even for the short diversion to allentown; our company's new fueling policies may have heightened the flight crew's concern as far as having enough fuel on board to travel the additional distance. It's clear to me that ewr was not the place to go for wind relief -- and I believe the PIC and I would have come to that conclusion if the collaboration hadn't been broken off. The consequences; in this instance; were no more serious than bussed passenger; a flight delay; and the costs associated with adding a repositioning trip from ewr back to white plains in order to complete the next segment back to detroit. Our recalcitrant PIC was back in the air; winging his way from hpn to detroit packed with revenue; by XE10 or so. While no metal was bent -- and no flight attendants were injured; that I'm aware of -- in the making of this diversion; at least 2 principles were left by the wayside; even if crash fire rescue equipment 14 allows some room for interpretation in this circumstance: 1) the PIC diverted without consulting any of his ground-based resources. 2) if wind conditions threatened the safety of flight; then the PIC's diversion to ewr appears indefensible. It does occur to me that had I been more assertive about allentown sooner in this sequence of events; possibly the PIC would have been persuaded to think through his choice of airports.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DISPATCHER FOR COMMUTER ACR RPTS THAT FLT CREW OF CARJ FAILED TO INCLUDE HIM IN THEIR DECISION AS TO A PREFERRED DIVERSION ARPT.

Narrative: MY DETROIT TO WHITE PLAINS FLT DIVERTED TO EWR; NJ; WITHOUT CONSULTING ME OR DECLARING AN EMER; AS REQUIRED BY OUR OPS SPECS. 121.533 ASSIGNS JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREFLT PLANNING; DELAY; AND DISPATCH RELEASE TO THE DISPATCHER AND THE PIC. AS PART OF THIS REQUIREMENT; BOTH PIC AND DISPATCHER MUST COMPLY NOT ONLY WITH THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF CFR CHAPTER 14; THEY MUST ALSO COMPLY WITH THEIR CARRIER'S OPS SPECS. THIS EVENT INVOLVED A BREAKDOWN IN THE COLLABORATION BTWN FLT CREW AND DISPATCH; AS WELL AS A CONCERN WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 121.627. I FIRST BECAME SPECIFICALLY AWARE OF MY DETROIT TO WHITE PLAINS FLT WHEN ITS FLT CREW SENT ME AN ACARS MESSAGE. IT POSED A STARK QUESTION IN TELEGRAPHIC PROSE: SHOULD THEY DIVERT TO NEWARK OR ALLENTOWN? THEY DID MENTION THAT THEY WERE CARRYING 5700 LBS OF FUEL ON BOARD. SINCE I HAD NOT BUILT THE ORIGINAL RELEASE; MY INITIAL REACTION WAS TO CHK THE RECORDS ON THE DESK -- INDEED; THE DISPATCHER WHO HAD BUILT THE RELEASE HAD NOT LISTED ANY ALTERNATE. I DID RECALL THAT SHE HAD MENTIONED GUSTY WINDS RPTED AT A NUMBER OF OUR EAST COAST DESTS; AND I HAD REPEATEDLY VERIFIED THAT FOR MYSELF BOTH DURING THE INITIAL WX FAMILIARIZATION PERIOD THAT IS BUILT INTO OUR 'TURNOVER' AND IN THE COURSE OF MY NORMAL FLT PLANNING DUTIES. AT NO TIME; HOWEVER; IN ANY COM WITH ME DID THIS FLT CREW CITE ADVERSE XWINDS OR WINDSHEAR AS A FACTOR IN THIS DIVERSION -- OR ANY OTHER REASON FOR THAT MATTER. QUICKLY; I LOCATED THE FLT ON MY ACFT SITUATION DISPLAY; AND VERIFIED THE FACT THAT IT WAS WNW OF WHITE PLAINS; ABOUT 30 ODD NM FROM EWR; WITH ALLENTOWN LYING APPROX 50 NM FURTHER TO THE WSW OF ITS POS. I DID A REVIEW FOR BOTH EWR AND ALLENTOWN; AND SENT THE CREW AN ACARS INDICATING THAT WHILE EWR WAS CLOSER; BUT ALLENTOWN OFFERED MUCH BETTER WIND CONDITIONS; AGAIN; I ASSUMED THAT WIND WAS THE ISSUE. NEXT; I RAN A 'DIVERSION' SCENARIO USING THE ACFT DIVERSION FUNCTION AND CMK AS THE DIVERT POINT -- CMK LYING ACTUALLY SOMEWHAT FARTHER FROM ALLENTOWN THAN MY FLT WAS; AND THUS REPRESENTING A CONSERVATIVE CHOICE FOR VERIFYING THE PLANE WAS CARRYING SUFFICIENT FUEL TO REACH THAT ARPT. MY FIGURES INDICATED A BURNOFF OF 1498 LBS; ADDED TO THE MANDATORY 45 MIN RESERVE; THE RESULT WAS A MINIMUM FUEL OF 4998 LBS -- BY THESE CALCULATIONS; THE 'PAD' OR EXTRA FUEL INCLUDED OVER 700 LBS. I COULD DIVERT THE FLT TO ALLENTOWN; CONFIDENT THEY COULD GO THE DISTANCE WITH NO SAFETY OR LEGALITY ISSUES WHATSOEVER. I WAS ABOUT TO COMMUNICATE THIS TO THE CREW WHEN I RECEIVED A SECOND ACARS FROM THEM INFORMING ME THEY WERE COMMITTED TO EWR. AT THIS POINT; THE DISPATCH SUPVRS ON DUTY HAD TAKEN NOTICE AND BEGAN ADVISING ME TO INSTRUCT THE FLT TO GO TO ALLENTOWN. NEITHER OF THESE INDIVIDUALS THOUGHT EWR MADE SENSE: THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE ATC DELAYS BOTH INTO AND OUT OF EWR ALL THAT DAY. EVEN IF OUR FLT DID NOT GET A PROHIBITIVELY LONG HOLD; THEY WERE VERY LIKELY TO END UP TRAPPED ON THE RAMP; VICTIMS OF EITHER A GND DELAY OR A FULL BLOWN GND STOP. UNABLE TO RE-ESTABLISH COMS WITH THE FLT CREW EITHER BY RADIO OR ACARS; WE SHIFTED GEARS TO PLANNING FOR THE AFTERMATH. AT XA56 WHITE PLAINS WAS RPTING WINDS AT 320 DEGS AT 25 KTS GUSTING TO A PEAK OF 36 KTS. BY XB56 THE WIND HAD SHIFTED 10 DEGS TO 330 DEGS AT 23 KTS GUSTING TO 33 KTS WITH A 34 KT PEAK RECORDED AT XB03Z. EWR RPTED WINDS OF 290 DEGS AT 22 KTS; GUSTING TO 35 KTS AT XA51. BY XB51 WINDS THERE WERE 310 DEGS AT 22 KTS; GUSTING TO 30 KTS. ALLENTOWN'S WINDS AT XA51 WERE RPTED AS 290 DEGS AT 15 KTS; GUSTING TO 22 KTS. 1 HR LATER; THEY WERE RPTING 290 DEGS AT 19 KTS; GUSTING TO 26 KTS. IF THE WINDS AT WHITE PLAINS WERE CAUSE FOR CONCERN; WINDS AT EWR HARDLY OFFERED ANY CONSOLATION. STILL; IT'S POSSIBLE THE CREW TOOK MY INITIAL RESPONSE AS A SORT OF 'TAKE YOUR PICK' ANSWER. I COULD HAVE BEEN MORE DIRECT WITH THEM. I ALSO COULD HAVE INVOLVED EITHER OR BOTH DISPATCH SUPVRS SOONER -- AND I ADMIT TO HAVING A CERTAIN EGO INVESTMENT IN PROVING I COULD SOLVE MY OWN PROBS. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT DURING THIS SAME TIME PERIOD; SEVERAL MAJOR ACR'S ALL HAD ACFT LAND SUCCESSFULLY AT WHITE PLAINS. AND; IN CASE YOU THINK THAT'S SIMPLY A FUNCTION OF THESE CARRIERS OPERATING HEAVIER ACFT BETTER ABLE TO FIGHT XWINDS AND WINDSHEAR THAN OUR RJ85; I SHOULD ADD THAT ANOTHER ACR GOT ONE OF ITS LITTLE CRJ'S IN (ALBEIT ON THE SECOND ATTEMPT). IT IS ALSO INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT EVEN FOR THE SHORT DIVERSION TO ALLENTOWN; OUR COMPANY'S NEW FUELING POLICIES MAY HAVE HEIGHTENED THE FLT CREW'S CONCERN AS FAR AS HAVING ENOUGH FUEL ON BOARD TO TRAVEL THE ADDITIONAL DISTANCE. IT'S CLR TO ME THAT EWR WAS NOT THE PLACE TO GO FOR WIND RELIEF -- AND I BELIEVE THE PIC AND I WOULD HAVE COME TO THAT CONCLUSION IF THE COLLABORATION HADN'T BEEN BROKEN OFF. THE CONSEQUENCES; IN THIS INSTANCE; WERE NO MORE SERIOUS THAN BUSSED PAX; A FLT DELAY; AND THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH ADDING A REPOSITIONING TRIP FROM EWR BACK TO WHITE PLAINS IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE NEXT SEGMENT BACK TO DETROIT. OUR RECALCITRANT PIC WAS BACK IN THE AIR; WINGING HIS WAY FROM HPN TO DETROIT PACKED WITH REVENUE; BY XE10 OR SO. WHILE NO METAL WAS BENT -- AND NO FLT ATTENDANTS WERE INJURED; THAT I'M AWARE OF -- IN THE MAKING OF THIS DIVERSION; AT LEAST 2 PRINCIPLES WERE LEFT BY THE WAYSIDE; EVEN IF CFR 14 ALLOWS SOME ROOM FOR INTERP IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE: 1) THE PIC DIVERTED WITHOUT CONSULTING ANY OF HIS GND-BASED RESOURCES. 2) IF WIND CONDITIONS THREATENED THE SAFETY OF FLT; THEN THE PIC'S DIVERSION TO EWR APPEARS INDEFENSIBLE. IT DOES OCCUR TO ME THAT HAD I BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE ABOUT ALLENTOWN SOONER IN THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS; POSSIBLY THE PIC WOULD HAVE BEEN PERSUADED TO THINK THROUGH HIS CHOICE OF ARPTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.