Narrative:

Flight XXX was a scheduled flight from sna to hnl. The cockpit crew consisted of captain AAA; first officer BBB. The cabin crew consisted of lead flight attendant XXX; second flight attendant YYY; and third flight attendant ZZZ. The flight was entering the final phases of the descent and approach. The WX at the time was MVFR with isolated rain showers between the field and the aircraft. In addition; the WX was contributing to a sequencing back-up of aircraft for approachs to the field. We were in contact with ZHN receiving vectors to an approach to ILS runway 8L at hnl. During the last 30 mins of the flight; the flight crew received multiple calls from flight attendants regarding several cabin issues. The flight attendant interruptions were very detrimental to the cockpit's performance and detracted from the flight crew members receiving critical directions from ATC. On the aforementioned flight; at approximately 10 mins prior to landing; the second flight attendant called to inquire if we were still landing at the predicted land time (this was after he had already called 2 previous times to inquire about the same thing several hours prior). Immediately following that; lead flight attendant called to ask if 'we knew what gate flight DDD was parking at since we had some passenger connecting and it would benefit them to know where it was at.' almost 2 mins later; again called up to ask if we could notify hnl ramp that they would need extra agriculture clearance forms since they 'failed to make sure (!) they had enough forms flying out of orange county.' when I asked how many he needed; he responded; '...a whole bunch since I ran out right around the exit row.' I have to emphasize that all these calls came within a very short time span while the aircraft was being vectored around inclement WX and multiple traffic contacts around us. At the very least; this is highly unprofessional (since the majority of these issues could have been handled at altitude prior to the descent) and at its extreme; I feel; can ultimately contribute to a hazardous environment where a flight crew can miss calls and result in a mishap. Once on the ground; captain ZZZ counseled the individuals as to their conduct and the impact they had on cockpit performance. Recommendations: 1) distribute/promulgate into flight attendant safety newsletters the observance of this trend and the paramount importance that they respect the workload that exists in the cockpit during takeoff/approachs/lndgs. Furthermore; reinforce among cabin personnel the need for professionalism and proactivism in staying ahead of cabin duties. While it is easy to procrastinate and 'wait till the descent' to handle problems; it is absolutely not fair to fellow crew members (and very often our passenger) to treat their duties with such a lax attitude with the resultant higher workload and inconveniences to our passenger. 2) include training during the flight attendant recurrent CRM phase that emphasizes the critical importance flight attendants play in a cohesive crew environment. Also include reviewing the purpose and importance of a sterile cockpit and the associated procedures. Flight attendant's disregard for these established procedures can severely hamper a flight crew's effectiveness during critical phases of flight. 3) include training during pilot recurrent CRM phase that emphasizes the captain's and first officer's responsibility to cultivate a professional cockpit environment that adheres to prescribed sterile cockpit rules and flight crew professionalism. Any deviations from these guidelines by individuals should be dealt with following flts with instruction and; if further problems occur; are dealt with through proper channels.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 FO RPTS CABIN ATTENDANTS VIOLATE STERILE COCKPIT WITH CALLS NOT OF AN EMER NATURE.

Narrative: FLT XXX WAS A SCHEDULED FLT FROM SNA TO HNL. THE COCKPIT CREW CONSISTED OF CAPT AAA; FO BBB. THE CABIN CREW CONSISTED OF LEAD FLT ATTENDANT XXX; SECOND FLT ATTENDANT YYY; AND THIRD FLT ATTENDANT ZZZ. THE FLT WAS ENTERING THE FINAL PHASES OF THE DSCNT AND APCH. THE WX AT THE TIME WAS MVFR WITH ISOLATED RAIN SHOWERS BTWN THE FIELD AND THE ACFT. IN ADDITION; THE WX WAS CONTRIBUTING TO A SEQUENCING BACK-UP OF ACFT FOR APCHS TO THE FIELD. WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH ZHN RECEIVING VECTORS TO AN APCH TO ILS RWY 8L AT HNL. DURING THE LAST 30 MINS OF THE FLT; THE FLT CREW RECEIVED MULTIPLE CALLS FROM FLT ATTENDANTS REGARDING SEVERAL CABIN ISSUES. THE FLT ATTENDANT INTERRUPTIONS WERE VERY DETRIMENTAL TO THE COCKPIT'S PERFORMANCE AND DETRACTED FROM THE FLT CREW MEMBERS RECEIVING CRITICAL DIRECTIONS FROM ATC. ON THE AFOREMENTIONED FLT; AT APPROX 10 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG; THE SECOND FLT ATTENDANT CALLED TO INQUIRE IF WE WERE STILL LNDG AT THE PREDICTED LAND TIME (THIS WAS AFTER HE HAD ALREADY CALLED 2 PREVIOUS TIMES TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE SAME THING SEVERAL HRS PRIOR). IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THAT; LEAD FLT ATTENDANT CALLED TO ASK IF 'WE KNEW WHAT GATE FLT DDD WAS PARKING AT SINCE WE HAD SOME PAX CONNECTING AND IT WOULD BENEFIT THEM TO KNOW WHERE IT WAS AT.' ALMOST 2 MINS LATER; AGAIN CALLED UP TO ASK IF WE COULD NOTIFY HNL RAMP THAT THEY WOULD NEED EXTRA AGRICULTURE CLRNC FORMS SINCE THEY 'FAILED TO MAKE SURE (!) THEY HAD ENOUGH FORMS FLYING OUT OF ORANGE COUNTY.' WHEN I ASKED HOW MANY HE NEEDED; HE RESPONDED; '...A WHOLE BUNCH SINCE I RAN OUT RIGHT AROUND THE EXIT ROW.' I HAVE TO EMPHASIZE THAT ALL THESE CALLS CAME WITHIN A VERY SHORT TIME SPAN WHILE THE ACFT WAS BEING VECTORED AROUND INCLEMENT WX AND MULTIPLE TFC CONTACTS AROUND US. AT THE VERY LEAST; THIS IS HIGHLY UNPROFESSIONAL (SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THESE ISSUES COULD HAVE BEEN HANDLED AT ALT PRIOR TO THE DSCNT) AND AT ITS EXTREME; I FEEL; CAN ULTIMATELY CONTRIBUTE TO A HAZARDOUS ENVIRONMENT WHERE A FLT CREW CAN MISS CALLS AND RESULT IN A MISHAP. ONCE ON THE GND; CAPT ZZZ COUNSELED THE INDIVIDUALS AS TO THEIR CONDUCT AND THE IMPACT THEY HAD ON COCKPIT PERFORMANCE. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) DISTRIBUTE/PROMULGATE INTO FLT ATTENDANT SAFETY NEWSLETTERS THE OBSERVANCE OF THIS TREND AND THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE THAT THEY RESPECT THE WORKLOAD THAT EXISTS IN THE COCKPIT DURING TKOF/APCHS/LNDGS. FURTHERMORE; REINFORCE AMONG CABIN PERSONNEL THE NEED FOR PROFESSIONALISM AND PROACTIVISM IN STAYING AHEAD OF CABIN DUTIES. WHILE IT IS EASY TO PROCRASTINATE AND 'WAIT TILL THE DSCNT' TO HANDLE PROBS; IT IS ABSOLUTELY NOT FAIR TO FELLOW CREW MEMBERS (AND VERY OFTEN OUR PAX) TO TREAT THEIR DUTIES WITH SUCH A LAX ATTITUDE WITH THE RESULTANT HIGHER WORKLOAD AND INCONVENIENCES TO OUR PAX. 2) INCLUDE TRAINING DURING THE FLT ATTENDANT RECURRENT CRM PHASE THAT EMPHASIZES THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE FLT ATTENDANTS PLAY IN A COHESIVE CREW ENVIRONMENT. ALSO INCLUDE REVIEWING THE PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF A STERILE COCKPIT AND THE ASSOCIATED PROCS. FLT ATTENDANT'S DISREGARD FOR THESE ESTABLISHED PROCS CAN SEVERELY HAMPER A FLT CREW'S EFFECTIVENESS DURING CRITICAL PHASES OF FLT. 3) INCLUDE TRAINING DURING PLT RECURRENT CRM PHASE THAT EMPHASIZES THE CAPT'S AND FO'S RESPONSIBILITY TO CULTIVATE A PROFESSIONAL COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT THAT ADHERES TO PRESCRIBED STERILE COCKPIT RULES AND FLT CREW PROFESSIONALISM. ANY DEVS FROM THESE GUIDELINES BY INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH FOLLOWING FLTS WITH INSTRUCTION AND; IF FURTHER PROBS OCCUR; ARE DEALT WITH THROUGH PROPER CHANNELS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.