Narrative:

I was plugged in; monitoring north radar; awaiting a position brief to open handoff. While the brief dragged on; the radar controller failed to notice a head-on developing. North radar had a departing heavy B747 on the knik SID; climbing on a ground track about 20 degrees west of the normal ground track due to wind. The controller failed to project this aircraft would conflict with a descending B737. Controller was vectoring toward left base for runway 7R. The 2 aircraft ended up nose-to-nose; 5 mi apart and the conflict alert going off. About midway through the brief; the local controller upstairs watching the d-brite recognized the nose-to-nose conflict and attempted to alert the radar controller. Upon buzzing in; the local controller heard radar issuing turns to the associated aircraft and figured the situation was being handled. However; the radar controller only realized the pending situation moments before the conflict alert alerted. The radar controller issued a 180 degree heading to the sebound arrival; and a right turn of 040 degrees to the nwbound departure. This was too little; too late. The radar controller began issuing traffic to the involved aircraft as the conflict alert was going off. The descending B737 reported the opposing B747 in sight and the controller told him to maintain visual separation from that traffic. Had the pilot of the B737 not reported traffic in sight; this controller would be decertified. The B747 never called traffic in sight. This radar controller routinely fails to protect the climb out corridor. The controller does this by running arrival traffic too close to the airport on too tight a vector; putting them directly in conflict with climb out traffic. Also; the controller's briefings are too verbose; wasting too much time covering redundant or non-applicable items while dire and pressing items like separating aircraft go unattended! This radar controller does not act on corrective suggestions from peers; nor learn from mistakes! 20 mins later; the controller was doing the same thing again and I had to tell the controller (as handoff) to fix the situation with a turn. This controller's perception that they can rely on visual separation to solve poor vectoring techniques is dangerous. Other controllers and I have pointed out that the controller should run the arrival feeds from tager further to the west for 2 reasons: first and foremost; to remain clear of the climb out corridor. Secondly; the wider feed allows final radar to blend that traffic with traffic from the south more effectively; instead of 'jamming' the final controller with aircraft too close to the FAF. Investigation of this matter concluded it was sloppy; but separation was maintained. I neither contributed to the problem at hand nor the solution as I was a spectator; not signed on or given traffic yet.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A11 CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERNS REGARDING TECHNIQUES USED BY FELLOW CTLR THAT FREQUENTLY RELIES ON VISUAL SEPARATION TO RESOLVE CONFLICTIONS.

Narrative: I WAS PLUGGED IN; MONITORING N RADAR; AWAITING A POS BRIEF TO OPEN HDOF. WHILE THE BRIEF DRAGGED ON; THE RADAR CTLR FAILED TO NOTICE A HEAD-ON DEVELOPING. N RADAR HAD A DEPARTING HVY B747 ON THE KNIK SID; CLBING ON A GND TRACK ABOUT 20 DEGS W OF THE NORMAL GND TRACK DUE TO WIND. THE CTLR FAILED TO PROJECT THIS ACFT WOULD CONFLICT WITH A DSNDING B737. CTLR WAS VECTORING TOWARD L BASE FOR RWY 7R. THE 2 ACFT ENDED UP NOSE-TO-NOSE; 5 MI APART AND THE CONFLICT ALERT GOING OFF. ABOUT MIDWAY THROUGH THE BRIEF; THE LCL CTLR UPSTAIRS WATCHING THE D-BRITE RECOGNIZED THE NOSE-TO-NOSE CONFLICT AND ATTEMPTED TO ALERT THE RADAR CTLR. UPON BUZZING IN; THE LCL CTLR HEARD RADAR ISSUING TURNS TO THE ASSOCIATED ACFT AND FIGURED THE SITUATION WAS BEING HANDLED. HOWEVER; THE RADAR CTLR ONLY REALIZED THE PENDING SITUATION MOMENTS BEFORE THE CONFLICT ALERT ALERTED. THE RADAR CTLR ISSUED A 180 DEG HDG TO THE SEBOUND ARR; AND A R TURN OF 040 DEGS TO THE NWBOUND DEP. THIS WAS TOO LITTLE; TOO LATE. THE RADAR CTLR BEGAN ISSUING TFC TO THE INVOLVED ACFT AS THE CONFLICT ALERT WAS GOING OFF. THE DSNDING B737 RPTED THE OPPOSING B747 IN SIGHT AND THE CTLR TOLD HIM TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM THAT TFC. HAD THE PLT OF THE B737 NOT RPTED TFC IN SIGHT; THIS CTLR WOULD BE DECERTIFIED. THE B747 NEVER CALLED TFC IN SIGHT. THIS RADAR CTLR ROUTINELY FAILS TO PROTECT THE CLBOUT CORRIDOR. THE CTLR DOES THIS BY RUNNING ARR TFC TOO CLOSE TO THE ARPT ON TOO TIGHT A VECTOR; PUTTING THEM DIRECTLY IN CONFLICT WITH CLBOUT TFC. ALSO; THE CTLR'S BRIEFINGS ARE TOO VERBOSE; WASTING TOO MUCH TIME COVERING REDUNDANT OR NON-APPLICABLE ITEMS WHILE DIRE AND PRESSING ITEMS LIKE SEPARATING ACFT GO UNATTENDED! THIS RADAR CTLR DOES NOT ACT ON CORRECTIVE SUGGESTIONS FROM PEERS; NOR LEARN FROM MISTAKES! 20 MINS LATER; THE CTLR WAS DOING THE SAME THING AGAIN AND I HAD TO TELL THE CTLR (AS HDOF) TO FIX THE SITUATION WITH A TURN. THIS CTLR'S PERCEPTION THAT THEY CAN RELY ON VISUAL SEPARATION TO SOLVE POOR VECTORING TECHNIQUES IS DANGEROUS. OTHER CTLRS AND I HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE CTLR SHOULD RUN THE ARR FEEDS FROM TAGER FURTHER TO THE W FOR 2 REASONS: FIRST AND FOREMOST; TO REMAIN CLR OF THE CLBOUT CORRIDOR. SECONDLY; THE WIDER FEED ALLOWS FINAL RADAR TO BLEND THAT TFC WITH TFC FROM THE S MORE EFFECTIVELY; INSTEAD OF 'JAMMING' THE FINAL CTLR WITH ACFT TOO CLOSE TO THE FAF. INVESTIGATION OF THIS MATTER CONCLUDED IT WAS SLOPPY; BUT SEPARATION WAS MAINTAINED. I NEITHER CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROB AT HAND NOR THE SOLUTION AS I WAS A SPECTATOR; NOT SIGNED ON OR GIVEN TFC YET.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.