Narrative:

I departed VFR from uncontrolled airport ZZZ2. Contacted approach requesting IFR clearance to ZZZ1. Received transponder code and told to maintain VFR. Continued southbound at 800 ft. Clouds lower ahead of me. Descended several hundred ft to maintain ground contact and VFR conditions. Received another call from ATC (radar contact) but told to stay VFR. At that time ceiling and forward visibility had deteriorated and rather than making turn with high ground on both sides of valley I was in; I told controller I would be entering IMC. He told me I had not yet received an IFR clearance. I acknowledged this and told him I felt a climb through the clouds in IMC was desired for the 'safety of flight.' the controller issued an IFR clearance at which time I proceeded into IMC conditions. The rest of the training flight proceeded without issue. I was instructed to call TRACON and speak with a supervisor. We discussed the matter. I identified the primary mistake made as not obtaining the clearance on the ground. ZZZ2 has no radio contact with approach until airborne so it is common to pick up clrncs in the air. This day I misjudged the time required to pick up an airborne clearance and the extent to which conditions deteriorated to the south. I had other opportunities to correct this situation including turning around earlier and heading back toward the airport. The controller and TRACON supervisor were very professional in all of the following communication. At this point the matter was considered closed. I feel I just learned a good lesson including a need to be more conservative in choices (attitude) and please feel free to share this experience with others. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated the lowest altitude he descended to was about 800 ft. He didn't feel complacency was the issue here; but more surprise that conditions really shouldn't get this bad. He did not plan for nor did he anticipate the WX to deteriorate to this level. He now realizes how easily he got burned by not taking the time to get his clearance on the ground. The problem is with no ATC repeater at the airport; pilots must use their cell phones or get land line clearance and be ready to go within 5 mins. Talking with the ATC supervisor after the fact; the reporter was told that his voice remained so calm that the controller perceive him to be arrogant. He did not feel that way; because he definitely was concerned about his predicament; but thought the best way was to remain calm.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA28 DEPARTED AN UNCONTROLLED ARPT VFR AND WHILE ATTEMPTING TO GET IFR CLRNC ENTERED IMC NEAR TERRAIN. PLT DECLARED FLT SAFETY AND CLBED TO VFR WHILE RECEIVING AN IFR CLRNC.

Narrative: I DEPARTED VFR FROM UNCONTROLLED ARPT ZZZ2. CONTACTED APCH REQUESTING IFR CLRNC TO ZZZ1. RECEIVED TRANSPONDER CODE AND TOLD TO MAINTAIN VFR. CONTINUED SBND AT 800 FT. CLOUDS LOWER AHEAD OF ME. DESCENDED SEVERAL HUNDRED FT TO MAINTAIN GND CONTACT AND VFR CONDITIONS. RECEIVED ANOTHER CALL FROM ATC (RADAR CONTACT) BUT TOLD TO STAY VFR. AT THAT TIME CEILING AND FORWARD VISIBILITY HAD DETERIORATED AND RATHER THAN MAKING TURN WITH HIGH GND ON BOTH SIDES OF VALLEY I WAS IN; I TOLD CTLR I WOULD BE ENTERING IMC. HE TOLD ME I HAD NOT YET RECEIVED AN IFR CLRNC. I ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND TOLD HIM I FELT A CLB THROUGH THE CLOUDS IN IMC WAS DESIRED FOR THE 'SAFETY OF FLT.' THE CTLR ISSUED AN IFR CLRNC AT WHICH TIME I PROCEEDED INTO IMC CONDITIONS. THE REST OF THE TRAINING FLT PROCEEDED WITHOUT ISSUE. I WAS INSTRUCTED TO CALL TRACON AND SPEAK WITH A SUPERVISOR. WE DISCUSSED THE MATTER. I IDENTIFIED THE PRIMARY MISTAKE MADE AS NOT OBTAINING THE CLRNC ON THE GND. ZZZ2 HAS NO RADIO CONTACT WITH APCH UNTIL AIRBORNE SO IT IS COMMON TO PICK UP CLRNCS IN THE AIR. THIS DAY I MISJUDGED THE TIME REQUIRED TO PICK UP AN AIRBORNE CLRNC AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH CONDITIONS DETERIORATED TO THE S. I HAD OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO CORRECT THIS SIT INCLUDING TURNING AROUND EARLIER AND HEADING BACK TOWARD THE ARPT. THE CTLR AND TRACON SUPERVISOR WERE VERY PROFESSIONAL IN ALL OF THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION. AT THIS POINT THE MATTER WAS CONSIDERED CLOSED. I FEEL I JUST LEARNED A GOOD LESSON INCLUDING A NEED TO BE MORE CONSERVATIVE IN CHOICES (ATTITUDE) AND PLEASE FEEL FREE TO SHARE THIS EXPERIENCE WITH OTHERS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THE LOWEST ALT HE DESCENDED TO WAS ABOUT 800 FT. HE DIDN'T FEEL COMPLACENCY WAS THE ISSUE HERE; BUT MORE SURPRISE THAT CONDITIONS REALLY SHOULDN'T GET THIS BAD. HE DID NOT PLAN FOR NOR DID HE ANTICIPATE THE WX TO DETERIORATE TO THIS LEVEL. HE NOW REALIZES HOW EASILY HE GOT BURNED BY NOT TAKING THE TIME TO GET HIS CLRNC ON THE GND. THE PROB IS WITH NO ATC REPEATER AT THE ARPT; PLTS MUST USE THEIR CELL PHONES OR GET LAND LINE CLRNC AND BE READY TO GO WITHIN 5 MINS. TALKING WITH THE ATC SUPERVISOR AFTER THE FACT; THE RPTR WAS TOLD THAT HIS VOICE REMAINED SO CALM THAT THE CTLR PERCEIVE HIM TO BE ARROGANT. HE DID NOT FEEL THAT WAY; BECAUSE HE DEFINITELY WAS CONCERNED ABOUT HIS PREDICAMENT; BUT THOUGHT THE BEST WAY WAS TO REMAIN CALM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.