Narrative:

Upon closing up at the gate; a 'spoiler fail' message was on the EICAS and the speed brake was indicating 'open.' speed brake handle was in closed position. Maintenance was contacted. This failure had been entered in the aircraft maintenance log prior in the day. Maintenance reset the speed brake circuit breakers and the spoiler indicator circuit breaker. They said it was the indicator and that all was good to go. The captain had checked the wings when we initially had the indication. The speed brake and spoilers had not deployed. The aml was balanced all indications seemed good. We departed the gate. The takeoff proceeded normally. Approximately 500 ft off the ground we entered into the WX which was over the entire northeast. We encountered some turbulence. The indication of speed brake open and a failure message again occurred. We decided that we could not proceed to ZZZ2 in this state and that it would be prudent to return to ZZZ or ZZZ1. We informed departure of our dilemma and that we wanted to level off and troubleshoot the problem. ATC asked if we could continue to 10000 ft to clear all the traffic in the busy flight path area. Since there was no impact to aircraft control; that we could climb; that it seemed to be an indicator disagreement error only; we accepted the climb to 10000 ft and requested ATC to vector us in the area of ZZZ/ZZZ1. I was the PF. I continued to fly and communicate with ATC while the captain ran the checklist; contacted dispatch and maintenance control to review the event. Get suggestions on troubleshooting and review the required landing procedure and runway distance needed. We were trying to determine if ZZZ or ZZZ1 would be the best airport to land. We did not immediately declare an emergency since we did not require priority handling. After review with dispatch; it was determined that ZZZ would meet landing distance requirements. We again reviewed the situation at the flight deck level. Decided to declare an emergency at that time and proceed for a flaps 22 degrees landing at ZZZ. All the appropriate information was given to ATC and we requested crash fire rescue equipment equipment to be ready as well. This was only precautionary in nature. We proceeded to ZZZ. Dispatch contacted us again wanting to review the landing criteria again. At this point in time we had been in the air for 20 mins reviewing this in light to moderate turbulence and rain storms. At this point I suggested to the captain that this was enough. If there was any doubt as to a return to ZZZ due to wet conditions; landing criteria or runway length; then let us now proceed immediately to ZZZ1 where runway length was not an issue. Up to this point we only had an indicator error. We had utilized company assets and had contacted everyone to receive input. Since it seemed inconclusive; I felt a return to ZZZ was now out. We discussed this; concurred and proceeded to ZZZ1. Upon transfer to ZZZ1 tower; we again made sure the crash fire rescue equipment would be standing by; reviewed the flaps 22 landing; WX conditions; reviewed speed with the added 10 KT malfunction increment. We landed on runway 4L and proceeded to the gate. I believe we followed all the procedures correctly; from maintenance at the gate to using company resources to troubleshoot in the air. Information flow and CRM was good. Everyone was part of a decision making process. The one item upon reflection was the issue of declaring an emergency. At first we did not declare an emergency. When proceeding inbound we did declare it but I am not sure if ATC realized we did. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the same EICAS spoil fail warning and speed brake open indication that was corrected at the gate before departure came on again at 500 ft after takeoff. The reporter indicated the WX was bad throughout the northeast area and they could not proceed to destination in this condition and decided to divert to a suitable airport. The reporter stated he believed the problem was only an indication and a false warning since the airplane flew normally; but as more time went on; he thought something more serious may happen. The reporter stated the maintenance action taken at the diversion airport is unknown as maintenance has not advised the flight crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB135 ON TKOF AT 500 FT DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO EICAS 'SPOIL FAIL' MESSAGE AND SPD BRAKE INDICATING 'OPEN.'

Narrative: UPON CLOSING UP AT THE GATE; A 'SPOILER FAIL' MESSAGE WAS ON THE EICAS AND THE SPD BRAKE WAS INDICATING 'OPEN.' SPD BRAKE HANDLE WAS IN CLOSED POSITION. MAINT WAS CONTACTED. THIS FAILURE HAD BEEN ENTERED IN THE ACFT MAINT LOG PRIOR IN THE DAY. MAINT RESET THE SPD BRAKE CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND THE SPOILER INDICATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER. THEY SAID IT WAS THE INDICATOR AND THAT ALL WAS GOOD TO GO. THE CAPT HAD CHKED THE WINGS WHEN WE INITIALLY HAD THE INDICATION. THE SPD BRAKE AND SPOILERS HAD NOT DEPLOYED. THE AML WAS BALANCED ALL INDICATIONS SEEMED GOOD. WE DEPARTED THE GATE. THE TKOF PROCEEDED NORMALLY. APPROX 500 FT OFF THE GND WE ENTERED INTO THE WX WHICH WAS OVER THE ENTIRE NE. WE ENCOUNTERED SOME TURB. THE INDICATION OF SPD BRAKE OPEN AND A FAILURE MESSAGE AGAIN OCCURRED. WE DECIDED THAT WE COULD NOT PROCEED TO ZZZ2 IN THIS STATE AND THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO RETURN TO ZZZ OR ZZZ1. WE INFORMED DEP OF OUR DILEMMA AND THAT WE WANTED TO LEVEL OFF AND TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB. ATC ASKED IF WE COULD CONTINUE TO 10000 FT TO CLR ALL THE TFC IN THE BUSY FLT PATH AREA. SINCE THERE WAS NO IMPACT TO ACFT CTL; THAT WE COULD CLB; THAT IT SEEMED TO BE AN INDICATOR DISAGREEMENT ERROR ONLY; WE ACCEPTED THE CLB TO 10000 FT AND REQUESTED ATC TO VECTOR US IN THE AREA OF ZZZ/ZZZ1. I WAS THE PF. I CONTINUED TO FLY AND COMMUNICATE WITH ATC WHILE THE CAPT RAN THE CHKLIST; CONTACTED DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL TO REVIEW THE EVENT. GET SUGGESTIONS ON TROUBLESHOOTING AND REVIEW THE REQUIRED LNDG PROC AND RWY DISTANCE NEEDED. WE WERE TRYING TO DETERMINE IF ZZZ OR ZZZ1 WOULD BE THE BEST ARPT TO LAND. WE DID NOT IMMEDIATELY DECLARE AN EMER SINCE WE DID NOT REQUIRE PRIORITY HANDLING. AFTER REVIEW WITH DISPATCH; IT WAS DETERMINED THAT ZZZ WOULD MEET LNDG DISTANCE REQUIREMENTS. WE AGAIN REVIEWED THE SIT AT THE FLT DECK LEVEL. DECIDED TO DECLARE AN EMER AT THAT TIME AND PROCEED FOR A FLAPS 22 DEGS LNDG AT ZZZ. ALL THE APPROPRIATE INFO WAS GIVEN TO ATC AND WE REQUESTED CFR EQUIP TO BE READY AS WELL. THIS WAS ONLY PRECAUTIONARY IN NATURE. WE PROCEEDED TO ZZZ. DISPATCH CONTACTED US AGAIN WANTING TO REVIEW THE LNDG CRITERIA AGAIN. AT THIS POINT IN TIME WE HAD BEEN IN THE AIR FOR 20 MINS REVIEWING THIS IN LIGHT TO MODERATE TURB AND RAIN STORMS. AT THIS POINT I SUGGESTED TO THE CAPT THAT THIS WAS ENOUGH. IF THERE WAS ANY DOUBT AS TO A RETURN TO ZZZ DUE TO WET CONDITIONS; LNDG CRITERIA OR RWY LENGTH; THEN LET US NOW PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO ZZZ1 WHERE RWY LENGTH WAS NOT AN ISSUE. UP TO THIS POINT WE ONLY HAD AN INDICATOR ERROR. WE HAD UTILIZED COMPANY ASSETS AND HAD CONTACTED EVERYONE TO RECEIVE INPUT. SINCE IT SEEMED INCONCLUSIVE; I FELT A RETURN TO ZZZ WAS NOW OUT. WE DISCUSSED THIS; CONCURRED AND PROCEEDED TO ZZZ1. UPON TRANSFER TO ZZZ1 TWR; WE AGAIN MADE SURE THE CFR WOULD BE STANDING BY; REVIEWED THE FLAPS 22 LNDG; WX CONDITIONS; REVIEWED SPD WITH THE ADDED 10 KT MALFUNCTION INCREMENT. WE LANDED ON RWY 4L AND PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. I BELIEVE WE FOLLOWED ALL THE PROCS CORRECTLY; FROM MAINT AT THE GATE TO USING COMPANY RESOURCES TO TROUBLESHOOT IN THE AIR. INFO FLOW AND CRM WAS GOOD. EVERYONE WAS PART OF A DECISION MAKING PROCESS. THE ONE ITEM UPON REFLECTION WAS THE ISSUE OF DECLARING AN EMER. AT FIRST WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. WHEN PROCEEDING INBOUND WE DID DECLARE IT BUT I AM NOT SURE IF ATC REALIZED WE DID. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE SAME EICAS SPOIL FAIL WARNING AND SPD BRAKE OPEN INDICATION THAT WAS CORRECTED AT THE GATE BEFORE DEP CAME ON AGAIN AT 500 FT AFTER TKOF. THE RPTR INDICATED THE WX WAS BAD THROUGHOUT THE NE AREA AND THEY COULD NOT PROCEED TO DEST IN THIS CONDITION AND DECIDED TO DIVERT TO A SUITABLE ARPT. THE RPTR STATED HE BELIEVED THE PROB WAS ONLY AN INDICATION AND A FALSE WARNING SINCE THE AIRPLANE FLEW NORMALLY; BUT AS MORE TIME WENT ON; HE THOUGHT SOMETHING MORE SERIOUS MAY HAPPEN. THE RPTR STATED THE MAINT ACTION TAKEN AT THE DIVERSION ARPT IS UNKNOWN AS MAINT HAS NOT ADVISED THE FLT CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.