Narrative:

We finally got our opportunity to start the #2 engine with the closure of the service door at departure time. We had also just received the load sheet. It was clear that we were going to take a delay so I was anxious to get the engines going. I called; 'clear on #2?' and the first officer responded; but; in my haste; I had already engaged the started when it registered that his reply had been; 'no.' I immediately returned the engine start selector to 'off/start abort.' the starter was engaged approximately 2 seconds. The first officer said that he did not observe the propeller to have moved. He said the area was not clear; because a ground person (probably the man who had just closed the service door) had been walking too close to the engine (although not directly toward the propeller arc). Given on-time performance pressures; I let myself become too focused on getting things done quickly and not focused enough on getting things done safely. I caught my own mistake. I immediately realized that I had not heard 'clear;' and verified that with the other pilot. The starter was immediately shut off. Engine start was completed when the area was clear. There is little in the way of external controls that can be applied that are not already in place. This is a matter of the individual flight crew member reassessing his performance and priorities then making the appropriate corrections in his approach to the tasks at hand. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that his chief pilot called him in and asked him if he had a problem because his conscientious approach to flying has caused delays and will not allow him to accept an aircraft that is not ready for flight even if that means taking a delay at an out station for maintenance. The chief pilot suggested that he xfer to another base in order to find out how things are done at other places. The reporter felt threatened and coerced into changing his cautious ways.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATTEMPTING TO MEET HIS SCHEDULE; AN ATR 72 PLT ENGAGED #2 ENG STARTER WITH A GND PERSON NEAR THE PROP. STARTER DISENGAGED WHEN PERSON WAS SEEN.

Narrative: WE FINALLY GOT OUR OPPORTUNITY TO START THE #2 ENG WITH THE CLOSURE OF THE SVC DOOR AT DEP TIME. WE HAD ALSO JUST RECEIVED THE LOAD SHEET. IT WAS CLR THAT WE WERE GOING TO TAKE A DELAY SO I WAS ANXIOUS TO GET THE ENGS GOING. I CALLED; 'CLR ON #2?' AND THE FO RESPONDED; BUT; IN MY HASTE; I HAD ALREADY ENGAGED THE STARTED WHEN IT REGISTERED THAT HIS REPLY HAD BEEN; 'NO.' I IMMEDIATELY RETURNED THE ENG START SELECTOR TO 'OFF/START ABORT.' THE STARTER WAS ENGAGED APPROX 2 SECONDS. THE FO SAID THAT HE DID NOT OBSERVE THE PROP TO HAVE MOVED. HE SAID THE AREA WAS NOT CLR; BECAUSE A GND PERSON (PROBABLY THE MAN WHO HAD JUST CLOSED THE SVC DOOR) HAD BEEN WALKING TOO CLOSE TO THE ENG (ALTHOUGH NOT DIRECTLY TOWARD THE PROP ARC). GIVEN ON-TIME PERFORMANCE PRESSURES; I LET MYSELF BECOME TOO FOCUSED ON GETTING THINGS DONE QUICKLY AND NOT FOCUSED ENOUGH ON GETTING THINGS DONE SAFELY. I CAUGHT MY OWN MISTAKE. I IMMEDIATELY REALIZED THAT I HAD NOT HEARD 'CLR;' AND VERIFIED THAT WITH THE OTHER PLT. THE STARTER WAS IMMEDIATELY SHUT OFF. ENG START WAS COMPLETED WHEN THE AREA WAS CLR. THERE IS LITTLE IN THE WAY OF EXTERNAL CTLS THAT CAN BE APPLIED THAT ARE NOT ALREADY IN PLACE. THIS IS A MATTER OF THE INDIVIDUAL FLT CREW MEMBER REASSESSING HIS PERFORMANCE AND PRIORITIES THEN MAKING THE APPROPRIATE CORRECTIONS IN HIS APCH TO THE TASKS AT HAND. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT HIS CHIEF PLT CALLED HIM IN AND ASKED HIM IF HE HAD A PROB BECAUSE HIS CONSCIENTIOUS APCH TO FLYING HAS CAUSED DELAYS AND WILL NOT ALLOW HIM TO ACCEPT AN ACFT THAT IS NOT READY FOR FLT EVEN IF THAT MEANS TAKING A DELAY AT AN OUT STATION FOR MAINT. THE CHIEF PLT SUGGESTED THAT HE XFER TO ANOTHER BASE IN ORDER TO FIND OUT HOW THINGS ARE DONE AT OTHER PLACES. THE RPTR FELT THREATENED AND COERCED INTO CHANGING HIS CAUTIOUS WAYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.